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On the effect of experience:
An experimental approach to delegation and tax compliance
by Viola Saredi
In the field of decision-making under risk, researchers have started to focus
on the effect of information acquisition modality on people’s decisional pro-
cess, by means of a comparison between Decision from Description (DfD) and
Decision from Experience (DfE). A literature review on the topic is provided
in Chapter 1, which analyzes the determinants of the so-called description-
experience gap and its translation into the planning-ongoing gap, according to
which people tend to overweight rare events under description (or planning)
and underweight them under experience (or ongoing decision-making).
In such a framework, Chapter 2 experimentally investigates delegation in
risky choices, in a three-party agency framework. Agents build a portfolio for
their principals by selecting among prospects that are either fully described
or experienced. Nevertheless, principals are given the opportunity to take
over control and build their own portfolio by paying a fee. Principals are
more efficient and ambitious than agents. Such a higher quality of principals’
portfolios is associated to a higher effort exerted in collecting information on
risky options. Principals anticipate this performance difference, but pay a
control fee that is generally excessive and negatively impacts on their final
earnings.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 study tax compliance, by providing a comparison
between the two information acquisition modalities. Specifically, Chapter 3
serves as an introduction to Chapter 4, as it reviews the main theoretical and
experimental literature on tax compliance, by referring to the role of objec-
tive, perceived, and weighted probabilities in compliance decisions. Besides
this, it provides a novel methodological analysis that justifies the adoption of
laboratory experiments as an externally valid tool if sustained by agent-based
simulations in the field of tax compliance. Chapter 4 reports on a laboratory
experiment designed to explore the presence of the planning-ongoing gap in
taxpayers’ behavior, by means of a (self) commitment system for compliance.
In line with overweighting of rare events - i.e., fiscal audits-, planning induces
the majority of people not only to opt for a commitment to tax compliance,
but also to actually comply.
Keywords: experimental economics; delegated choices under risk; decision
from experience; tax compliance; agent-based simulations; external validity;
plannin-ongoing gap
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1Introduction and
Overview of included papers
Behavioral Economics (BE) emerges from the realization that traditional eco-
nomic models are too unrealistic. Standard economic theory deals with ra-
tional agents. These are supposed to be able to fully identify the available
alternatives, their own needs, and the optimal ways in which they can satisfy
them, by means of a sometimes mathematically complex cost-benefit analysis.
In such an ideal framework, defaults, frames, subjective probability weighting,
or learning mode are supposed to have no effect on human choices. Individuals
are able to assess probabilities in a consistent manner, are perfectly aware of
their stable preferences, rationally update their beliefs, and thus are always ca-
pable of maximizing their own interest (Becker, 1976). According to Fischhoff
(1988), neoclassical economists have traditionally taken for granted that peo-
ple optimize their decisions; therefore, their research has never been intended
to test the hypothesis that people actually optimize, rather to identify what
people optimize.
However, in the 1950s researchers started to observe that, in many circum-
stances, economic agents do not adopt those behaviors that standard economic
theory prescribes. This raised the question whether it is correct to assume
that individuals are actually able to solve complex decision-making problems
by means of sophisticated algorithms. This problem was immediately faced by
Herbert Simon, who proposed his hypothesis of bounded rationality (Simon,
1955; Simon, 1956). In this way, Behavioral Economics began to emerge as an
interdisciplinary approach to human behavior. Nevertheless, this rise was not
so immediate and simple. As a matter of fact, in the same period, another
proposal was advanced by the economist Friedman (1953): although individu-
als do not have the formal tools necessary for optimization in decision-making,
they behave as if they do so, just like a billiard player makes ‘his shot as if
he knew the formulas’ (Friedman and Savage, 1948). Friedman was skeptical
about the possibility of observing how people face decision problems, because
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individuals could be unaware of the mental processes involved in their actions.
Departures from rational maximization could be considered as random errors,
which however tend to disappear in the long run. In fact, those who fail to
conform to rational behavior are gradually excluded from markets: only ra-
tional operators can survive. It is, therefore, evident that in Friedman’s view
it was pointless to investigate cognitive the aspects of decision-making.
Nevertheless, through the years much research has been devoted to the
psychological analysis of the realism and plausibility of standard economics.
Probably, the most significant impulse to the development of BE was the
emergence in the 1970s of a new branch of psychology called ‘behavioral deci-
sion making’ (BDM). In fact, according to Dawes (1998), what distinguishes
BDM from other existing approaches to human decision-making resides in the
fact that BDM adopts theories of rational decisions as a reference point from
which individuals’ observed behavior systematically departs. It took the work
of the two psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman to bring BDM
to the attention of mainstream economists. They are probably best known
for the development of Prospect Theory, presented in the Econometrica pa-
per ‘Prospect Theory: An analysis of decision under risk’ (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), and deepened in ‘The framing of decisions and the psychology
of choice’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1985). The two authors point out that
human choices are not always optimal: in this respect, their theory suggests
that individuals’ willingness to take risk is highly reference-dependent, and
affected by probability weighting. Thanks to this, PT has proved its success
in accommodating a wide range of anomalies of decision-making (Kahneman
and Tversky, 2000), by recognizing that decision-makers assess lotteries in
terms of deviations from a reference point and not of absolute wealth state,
for instance.
More recently, Prospect Theory has been challenged in the study of un-
certainty (for applications, see Hertwig et al., 2004; Hau et al., 2008; Hertwig
and Erev, 2009; Gonzalez and Dutt, 2011). Building on the continuum of un-
certainty introduced by Knight (1921) in his seminal book ‘Risk, Uncertainty,
and Profit’, an experience-based approach has been proposed to investigate
how people make decisions when they are not provided with a full description,
but are induced to experience the initially unknown available alternatives. In
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fact, in general, Decisions from Description (DfD) have been operationalized
in the laboratory as choices between monetary gambles: precisely, the PT
approach is adopted with non-trivial choice problems that explicitly describe
outcomes and associated probabilities (as in Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
In contrast, Decision from Experience (DfE) has been defined by Hadar and
Fox (2009) as a situation in which individuals derive an incomplete knowledge
of possible outcomes and probabilities from a sampling procedure. Decision
from Experience is characterized by repeated decisions for which no objective
prior information on payoff distributions is provided. Decision-makers have
to rely on the information collected during the iterated trials. In order to in-
vestigate the difference between a description-based and an experience-based
task, Barron and Erev (2003) explore five different experimental situations
on small feedback-based decisions, and find that experience can lead to the
opposite results of Decision from Description. This gives birth to the so-called
description-experience gap. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider that DfE
should not be considered as an actual challenge to PT, since it may provide a
beautiful tool to study not only risk, but also ambiguity - even if its empirical
sophistication is still missing in modern ambiguity theory.
Since then, a number of both psychological and economic contributions
have entered the always growing body of behavioral economics literature (see
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin, 2011), and this field has become very pop-
ular nowadays especially for its evident policy implications. In his article ‘The
End of Rational Economics‘, Dan Ariely argues that the 2007-09 financial
crisis has negatively affected people’s trust in traditional economic theory:
We are now paying a terrible price for our unblinking faith in the
power of the invisible hand. We’re painfully blinking awake to
the falsity of standard economic theory - that human beings are
capable of always making rational decisions and that markets and
institutions, in the aggregate, are healthily self-regulating. [...]
We are finally beginning to understand that irrationality is the
real invisible hand that drives human decision making. It’s been a
painful lesson, [...]. Armed with the knowledge that human beings
are motivated by cognitive biases of which they are largely unaware
(a true invisible hand if there ever was one), businesses can start
to better defend against foolishness and waste.
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In fact, during the last few years, in an increasing number of countries
(such as the USA, and the UK), new government institutions devoted to the
application of behavioral science in order to redesign and improve public ser-
vices have begun to appear. Building on both psychological and economic
evidence, Behavioral Economics relies on the hypothesis that cognitive biases
may prevent people’s rational decisions. BE focuses on the real decisions peo-
ple make, such as deciding whether to save for retirement, whether to cheat
and to what extent, and so on.
Nevertheless, some researchers are more skeptical about the efficacy of
BE in preventing people from making wrong decisions: as pointed out by
Loewenstein and Ubel (2010), sometimes the behavioral sciences have been
used ‘as a political expedient, allowing policymakers to avoid painful but more
effective solutions rooted in traditional economics’. In order to support this
claim, the two authors report the failure of the American law on posting
calories in restaurants in order to address the obesity issue (see also Hartocollis,
2009).
Figure 1: Behavioral Economics - Analysis on Google Trends
An analysis of what people are looking for on Google seems to support
what Dan Ariely claims: since 2008, in the USA and the UK there has been
a remarkably growing interest in understanding what this field is. Figure 1
shows the relative frequency of researches of ‘Behavioral Economics’ on Google
over the last nine years in four different countries, chosen among the most
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active in this academic field.1 As the result of Google Trends suggests, there
is an undeniable increasing, though oscillatory, frequency (with respect to the
overall quantity of researches on Google) in the USA, Germany, and the UK; in
contrast, in Italy this trend is not so clear, but, at the same time, we observe a
recent renovated interest after an apparent past depression from 2008 to 2011.
Similarly, Figure 2 reports an overview of how many people have been look-
ing for the meaning of BE on Wikipedia over the last nine years in the world.
Also in this case, it is evident that, overall, people’s interest in understanding
the fundamentals of Behavioral Economics has been continuously growing.
Figure 2: Behavioral Economics on Wikipedia
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The same spread consensus is not always found for experimental economics,
which however is one of the main data source of BE. In fact, many economists
are skeptical about the external validity and the generalizability of conclu-
sions and inferences about data collected in the laboratory. A laboratory is
an artificial context: time is compressed, subjects are asked to make unrealis-
tic and unnatural repeated decisions, and the framing is manipulated by the
experimenter. Nevertheless, experimental studies, in the laboratory, as well
as in the field, are possible and valuable. In fact, surveys and questionnaires
are not always reliable, especially with respect to illegal activities (Slemrod
1For the sake of completeness, for the Italian and the German case, the research key
’Behavioral Economics’ has also been translated into Italian and German, respectively. Nev-
ertheless, for none of the two countries a difference in searching trends has emerged with
respect to the English key.
6 List of Tables
and Weber, 2012); on the contrary, experiments allow the combination of eco-
nomic and psychological theory with evidence. Therefore, experiments play
an important role concerning research on tax evasion. Anyway, experimen-
tal results should not be taken as empirical evidence for people’s behavior in
real-life situations. As a matter of fact, people behave differently when they
know to be observed (Levitt, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007). Field experiments
might overcome these limits of the laboratory, but they are not always easily
implementable. Similarly, Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) may
contribute to the development of realistic decision-making models: simulations
allow researchers to observe how a system evolves when heterogeneous, and
sometimes boundedly rational agents are free to interact.
In any case, laboratory experiments may provide a valuable support in
gaining some clear and controlled insights on individuals’ behavior in clandes-
tine activities (defined as any hidden activity, either legal or not, which could
be hardly identified, investigated, and quantified in the field), such as cheating
in general, tax evasion, bribing, or even agents’ behavior in agency dilemmas.
Such experiments allow to carefully study simple dynamics and individual be-
haviors in a highly controlled setting. In this sense, laboratory findings may
contribute to the understanding of the main causes of clandestine activities,
and offer a starting point for new policies fighting against these activities with
the help of a behavioral economics solid background.
Outline of the Thesis
The present thesis relies on laboratory experiments in order to shed new light
on the role played by experience in different decision contexts, also involving
clandestine activities. Experience represents the history of a person: an indi-
vidual undergoing a certain situation, might learn and gather information on
the features of that specific situation. In this sense, experience can be thought
of as a source of information acquisition, opposed to a descriptive full knowl-
edge. As pointed out by Hertwig et al. (2004), in our everyday life most of
us are involved in situations and interpersonal interactions in which parties’
information and past experience play a fundamental role. One example is the
possible disagreement between doctors and patients, which could be due to
the fact that their opinions and decisions regarding risky situations are based
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on information coming from different sources. Patients can learn from descrip-
tion, meaning that they can search for and read even detailed information on
the Web, find official statistics on surgeon consequences, and side effects; the
same statistics are available to doctors. However, doctors can also rely on their
previous training and personal experience: if few doctors have encountered one
of the uncommon side effects, then they might underestimate the probability
of such rare events. Situations of this kind have been experimentally studied
by Hertwig et al. (2004): the effect of rare events on decision-making under
risk depends on how knowledge about their probability is obtained. In line
with this, Weber et al. (1993) demonstrate experimentally that, when asked to
generate a diagnostic hypothesis, physicians rely on their memory, and recent
experience. In fact, the experimentally manipulated availability of a certain
hypothesis induces doctors to generate that hypothesis more frequently. More
in general, it has been shown that decision-making in repeated games is highly
sensitive to recent feedbacks (among others, Erev and Roth, 1998; Cheung
and Friedman, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999).
However, according to traditional economics, no behavioral difference is
expected to emerge if decision-makers personally experience the outcomes of
a decision problem with respect to the case of a pure description of these out-
comes. As exemplified by Malmendier and Nagel (2016), the effect of living
through a depression on financial investment should not differ from the effect
of reading about it; or alternatively, the effect of having experienced unem-
ployment on consumption from the effect of knowing your risk of future unem-
ployment. Nevertheless, the authors analyze individuals’ expectations about
future inflation, and interestingly find that differences in life-time experiences
strongly correlate with differences in inflation expectations. To a similar pur-
pose, Simonsohn et al. (2008) experimentally test whether the same piece of
information is weighted differently only because it is learned from direct ex-
perience: they find that participants’ decisions are influenced more heavily by
the behavior of players they interact with than by others’ behavior that they
simply observe.
Building on such an evidence, this thesis investigates how learning from
experience might influence individuals’ decisions, and aims to provide policy
advice.
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Chapter 1 introduces the main literature on experience-based decisions,
and draws a comparison between Decision from Description and Decision from
Experience, which are applied in Chapter 2-4. In line with this, we provide a
review on the description-experience gap concept (and its more recent trans-
lation into the planning-ongoing gap), and on how experience, as a knowledge
source, affects individuals’ behavior. This chapter is intended to provide an
overview of the main experimental literature critically investigating the na-
ture of the gap. It is shown how the existence of such a gap has been con-
stantly challenged. At the same time, however, the relevance of the laboratory
adoption of an experience-based paradigm to study real-world phenomena is
explained.
Chapter 2 is based on the working paper ’Taking Over Control: An Experi-
mental Analysis of Delegation Avoidance in Risky Choices’, joint with Matteo
Ploner (CEEL - University of Trento). It reports on a three-party agency
problem embedded in delegated risky decisions, by analyzing discrepancies in
risk-taking and decision quality. The usual agency dilemma involves the in-
teraction between an agent and a principal: the agent is motivated to behave
according to his own best interest, and, at the same time, makes decisions on
behalf of the principal, who acts as both employer and recipient of the agent
himself. In our study we distinguish between the two roles of the principal
and thus identify three parties: the experimenter act as an employer, while
the role of agent and recipient are played by experimental subjects. Consider
a bank (employer) where a financial advisor (agent) is hired to provide invest-
ment services to the bank’s clients (recipients), or, alternatively, a hospital
where a doctor has to choose the medical treatment on behalf of his patient,
for instance.
The experiment studies such an agency conflict by providing a better in-
sight into real world decision-making: besides description-based decisions, in
which subjects receive a full description of the decision problem in terms of
outcomes and probability distribution, experience-based tasks are introduced,
since they present relevant similarities with the settings people encounter out-
side the laboratory. The experience condition is characterized by an initial
lack of information concerning the decision problem; however, subjects have
the chance to collect information through sampling (Barron and Erev, 2003;
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Hertwig et al., 2004), in order to make better decisions. Such an experimental
exploration of delegated risk-taking captures important components of every-
day decisions, such as costly acquisition and collating of payoff information
(Rakow and Newell, 2010).
Hence, the aim of the paper is twofold: on the one hand, we verify whether
the way in which the decision-maker collects information (description vs. ex-
perience) affects the outcome of the decision process and a principal’s (or
recipient’s) willingness to delegate; on the other hand, we test whether choices
differ systematically according to whether they have direct consequences for
oneself or for someone else (self vs. other).
We find that subjects deciding on behalf of others tend to make ineffi-
cient investment decisions: principals are more ambitious, and make fewer
and less dominated choices, irrespective of the process of information acqui-
sition. While principals adapt their effort to the complexity of the situation,
agents are reluctant to collect information to evaluate prospects. Principals
predict agents’ poor performance and are ready to pay a substantial fee to
avoid delegation. However, the fee is generally excessive and negatively im-
pacts on final earnings. This research shows that in making decisions on behalf
of others agents’ performance might be very poor: not only, agents’ choices
are not in line with principals’ preferences, but they are also characterized
by a high degree of inefficiency, maybe due to agents’ sloppiness and lack of
effort. However, principals’ evaluation of agents’ performance is even worse:
they are ready to give up part of their final earnings and they end up paying
an excessive fee in order to avoid delegation.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 add to the literature on tax compliance. Specif-
ically, Chapter 3 is based on the book chapter ‘Taxpayer’s Behavior: from
the Laboratory to Agent-Based Modeling’, joint with Luigi Mittone (CEEL
- University of Trento). It serves not only as an introduction to Chapter 4,
but also provides a novel methodological analysis that justifies the adoption
of laboratory experiments as an externally valid tool which might need to
be sustained by agent-based simulations. In this respect, the chapter offers
a review of the main theoretical and experimental literature on tax compli-
ance, by specifically referring to the role of objective, perceived, and weighted
probabilities in compliance decisions. Then, in the field of tax compliance,
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I recall and extend the mediation approach proposed by Guala and Mittone
(2005), by specifically addressing experiments’ external validity, intended to
bridge the gap between experimental systems and the real domain of appli-
cation. By relying on human-calibration for the implementation of realistic
taxpayers, agent-based simulations help test and investigate human behavior.
They tackle the limits of rationality and behavioral homogeneity, which tradi-
tionally characterize theoretical and experimental claims. In order to analyze
the role of simulations in supporting tax experiments’ external validity, three
different approaches are identified and discussed. Firstly, I consider models
focusing on the macro dynamics among heterogeneous behavioral types iden-
tified in the laboratory. From this viewpoint, agent-based simulations allow
researchers to implement and manipulate population heterogeneity in a highly
controlled manner, so that this, and its interaction with other variables, can
be analyzed as a determinant of policies’ efficacy. Secondly, I present models
analyzing micro behavioral patterns observed in the laboratory. Such a micro
perspective allows researchers not only to test and validate experimental find-
ings, but it also helps uncover and understand human cognitive processes and
psychological drivers, which cannot be fully investigated in a purely human
setting. Lastly, a combined approach is considered: this is intended to address
the complexity of the decision environment outside the laboratory, and helps
understand the interaction between micro and macro factors. Hence, this
chapter provides a possible guidance for the adoption of such a human-agent
combination to a policy purpose.
Chapter 4 is based on the journal paper ’Commitment to Tax Compliance:
Timing Effect on Willingness to Evade’, joint with Luigi Mittone (CEEL -
University of Trento). It builds on the experimental evidence of the existence of
a significant difference between planning and ongoing decisions in the context
of tax compliance (see Mittone, 1997). When asked to plan their actions,
people often overweight events with small probabilities while in ongoing (i.e.
real time and, in general, repeated) decisions, they tend to underweight these
events and thus behave as if they ignored them.
More precisely, the chapter tests experimentally the robust presence of
such an inconsistency in tax-payers’ behavior, and, based on this, proposes
the introduction of a gentle rule of enforcement to sustain tax compliance. In
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fact, the availability of a mechanism of partial commitment to compliance is
experimentally tested in a repeated measurements setting: the inconsistency
between planning and ongoing decisions is investigated by offering tax payers
the possibility to commit to automatically pay half of the due tax and then to
decide whether to pay the remaining part with a discount (in return for the
automatic declaration). This allows to investigate whether a (partial and ap-
pealing) enforcement system may induce people to commit to tax-compliance
in the long-term and to stick with their compliance plan. According to pre-
vious results found in the literature, we expect that tax payers, when asked
to decide between (immediate full) compliance and (immediate full) evasion,
underweight the probability of being audited, while they overweight this event
when they need to plan their behavior.
In our research, we identify two main treatments: The Ongoing Treat-
ment - in which subjects can decide every round both whether to adopt the
commitment mechanism for that round, and whether to declare their round-
earnings - and the Planning Treatment - in which subjects can decide every
ten rounds whether to adopt the commitment mechanism for the following
rounds, but every round whether to declare their round-earnings. Experimen-
tal results confirm that ex-ante evaluation and planning induce the majority
of people to adopt a long-lasting commitment - i.e. to choose the condition
under which compliance is more profitable - which, in turn, actually fosters
tax compliance. In contrast, in the case of ongoing decision-making, we find
a less frequent adoption of the (short-term) commitment, and a significantly
lower rate of compliance, as if tax-payers perceived evasion as less risky.
Finally, the Section Concluding Remarks summarizes the results of the
experimental studies, identifies their main limitations and proposes lines of
future research.
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Chapter 1
Literature Review
1.1 Experience as a learning mode
In our everyday life, we have to face choices: some of them are simple, and
require only a negligible amount of information; others have a big impact on
our life and, therefore, require much more time and effort. In many circum-
stances, we make decisions in uncertain conditions: we are not necessarily
provided with all the information we need to choose in an accurate way. In
this respect, not only the amount of available information, but also the infor-
mation acquiring mode is fundamental in determining the decision outcome,
which, in turn, affects our future satisfaction.
Nevertheless, over the last decades, Decision from Description (DfD) has
been the most common pardigm applied to the study of decision-making under
risk. Decision-makers are usually provided with a description of all outcomes
and corresponding probabilities of two (or more) different options; according
to these pieces of information, they are asked to select the option they prefer.
In a very famous example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose the follow-
ing problem: people can choose between (A) a 100% chance of winning 3, and
(B) an 80% chance of winning 4. Thanks to this, the two authors identify the
so-called ‘certainty effect‘: Contrary to EUT, 80% of decision-makers prefer
the sure option A over the risky one B, despite the lower expected value. The
two authors also claim that many people, by doing so, tend to overweight
small probabilities, and underweight moderate and large probabilities. This
finding is one of the main behavioral patterns that Prospect Theory can ac-
commodate (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Nevertheless, as mentioned in
the Introduction, more recent evidence has led to question the reliability and
the applicability of Prospect Theory to real life decisions, and a different and
more ecological paradigm based on experience has been proposed (Barron and
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Erev, 2003). Building on this, many experimental works explore situations
in which decision-makers face small decision problems called ’small feedback-
based decisions’. These problems are characterized by three main properties:
(i) decisions are repeated (or experienced repeatedly), (ii) alternatives have
small and similar expected values, and (iii) decision-makers do not have any
prior information about the payoff distributions, which are, however, simple
- i.e., each option contains only one or two possible outcomes, and are kept
constant during the experiment. Due to this, such problems are different from
those considered in standard decision theory (DfD): as a matter of fact, ac-
cording Decision from Experience (DfE), decisions are not one-shot, outcomes
and probabilities are not perfectly known; information is limited to feedbacks
concerning the outcomes of previous decisions or explorative trials.
For the experimental implementation, decision-makers face the same prob-
lem many times, and, for their decisions, they have to rely on the feedback they
collect through sampling. Each available option is represented by a button:
by clicking on it, individuals sample an outcome from the underlying distri-
bution, with replacement. In this respect, two different main paradigms have
been used (see Figure 1.1). According to the feedback paradigm (Barron and
Erev, 2003), decision-makers sample from all the available options, in order to
gather information on outcomes and associated probabilities. Each sampled
outcome contributes to determine the final payoff, which is constantly updated
and known to the decision-maker. Therefore, in such a process, the individual
has to balance the objectives of exploration - in terms of information gathering
- and exploitation - in terms of payoff maximization.1 These two goals can
be distinguished thanks to the alternative sampling paradigm (Hertwig et al.,
2004), which distinguishes the sampling phase from the choice phase. During
the former, the decision-maker is free to repeatedly sample from the available
options, but none of the sampled outcomes has actual monetary consequences.
The only purpose of this phase is collecting information on the options, so that
the individual can make an informed decision. Whenever the decision-maker
feels ready, he can stop sampling, and move to the choice phase, in which he
1A further specification is required: it is possible to implement either a partial feedback
paradigm - the decision-maker learns the outcome distribution corresponding to the selected
button - or a complete feedback paradigm - the decision-maker learns about the outcome
distributions of the all the options, but the actual payoff is determined according to the
outcome of the selected button.
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selects the option he prefers. He discovers his payoff only at the end of the
experiment.
Figure 1.1: Overview of the choice paradigms designed after
Camilleri (2011)
This figure considers two lotteries (one with 90% chance of winning 10,
and the other with 100% chance of winning 9), and provides a simple
graphical representations of four paradigms, which can be distinguished
according to outcome distribution, number of choices involved, and feed-
back. In the Description condition, full information is provided about
the distributions, only one decision is carried out, and the feedback is
incomplete, as the individual does not know the outcome of the non se-
lected lottery. As for the Experience condition, outcome distributions are
never known, since lotetries are represented by blank buttons; the choice
is single only in the sampling paradigm, and the feedback is incomplete
in both the sampling and the partial feedback paradigm.
Camilleri and Newell (2011b) provide an interesting experimental test of
these paradigms: specifically, they draw a detailed comparison among de-
scription, sampling, partial- and full-feedback paradigm, in order to study
the relevance of making repeated decisions, and the effect of the exploration-
exploitation tension. They find a big difference between the sampling and the
feedback paradigm, proving the relevance of consequential actual choices, com-
pared to the pure exploration characterizing the first phase of the sampling
paradigm.
Anyway, regardless of the specific paradigm adopted, decision-makers have
to explore probabilities and outcomes, by means of repeated draws with re-
placement from an a priori unknown probability distribution. In fact, accord-
ing to Camilleri and Newell (2013), a decision from experience is defined as ‘a
choice situation in which the alternative decision outcomes and their associ-
ated probabilities are learned from observing a sequential sample of outcomes
over time’. In contrast, a decision from description is ‘a choice situation in
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which the alternative decision outcomes and their associated probabilities are
learned from a summary description’.
Over the past few years, such a distinction has become of great inter-
est: researchers have collected substantial evidence showing that decisions
differ according to the process of information acquisition. This is the so-called
description-experience gap, which was initially identified by Barron and Erev
(2003), and replicated with a number of different decision problems (Hertwig
et al., 2004; Hertwig and Erev, 2009; Rakow and Newell, 2010; Hau et al.,
2008; Hau, Pleskac, and Hertwig, 2010; Rakow, Demes, and Newell, 2008;
Ungemach, Chater, and Stewart, 2009): under some conditions, preferences
elicited by applying DfE contradict PT predictions.
1.2 The Description-Experience Gap
During their first investigation, Barron and Erev (2003) replicate the experi-
ment by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), though moving from description to
experience. The basic task is a binary choice between two lotteries referred to
as H (= higher expected value) and L (= lower expected value). This task has
to be performed 400 times with immediate feedback, and the final payment
is determined by the accumulated payoffs (feedback paradigm). Following
the experimental structure proposed by Kahneman and Tversky, subjects are
given two different problems, yet with no prior descriptive information. In
one decision problem, subjects have to choose between ‘L: 3 with certainty’
and ‘H: 4 with probability 0.8; 0 otherwise’. In another problem, which is
created by multiplying the probability of winning in the previous problem by
0.25, they have to choose between ‘L: 3 with probability 0.25; 0 otherwise’
and ‘H: 4 with probability 0.2; 0 otherwise’. In DfD, Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) identify the common-ratio effect, which is an example of the certainty
effect: subjects tend to overweight small probabilities; therefore, a nonlinear
probability weighting function has to be adopted in order to correctly predict
people’s decisions. In the first problem, 80% of the subjects prefer option L
because they overweight the small probability of the bad outcome 0. Similarly,
in the second problem, most subjects overweight the probability of the good
outcome 4, and thus only 35% of them prefer option L over H. In contrast,
when DfE is applied, in the first problem, the mean proportion of H choices is
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63%, but it decreases to 51% in the second problem. Barron and Erev (2003)
explain that this result might be due to the payoff variability effect that they
identify in diverse decision problems. Payoff variability - defined according
to expected payoff difference - is higher in the first problem; therefore, we
observe a decrease in the payoff variability when moving to the second prob-
lem, which impairs expected value maximization. In fact, the proportion of
subjects choosing option H is higher in the first than in the second problem.
In line with this, the experimental application of DfE shows that subjects
tend to underweight small probabilities in both gain and loss domains: rare
events - i.e., those associated to relatively low probabilities - receive less impact
than they deserve according to their objective probabilities. Taleb (2007)
refers to the extreme case, in which the possibility of rare events is completely
ignored, as the ‘Black Swan effect’. But how does direct experience lead to
probability underweighting? In order to answer this question, it is necessary
to take into account two issues: the limited information search (reliance on
small samples), and the recency effect.
As for the first issue, the smaller the number of draws from a payoff dis-
tribution, the larger the probability that the subject will not encounter the
rare event. More in general, small samples cause the rare event to be encoun-
tered less frequently than expected (given its objective likelihood), since the
binomial distribution for the number of times a particular outcome will be
observed in n independent trials when both p (probability of the rare event)
and n (= number of draws) are small, is skewed. In fact, in their experimental
test which relies on the sampling paradigm, Hertwig et al. (2004) observe that
78% of subjects sample the rare event less than expected. This seems to have
a systematic effect on subsequent decisions.
As for the second issue, rare events are less likely to occur right before the
actual decision and therefore less likely to affect the final choice. In contrast,
common events will tend to be overweighted because they are more likely to be
encountered. Hertwig et al. (2004) find that, in general, the second half of the
sample sequence offers a better prediction of subjects’ subsequent decisions.
As it will be treated more extensively in Chpater 3 and Chapter 4, this find-
ing of probability underweighting can be of great interest in order to analyze
and explain subjects’ behavior in tax evasion experiments in which a sequence
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of small feedback-based decisions is involved. Indeed, fiscal audits can be
considered as rare events, whose probability is in general underweighted by
decision-makers since the audit experience is not frequent. In contrast, when
the perception of fiscal audits is artificially manipulated, so that subjects do
not consider them as rare events (for instance, because they are experienced
rather frequently during the first periods of the experiment), tax evasion is
reduced.
However, despite these evident biases affecting decisions, people tend to
rely on small samples for three important reasons, analyzed by Marchiori, Di
Guida, and Erev (2013).
1. People have cognitive limitations: as replicated in the laboratory, people
are presented information for a short period, and they are not able to
store and perfectly recall the whole amount of information they collect
through sequential sampling. Therefore, in repeated decisions people
might be highly sensitive to recent feedbacks (among others, Erev and
Roth, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Cheung and Friedman, 1998).
2. In order to gather information, people have to bear a psychological cost.
In this sense, reliance on a small sample might be optimal, because it
allows to minimize the searching effort. This factor is studied in Chapter
2, in which DfE is intended to replicate an agency dilemma in delegated
decision-making under risk.
3. When evaluating the probability that a certain event occurs, people usu-
ally look for a subset of previous experiences, which are comparable to
the situation they are facing.
Referring back to the characteristics of the description-experience gap,
experimental evidence seems to confirm the emergence of loss aversion under
both DfD and DfE: risky options minimizing the probability of losses are more
attractive than options maximizing expected payoffs. Nevertheless, Erev, Ert,
and Yechiam (2008) find contradictory results. In some cases, subjects deviate
from maximization because of loss aversion, while in many other cases subjects’
choices are led by reliance on small samples and diminishing payoff sensitivity.
Subjects do not make cautious decisions because they have an insufficient
sensitivity to large potential losses.
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As this review shows, over the last years, a growing number of researchers
have tested the description-experience gap in a variety of decision contexts.
For instance, in a recent contribution, Wulff, Hills, and Hertwig (2015) re-
port on a laboratory experiment testing the effect of two different learning
modes people can face when trying to acquire information on online products.
People can either read a summary description consisting of the mean of the
available consumer ratings, or sample individual reviews. Formally, both for-
mats present identical distributional information, but they differ in the way
users experience that information. In fact, summaries present complete in-
formation in one descriptive format (DfD), while individual ratings require a
sequential search (DfE). The authors prove the existence of a substantial de-
cision gap due to the difference between the two learning modes. In fact, they
observe that, when searching through individual reviews, people tend to rely
on small samples of ratings, and, at the same time, they overweight recently
sampled information.
To a similar purpose, together with prof. Matteo Cantamesse (Catholic
University of the Sacred Heart), I am currently conducting a research that ap-
plies a similar comparative approach to the investigatigation of the interaction
between summary rates and sample numerosity in the process of evaluating
a product or a service from online reviews. In fact, not only the number of
reviews a user actually reads, but also the numerosity of available reviews can
have a relevant impact: if fewer reviews are available, then it is more likely
to observe skewed distributions of ratings, or, at least, less representative dis-
tributions. This implies that some products or services may exhibit a higher
ranking, only because they also have a lower number of reviews. This kind
of investigation would provide relevant insights for a better understanding of
how people integrate these two pieces of information, i.e. reviews’ numerosity
and average rating.
Despite the interesting issue posed by the previous experimental example
(see Wulff, Hills, and Hertwig, 2015), in which two learning modes are avail-
able, it is important to highlight that, in many situations, we cannot rely on a
full description of the outcomes of the problem. On the contrary, we need to
rely on our empirical previous observations, i.e. on our or others’ experience.
In this respect, examples provided in the Introduction justify the research
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interest in systematically studying the existence of an experience effect on de-
cisions, compared to the traditional descriptive setting. As pointed out, the
fact of not having a solid, common, and reliable informational background has
relevant consequences: namely, (i) according to the specific experience, people
can rely on misleading samples (i.e., observed samples are not representative
of the true underlying outcome distribution); (ii) most recent experience can
be overweighted; (iii) people might not be able to build an accurate represen-
tation of the frequencies of possible outcomes.
For all these reasons, some authors have extensively studied and tested
in the laboratory the effect of sampling biases, the role of repeated choices,
and the role of probabilistic representation. Hence, their first aim is to ver-
ify whether the description-experience gap can be entirely due to reliance on
misleading samples, and thus it can be simply explained as a statistical phe-
nomenon. In order to understand to what extent the description-experience
gap can be caused by a sampling rather than different probability weight-
ing, Fox and Hadar (2006) reconsider and replicate the experimental analysis
conducted by Hertwig et al. (2004). They find that, when controlling for mis-
leading sampling, results can be explained by Prospect Theory. To the same
purpose, Rakow, Demes, and Newell (2008) introduce a condition in which
subjects’ sampling process is not free but yoked in order to control for sam-
pling bias and recency effects. According to their results, authors reject the
necessity of two separate theoretical models, one for description- and the other
for experience-based choices. This is also supported by Camilleri and Newell
(2009) and Camilleri and Newell (2011a): they investigate the effect of sam-
pling variability, which is inevitably implied by the DfE paradigm. The two
authors focus their analysis only on those trials in which subjects experience a
distribution resembling the true probability distribution underlying the avail-
able options: in these cases, no difference emerges across modes of information
acquisition. Therefore, the two authors point out that the difference across
decision patterns is mainly due to non-equivalent information at the point of
choice - i.e., to the specific sample a decision-maker experiences before mak-
ing a decision. Nevertheless, Camilleri and Newell (2011a) also admit that
description-based models are insufficient to investigate many real-world deci-
sion problems that involve searching, learning, and iterative beliefs updating,
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for instance.
Besides this, Ungemach, Chater, and Stewart (2009) present an experi-
mental analysis showing that the description-experience gap cannot be simply
regarded as a statistical phenomenon. In fact, they force participants to sam-
ple 40 times from each option; participants are free to choose the sampling
order, and also the outcome order is random. However, the authors build
the sampling process such that each participant can rely on a sample that is
representative of the underlying distribution. They report that, even under
these conditions, underweighting emerges, and it is due neither to recency nor
to judgment error. A similar conclusion is drawn by Hau et al. (2008) and
Camilleri and Newell (2011b), who test whether the reliance on very large
samples - i.e., on samples that are likely to resemble the true underlying dis-
tributions - cancels out the description-experience gap. Interestingly, they
find that decision-makers treat and weight probabilities in a different manner
according to the information gathering mode.
In summary, experimental evidence seems to show that, if people receive
perfectly equivalent information under the two conditions, then the gap disap-
pears. However, at the same time, this seems not to be always true. Further-
more, description-based choices sometimes are highly artificial: in real world
decisions, people might not have full information on a given problem, and
they might need to rely on their previous, and inevitably potentially biased,
experience.
Finally, besides this investigation of the effect of sampling biases, re-
searchers have also addressed the issue of information storage, and the issue of
probability representation. As for memory, Hertwig et al. (2004) show that,
according to the ‘narrow window hypothesis’ (Kareev, 1995; Kareev, 2000),
people tend to rely on a limited number of sampled outcomes, which are con-
densed among the latest sampled items. Based on this, the memory order
effect seems to be relevant in explaining the gap. However, in contrast to this,
Camilleri and Newell (2011a), Hau et al. (2008), and Ungemach, Chater, and
Stewart (2009) find that the gap emerges even when memory can play no role
at all. Therefore, it seems that memory might be relevant, but it cannot be
named among the main determinants of the gap.
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As for the role of probabilistic representation, Fox and Hadar (2006) sug-
gest that probabilities might be estimated according to the information format.
For this reason, Camilleri and Newell (2009) run an experiment investigating
probability judgment. Participants are asked to estimate the probability of
each outcome of the different options they face: they find that people tend to
overestimate probabilities of rare events, especially in a description-based task.
In a further experimental exploration, Camilleri and Newell (2011a) confirm
these findings: they reject the hypothesis that the effect of presentation for-
mat on choice is directly mediated by its effect on probability estimates. These
results are in line with many previous observations: people tend to exhibit con-
servatism, which implies overestimation of small probabilities (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Fischhoff et al. (2000) report that teenagers overestimate the
chance of death in near future; similarly, Americans overestimate the proba-
bility that a smoker develop a lung cancer (Viscusi, 1992).
Nevertheless, at the same time, in the experimental and empirical liter-
ature, it is possible to identify underweighting of rare events as a robust
phenomenon, because of people reliance on small samples. One of the first
empirical evidence is provided by the Hungarian physician Semmelweis, who
demonstrated that routine hand washing can substantially reduce the death
rate of maternity patients and of their doctors. Although his experimental
findings were published, no increase in hand washing was observed. In fact,
in many circumstances people behave as if they ignore rare events, because
they believe that such events cannot happen to them. Therefore, as pointed
out by Cooper and Kagel (2003), this evidence suggests that experience might
reduce event weighting even when subjects, in order to make their decisions,
can rely on a summary description (decision under risk); therefore, in such
a case, feedback on previous occurrences - i.e., independent realizations of a
similar event - do not actually add any relevant information (Yechiam, Barron,
and Erev, 2005; Jessup, Bishara, and Busemeyer, 2008).
In this respect, Barron and Yechiam (2009), and Marchiori, Di Guida,
and Erev (2013) focus on the distinction between judgment and choice, and
provide experimental evidence on the so-called overestimating-underweighting
paradox. According to this, in an experience-based judgment and decision,
people overestimate rare events, but then they behave as if they underweighted
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them, exactly like smokers exhibit a low sensitivity to the risk of developing a
lung cancer, but, according to their elicited subjective estimates, they actually
tend to overestimate this probability (Viscusi and Hakes, 2008). Marchiori,
Di Guida, and Erev (2013) show that, even when people are provided with full
and certain information on a given decision problem (for instance, in terms
of objective probabilities), they exhibit a systematic underweighting, mainly
because their decisions depend on the information collected by means of small
and noisy samples of past experiences.
1.3 The Planning-Ongoing Gap
A closely related phenomenon is the so-called planning-ongoing gap, which can
be somehow considered as a translation of the description-experience gap.2
According to this, when asked to plan and evaluate in advance their future
actions, people often overestimate (and overweight) rare events; while in on-
going - i.e. real time, and, in general, repeated - decisions, they tend to under-
weight these events, and thus to behave as if these could be completely ignored
(Yechiam, Barron, and Erev, 2005; Schurr, Rodensky, and Erev, 2014b). Ac-
cording to Schurr et al. (2012), people are more risk seeking and spontaneous
when asked to make sequential and distinct evaluations or decisions (ongoing);
in contrast, their decisions are less affect-driven, when a series of problems are
evaluated jointly (planning).
This underweighting tendency has been identified in many diverse con-
texts: drivers pass on a two-lane road (Harris, 1988); people back up their
computers less frequently than suggested; people buy radios with a detach-
able front panel, but then they do not detach it after parking. Zohar and Erev
(2006) analyze the problem of rare event underweighting by explicitly referring
to the spread lack of compliance with safety rules in many organizations. As
a matter of fact, this kind of setting can be considered as an appropriate field
representation of experience-based decisions: employees repeatedly make the
same decision, and, thanks to the feedback they receive, learn how dangerous
a certain behavior might be. The two authors point out that employees often
seem to be willing to endanger their own well-being, and thus organizations
2People overweight rare events when relying only on description (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), but the opposite pattern emerges when they rely on experience (Barron and Erev,
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004).
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need to invest resources to promote employees’ compliance with safety rules.
In fact, when actually facing the compliance decisions, employees might be af-
fected by the melioration bias (Herrnstein et al., 1993) - the immediate benefit
of an option is emphasized - and the rare event bias (Hertwig and Erev, 2009)
- events associated to a negligible probability are disregarded. According to
this, employees tend to opt for the unsafe behavior: on the one hand, they
observe the immediate and tangible benefit of non complying with rules (such
as, wearing safety glasses, helmets, or ear plugs might require time, and re-
duce the comfort); on the other hand, they underweight the probability of an
accident. In addition, this unsafe behavior is reinforced by positive feedback,
in case no accident occurs while not complying with safety rules.
This evidence shows how experience might lead to inefficiency: in fact,
according to the previous example, though knowing the huge cost of not com-
plying with safety rules, employees prefer to adopt a reckless behavior. In
lottery terms, this seems to imply that experience causes a deviation from
the maximization of expected returns (Erev and Roth, 2014). In this respect,
an interesting way of addressing this issue is proposed by Schurr, Rodensky,
and Erev (2014a), and Erev et al. (2010): in their experimental research, they
study problems related to not obeying safety rules in the workplace. They
observe that workers are aware of the likelihood of rare events (i.e. accidents),
and thus of the importance of such rules, but that, at the same time, they
actually tend not to comply with safety rules, as if they underweighted rare
events. Building on this, they suggest how the planning-ongoing gap can be
exploited in order to offer a solution to employees’ unsafe behavior: it is pos-
sible to build an enforcement system on the fact that workers, when asked to
plan and think about the relevant risks in their workplace, state they want
to behave safely. Specifically, the research by Erev et al. (2010) focused on
doctors and nurses’ frequent violation of the safety rule ‘use protective gloves
while drawing blood from patients’. The authors reported that many workers
that violated the rule were planning to obey it. In this framework, a gentle
enforcement program was introduced to help workers behave in accordance
with their plans: workers were asked to remind the rule to their colleagues.
The implementation of this program led to an increase in the use of protective
gloves. Another demonstration of the potential of this approach can be found
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in the study by Schurr, Rodensky, and Erev (2014a) on the use of protective
gear in 11 midsize factories in Israel. Also in this case, a gentle enforcement
system is used: Supervisors are asked to approach those workers who do not
obey the safety rules, remind them how risky this behavior is, and record vi-
olations. Results show an increase in the rate of safe behaviors from 60% to
more than 90%.
In a similar manner, Chpaer 4 provides an experimental investigation of
the planning-ongoing gap in the research field of tax compliance; at the same
time, it tests the introduction of an enforcement system, intended to fight
against evasion temptation, by relying on planned compliance.
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2.1 Introduction
Traditionally, economic research on risky choices focused on the direct con-
sequences for the decision-maker. Only more recently has attention shifted
to contexts in which an agent chooses on behalf of a principal. From a re-
view of the relevant literature on delegated decision-making a complex picture
emerges: in general, individuals choose differently when deciding on others’
money rather than on their own, but no clear and consistent tendency in
the shift of risk propensity has been identified. Discrepancies across studies
could be due to a mixture of idiosyncratic experimental factors - such as the
risk preferences elicitation method, individual risk preferences, or the incen-
tives structure - which prevent from drawing clear conclusions about the effect
of delegation on risk-taking. Pollmann, Potters, and Trautmann (2014) and
Chakravarty et al. (2011) find that individuals exhibit less risk aversion when
choosing for an anonymous stranger than for themselves. Though opting for
a different elicitation method, Agranov, Bisin, and Schotter (2014) and Hsee
and Weber (1997) provide the same evidence of a decrease in risk aversion
prompted by delegation. Andersson et al. (2014) argue that such a higher risk
propensity when choosing for others may be prompted by a decrease in loss
aversion. On the other hand, Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009) and Kvaløy, Eriksen,
and Luzuriaga (2014) find that people are more risk averse when dealing with
other people’s money. This evidence is confirmed by Bolton, Ockenfels, and
Stauf (2015) and Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider (2015), who however also ob-
serve that individuals tend to be less risk averse when managing other people’s
money in the loss domain.
This research interest is motivated by the fact that in several domains
individuals make choices whose consequences are barely predictable, but which
nonetheless have important implications for others. Choices of this kind do not
always imply a direct link between the outcomes of the delegated choice and
the economic returns of the delegated agent. At the same time, however, the
immediate recipient of the delegated agent’s decisions might not coincide with
the agent’s employer. As an example, doctors working in a hospital choose
medical treatments on behalf of their patients, and bank financial advisors
define the composition of their clients’ portfolios. In such a context, how
2.1. Introduction 29
does a recipient’s willingness to delegate is affected by an agent’s source of
knowledge?
In our research, we adopt the perspective of the aforementioned studies:
delegated agents make decisions for others without a direct economic stake in
the decision. Nevertheless, previous studies consider only the point of view of
the delegated agent and compare decision-making for oneself and for others
only in terms of risk propensity. Generally, no assessment of the efficiency of
the decision in terms of the trade-off between risk and returns is made. To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to explore whether principals
- i.e., passive recipients of agents’ decisions - perceive delegation as efficient
and whether they are actually willing to delegate.1 Arora and McHorney
(2000) and Levinson et al. (2005) study people’s preferences for delegation
and participation in medical decisions, and find that patients’ demographic
variables are among the main determinants of delegation. Nevertheless, they
do not focus on how the doctors’ source of knowledge (previous academic
training vs. direct working experience) might affect patients’ willingness to
delegate.
The present experimental research investigates the agency problem that
characterizes delegated decisions, in which three parties are involved and the
principal affected by agent’s performance differs from the one who has hired
the agent and set the monetary incentive structure to be adopted. 2 In a con-
text where recipients and agents’ incentives are not aligned and the source of
knowledge might be different, we consider both the agent’s behavior, in terms
of risk-taking and decision quality, and the principal’s expectations about the
delegation. The experiment allows us to study conflicts in agency by providing
a better insight into real world decision-making (Koritzky and Yechiam, 2010):
it combines the research on three-party agency dilemmas and the comparison
1Such a willingness is also investigated in the questionnaire and laboratory study by
Botti and Iyengar (2004). Participants evaluate two different sets of imaginary dishes: one
consisting of four sumptuous entre´es, and one of four revolting dishes. They observe that,
in the case of more attractive entre´es, choosers (i.e., those selecting a dish for themselves)
show a higher anticipated satisfaction than non-choosers (i.e., those asked to imagine to eat
a dish chosen by someone else) do. In contrast, in the case of less attractive entre´es, choosers’
anticipated satisfaction is lower than non-choosers’. Nevertheless, this result holds only when
the choice options are more differentiated Botti and McGill (2006), or when actions have an
hedonic goal (i.e., they are made for one’s own pleasure) and not a utilitarian goal Botti and
McGill (2011).
2Following, the term principal will be used to refer to the principal-recipient and not to
the principal-employer, whose role is played by the experimenter.
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between description-based3 and experience-based4 tasks, which present rele-
vant similarities with decision settings people encounter in the real world.5
The aim of the paper is twofold: on the one hand, we verify whether the way
in which the decision-maker collects information (description vs. experience)
affects the outcome of the decision process and a principal’s willingness to
delegate;6 on the other hand, we test whether choices differ systematically
according to whether they have direct consequences for oneself or for someone
else (self vs. other).
In many instances, people facing a decision problem may rely both on
their knowledge from previous training and on their experience. Benjamin and
Budescu (2015) investigate how the learning mode (either by description or by
experience) affects advice giving and taking: they find that advisers learning
from description are more confident in providing information, and, in line with
this, advice from description is, in general, preferred by decision-makers. Ac-
cording to the risk/uncertainty taxonomy by Knight (1921),7 both description-
and experience-based choices can ultimately be considered as decision-making
under risk: even if probabilities are not explicit, they are still measurable (Hau,
Pleskac, and Hertwig, 2010). Risky decisions from experience occupy a middle
ground (Rakow and Newell, 2010). Initially, the probability distribution is not
known, but it can be determined through sampling. In this context, the degree
of experience is defined by the size of the experienced sample: despite prac-
tical difficulties in computations, if people decrease the degree of uncertainty
3This approach is based on prospects explicit and full description (in terms of outcomes
and associated probabilities), and it is the most commonly used for problems involving
monetary gambles.
4This approach (Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Rakow and Newell, 2010)
is characterized by repeated decisions on monetary gambles, and lack of objective prior
information on outcome distributions. Decision-makers have to rely on the information they
collect during the iterated trials.
5To list just a few examples: vaccinations recommendations (Hertwig et al., 2004), daily
decisions to use safety devices (Yechiam, Erev, and Barron, 2006; Erev, 2007), evaluation of
innovation (Rakow and Miler, 2009), and reaction to possible disasters (Yechiam, Barron,
and Erev, 2005; Weber, 2006).
6In both Description and Experience, people usually choose between two (risky) options.
Previous studies comparing these two learning modes in self decision-making show that, in
descriptive settings, people tend to overweight rare outcomes, while they underweight them
in experiential settings (e.g., Gonzalez and Dutt, 2011; Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber, Shafir,
and Blais, 2004; Hertwig and Erev, 2009).
7Knight (1921) introduces a continuum of types of uncertainty/probability, characterized
by different degrees of uncertainty : risky situations where probabilities are defined precisely
are opposed to situations where only estimation can form one’s beliefs.
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sufficiently, they can determine a priori probabilities with precision.8
We present a detailed exploration of the principal-agent relationship in
the context of delegated risk-taking that captures important components of
everyday decisions, such as costly acquisition and collating of payoff relevant
information (Rakow and Newell, 2010). If no specific assumption about agents’
qualification and trustworthiness is made, principals’ expectations can play a
fundamental role: the lack of trust in agents’ commitment may hamper the
emergence of potentially fruitful delegation relationships.
In the experiment, principals build a portfolio of prospects for themselves
(Self ) and, simultaneously, agents build a portfolio for their principals (Other),
choosing from the same set of lotteries. Prospects are either presented to par-
ticipants in a conventional way, as distributions of probabilities over outcomes
(Description), or are experienced by participants (Experience). As the study
is intended to purely address the issue of decision-making on behalf of some-
one else and not to investigate the role of monetary incentives, agents have no
stake in the choice they make on behalf of their principals: they earn a fixed
amount irrespective of their actual decisions. Therefore, the agents’ choices
we observe are not affected by any monetary concern. Under the canonical
assumption of selfish maximization, the choices of the agents are expected to
be quite erratic. Agents have no pecuniary incentive to implement a coher-
ent choice plan and this would reflect in mindless choices, especially when
the choice process is cognitively more demanding (i.e., Experience). How-
ever, previous evidence about delegated risky decisions (see the review above)
and the documented existence of widespread other-regarding preferences (e.g.,
Camerer, 2013) suggest that concerns for principals’ welfare would encourage
agents to make choices that, at the very least, do not explicitly harm the
principal. Andersson et al. (2013) find that a pro-social orientation moderates
agents’ propensity to risk others’ money, even when incentives to increase the
risk on behalf of others are introduced.
Within this setting, we analyze the effort of principals and agents in re-
ducing the degree of uncertainty of prospects and the efficiency of portfolios
8Some studies explore the relationship between the size of the Description-Experience
Gap and the extent of the information gathering process (Hau et al., 2008; Hau, Pleskac,
and Hertwig, 2010; Ungemach, Chater, and Stewart, 2009).
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in terms of mean/variance.9 Furthermore, we allow principals to retain full
control over the portfolio composition and we measure their willingness to
pay to avoid delegation. More precisely, our research is structured around the
following research questions:
Q1 - Does the risk content of portfolios change across experimental conditions
that differ in roles and information acquiring process?
Q2 - Does the efficiency of portfolios change across experimental conditions
that differ in roles and information acquiring process?
Q3 - Do principals exert more effort in reducing uncertainty than agents?
Q4 - How do principals’ expectations and attitudes affect the willingness to
delegate? What drives principals’ desire to take over control?
We find that (1) portfolios built by principals are more ambitious in terms
of mean/variance irrespective of the learning mode. In general, (2) participants
build more efficient portfolios under description; this is especially true for
principals, whose portfolios are caharecterized by a higher degree of efficiency.
In addition, (3) principals adapt their effort to the complexity of the task
more than agents. The lack of effort of agents and the inferior quality of
portfolio delivered is anticipated by the principals, who pay excessively large
fees to retain control over their earnings. They exhibit the strongest willingness
to retain their control when they decide under description and agents under
experience (4).
2.2 Methodology
We observe how principals and agents build a risky portfolio under different
decision settings (Description vs. Experience), and we measure principals’
willingness to pay in order not to delegate by means of a random price mech-
anism (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964).
9To define the efficiency of a portfolio we refer to a mean/variance dominance criterion. A
portfolio is more efficient than another if for a given expected return it has a lower variance
or, alternatively, if for a given variance it delivers higher expected returns.
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2.2.1 Experimental Task
Subjects can play either the role of principal (Self decision-making) or the role
of agent (Other decision-making). At the start of the experiment, each partic-
ipant is informed about his role and is randomly and anonymously matched
with another participant.
Principals are asked to build a portfolio for themselves, while agents are
asked to perform the same task for their principals. Before choices are im-
plemented, every principal states his willingness to pay to retain his portfolio,
instead of replacing it with the one built by their agent (see Figure 2.3).10 Sub-
jects build portfolios by selecting risky options from three multiple price lists
(MPLs).11 Each list involves 10 decisions between a Leftward and a Rightward
prospect, with the former being safer than the latter. The general structure
of each prospect is P = [L, p;H, 1− p] with 0 < L < H and p > 0. Expected
values do not vary across lists, while probability distributions go from p = 0.5
gambles (less risky and very easy to understand) to p = 0.7, and finally to
p = 0.9 gambles (characterized by higher degree of risk and rare events).12
Participants in both roles are asked to build two 30-prospect portfolios la-
beled A and B. Prospects in portfolio B are characterized by larger differences
in the standard deviations of the Leftward and Rightward prospects. In the
following, we adopt the letter of the portfolio and the probability p as labels
to identify blocks of 10 prospects. As an example, A.5 uniquely identifies
prospects of portfolio A that assign probability 50% to the lowest outcome.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 in the Appendix contain a detailed description of the
prospects.
The aforementioned task is common to all the experimental treatments:
the manipulation refers to the way in which prospects are presented. Under
10Bids are collected via a standard BDM procedure: bids must lie between 0 and 1000
ECU, to be deducted from principals earnings. The BDM screen can be found in Appendix
A.
11The choice structure of the present experiment can be considered as a version of the
multiple price list (MPL) format. The only difference is represented by the fact that our
participants do not go through a sequence of three prospect list screens. Instead, they are
displayed a screen for each couple of prospects they are sequentially asked to evaluate. This
was necessary for the implementation of the treatments involving experience. Nevertheless,
couples are always presented in the same order.
12The presence of rare events (i.e. events associated to small probabilities) is relevant
for the investigation of the Description-Experience gap in the context of self-other decision-
making: it is characterized by overweighting of rare events in case of description - i.e., a
higher degree of risk-taking (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) - and underweighting of rare
events in case of experience - i.e., a lower degree of risk-taking (Hertwig et al., 2004).
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Description, the typical decision screen (Figure 2.1) shows only two gambles
and no reference to previous decisions; it includes all the relevant informa-
tion on the two prospects, so that participants knowing both outcomes and
probability distributions can compare them.
Figure 2.1: Typical Decision Screen - Description
Payoff
Under Experience (Figure 2.2), subjects can collect information on each
couple of prospects and select the one that they prefer. The well-established
sampling paradigm is adopted (Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004).
Figure 2.2: Typical Decision Screen - Experience
Each prospect is represented by a button: by clicking on it, participants
sample an outcome from the underlying distribution, with replacement. They
can sample in whatever order and as many times as they like. When confident
enough to evaluate the prospects, they select the one from which the actual
payoff will be drawn. By means of this paradigm, we can investigate the
role of experience on subjects’ decisions, and, more interestingly, introduce
an agency problem, as the clicking task requires agents’ effort in reducing
the degree of uncertainty when making decisions. Hence, on the one hand,
2.2. Methodology 35
we can observe whether including this task in a principal’s decision problem
affects their willingness to pay in order not to delegate. On the other hand, we
can observe how much the principal and the agent are actually interested in
reducing uncertainty. Therefore, the treatments are motivated by our interest
in understanding not only how agent’s behavior is affected by the risk exposure
of a (passive) principal, but also how principal’s expectations and behavior
affect delegation.
2.2.2 Experimental Design and Session Structure
The experiment is based on a 2 × 2 factorial design. On the one hand, we
manipulate the way in which the principal receives information on prospects
to build his own portfolio, since he can either receive a full description of
prospects or discover these, by experiencing the lotteries. On the other hand,
we experimentally manipulate the way in which the agent receives information
about prospects when building their principal’s portfolios.
As shown in Table 4.1, we combine these two factors to obtain four exper-
imental treatments:
EE - Both the principal and the agent decide under experience;
DD - Both the principal and the agent decide under description;
DE - The principal decides under description, while the agent decides under
experience;
ED - The principal decides under experience, while the agent decides under
description.
Table 2.1: Treatments
Agent
Description Experience
Principal
Description DD DE
Experience ED EE
Specifically, the role and mode of information collection are experimentally
manipulated in a within-subjects fashion. Indeed, Figure 2.3 shows that each
session consists of two distinct yet identical parts for the structure, but not
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for the specific prospects: if a participant decides under Description in the
first part (either treatment DD or DE), then he decides under Experience
(either treatment EE or ED, respectively) in the second part, and vice versa.
Because of this within-subject manipulation, two different sets of prospects
are implemented (A and B): in the first part of the experiment, subjects build
a portfolio from one set; in the second part, they build a second portfolio from
the other set (see Table 2.10 and Table 2.11).
Every session includes two questionnaires measuring subjects’ locus of con-
trol and risk attitudes, and a questionnaire for demographics.13 Questionnaires
are administered at the end of the session, before subjects are made aware of
their final payoff. The first questionnaire consists of eight questions from the
Levenson’s IPC (Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance) scale14 (Levenson,
1972), while the second is composed of seven questions from the 30-item ver-
sion of the DOSPERT (Domain-Specific Risk-Taking) scale (Blais and Weber,
2006).15
Figure 2.3: Overview of the experimental structure
Control 
Questions 
and BDM 
trials 
First 
Portfolio 
Principals’ 
BDM 
questionnaires 
Subjects are 
informed 
about final 
payoffs 
Second 
Portfolio 
Principals’ 
BDM 
Each session ends with feedback about participants’ final payoffs. A prin-
cipal’s payoff is determined as the sum of the payoffs he gets in the two parts
of the experiment; it is computed at the end of the sessioh. Payoffs depend
first on the BDM procedure (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964): if the
principal’s bid (i.e. the willingness to pay in order not to delegate) is higher
13An English version of the questionnaires is in Appendix A.
14This scale of internal control products a measure of individual belief in chance as separate
from belief in powerful others: it allows us to determine to which extent subjects believe that
events in their life directly depend on their own actions. Therefore, such a scale is relevant for
the present experimental study, since we observe subjects’ willingness to ‘control’ decisions
on risky events affecting their earnings. We built a sample questionnaire consisting of five
questions on chance and three questions on internal control. Following Sapp and Harrod
(1993), we relied on the Lumpkin (1988) validated brief version of the Levenson (1972) scale,
though excluding the powerful others dimension.
15This psychometric scale allows us to introduce an additional control for participants’
risk taking in specific domains. Given the focus of our research, the sample questionnaire
consists of four financial and three social questions on work situations. Questions regarding
ethical, health/safety, or recreational issues have been neglected.
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than the randomly generated number, then the principal keeps his own port-
folio. According to the BDM procedure, the principals pay a fee equal to the
randomly drawn number. If the bid is lower, then their payoff for that part
is determined by the portfolio built by their agent. At the end of the session,
all selected prospects are played out and the principal is paid according to the
outcomes of the gambles. The agent’s payoff is fixed: it does not depend on
the decisions made on behalf of their principal and it is line with the usual
average payment that subjects receive in our laboratory.
2.2.3 Participants and Procedure
The experiment was run at CEEL (Cognitive and Experimental Economics
Laboratory) of the University of Trento (Trento, Italy), and participants were
recruited among undergraduate students or recent graduates (of the same
university), who previously subscribed to CEEL’s database. The experiment
was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Overall,
we conducted eight sessions.
In total, 156 participants took part in the experiment: 78 subjects (43
males, and 35 females) in both treatment EE and DD, while the remaining 78
subjects (40 males and 38 females) in ED and DE. The average age was 22.10
(s.d. = 2.565). Most of the participants (72%) were students of Economics,
4% of Law, 5% of Engineering, 5% of Humanities, 9% of Social Sciences, 2.5%
of Mathematics and Hard Sciences, and 2.5% had recently graduated. None of
the participants was informed about the purpose of the experiment and every
subject was allowed to participate only once.
Upon their arrival in the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned
to a computer, and asked to sit in cubicles. They were provided with the
instructions of the entire experiment and were informed that the experiment
was composed of two independent parts. Subjects were given time to read the
instructions individually. Then, instructions were read aloud by one of the
experimenters. Before the experiment started, participants answered a few
questions about the experimental rules, and were given the opportunity to
play three trial BDMs, which did not affect final payoffs. This was intended
to check participants’ comprehension, both of the experimental instructions
and of the bidding mechanism.
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In both the software and the instructions we employed non-loaded termi-
nology, such as “Participant 1” (for principals), “Participant 2” (for agents),
and “prospect”. This is intended to rule out any context-related effect, and
make our results more generalizable and valid in a variety of frameworks in-
volving delegated risk-taking.
Each session lasted about 50 minutes. As for the payoffs, Participants 1
received 3 Euros as a show-up fee, plus a sum that varied according to their
decisions (or, as appropriate, according to the decisions of their agent). In
the end, this sum was converted into Euro and rounded up or down to the
nearest ten euro-cent (1000 ECU = 2 Euros). On average, these participants
earned 14 Euros (with a maximum of 16.90 Euros, and a minimum of 9.70
Euros, show-up fee included). Participants 2 earned a fixed amount of 13
Euros (show-up fee included).
2.3 Results
Experimental data are presented in two steps. First (in Sections 3.1-3.3), we
present a statistical descriptive analysis of participants’ portfolios: we compare
subjects’ choices across treatments and roles. Also, we consider the level of
effort expended by both principals and agents in the process of information
gathering, as well as principals’ desire for control. Second (in Section 4.5.2),
we present a regression analysis.
2.3.1 Analysis of Risk and Efficiency in Decisions
Figure 2.4 reports participants’ portfolio decisions, keeping distinct both the
role and the information process. Each panel reports the frequency of choice
for the Rightward prospect in each of the 10-prospect Multiple Price Lists (see
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 in the Appendix for more details). The dashed line shows
the choice pattern of a risk-neutral decision maker.
The distribution of agents’ decisions in each MPL is systematically flatter
and more stable. Compared to principals, agents choose fewer “ambitious”
Rightward prospects beyond the risk-neutrality switching point and are more
likely to choose dominated prospects before this. In this respect, an analysis
of individual frequencies of Rightward prospects selected in Prospect # 1
(where the Leftward prospect always stochastically dominates the Rightward
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Figure 2.4: Prospect Choice
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prospect) shows interesting differences. Agents choose more frequently the
dominated Rightward prospect than principals, both in Experience (WRT,
p − value < 0.001) and in Description (WRT, p − value < 0.001).16 Overall,
compared to description, experience seems to lead to a more frequent selection
of dominated prospects (Table 2.2). This is especially true for agents (WST,
16All tests are two-sided, if not specified. WRT stands for Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, while
WST stands for Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test.
40 Chapter 2. Taking Over Control
p− value = 0.005), while only a marginally significant difference emerges for
principals (WST, p− value = 0.078).
Table 2.2: Relative frequency of dominated choices -
Prospect # 1
Other Self
Description 0.248 0.017
Experience 0.350 0.051
Result 1a - Agents tend to make systematically more dominated choices than prin-
cipals. Agents perform significantly worse under Experience than under
Description.
Building on this evidence, we perform a more detailed analysis of risky
choices, measuring both the expected return (µPF ) and the standard deviation
(σPF )
17 of every 10-prospect portfolio in a MPL.18
A summary of average expected portfolio returns and standard deviations
across 10-prospect MPL portfolios is reported in Table 2.3.19 Principals tend
to build more ambitious portfolios (higher return µ and degree of risk σ) under
Description than under Experience: this is more evident in Set A (WST on
µ: p − value < 0.001; WST on σ: p − value < 0.001) than in Set B. In
contrast, no clear tendency emerges for agents’ portfolios: in Set A, they are
slightly more ambitious under Description than under Experience (WST on
µ: p − value = 0.064; WST on σ: p − value = 0.202), while the opposite is
observed in Set B, yet not systematically.
The identification of these measures (µ and σ) also allows us to draw a com-
parison among portfolios according to the mean-variance efficiency criterion.20
17The portfolio’s expected return µPi =
∑30
i=1 wPiµPi is defined as the weighted average
of expected returns of every prospect Pi selected from the three MPLs. The portfolio’s
standard deviation σPi =
√∑30
i=1 w
2
Pi
σ2Pi is determined as the square root of the weighted
average of variances of every prospect Pi (since the covariance across prospects is assumed
to be null, the component
∑
Pi
∑
Pj 6=Pi wPiwPjσPiσPjρPiPj is omitted).
18We focus on portfolio choices at the MPL level instead of focusing on 30-prospect portfo-
lios A and B, to account for the nature of the experimental task: participants were choosing
in a MPL without knowing the nature of prospects in the following MPL. Because of this
they could not develop a global portfolio strategy.
19The same analysis for each MPL can be found in Appendix B (Table 2.7).
20Every portfolio PˆF is non-dominated by another portfolio PF either when σPˆF < σPF
or when σPˆF ≥ σPF and µPˆF ≥ µPF .
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Table 2.3: Portfolios’ Average Expected Returns and Stan-
dard Deviations
Other-Des Other-Exp Self-Des Self-Exp
A
µ 78.973 (9.454) 76.162 (8.467) 83.385 (5.788) 78.652 (7.028)
σ 24.015 (14.27) 22.049 (12.535) 28.87 (12.102) 24.567 (12.769)
B
µ 93.824 (8.995) 94.483 (8.019) 99.514 (5.213) 97.906 (6.000)
σ 24.892 (13.767) 24.535 (14.759) 30.188 (13.019) 28.413 (12.976)
Notes: For every set, role and mode of information acquisition, we compute the portfolio’s average
expected returns (µ) and standard deviations (σ). Corresponding standard deviations are in
parentheses.
In our analysis we consider separately each of the 10-prospect sub-portfolios,
as exemplified in Figure 2.5.21
Figure 2.5: Portfolios in the mean/variance space - MPL B.9
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Beside confirming that principals’ portfolios are characterized by higher
returns and risk, especially under Description, the analysis shows that these
are also closer to the efficiency frontier (gray line) of observed non-dominated
choices.
Table 2.4 reports the overall frequency of dominated and non-dominated
21A complete graphical representation of all MPLs can be found in Appendix B (Figure
2.24).
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choices in all 10-prospect sub-portfolios.22 It is evident that experience leads
to a lower degree of efficiency:23 irrespective of the role, the proportion
of dominated portfolios is significantly higher under Experience than un-
der Description (WST on principals: p − value < 0.001; WST on agents:
p − value < 0.001).24 Nevertheless, it emerges, at the same time, that the
proportion of dominated portfolios is systematically higher for agents than for
principals (WRT under Description: p − value < 0.001; WRT under Experi-
ence: p − value < 0.001). Principals are generally able to build an efficient
portfolio under Description, while seem to face some difficulties in doing so
under Experience. In contrast, the majority of agents’ portfolios is not efficient
even under Description, where the prospect evaluation process is assumed to
be simpler. The degree of inefficiency is dramatically high under Experience.
Table 2.4: Overall Portfolio Efficiency
% Dominated Portfolios Non-Dominated Portfolios
Other-Des 55.1 44.9
Other-Exp 73.5 26.5
Self-Des 31.2 68.8
Self-Exp 52.6 47.4
Result 1b - Principals choosing under Description build more ambitious and effi-
cient portfolios. The majority of portfolios built by agents are not effi-
cient.
2.3.2 The Portfolio Building Process: Effort Analysis
The clicking task can be intended to mimic the effort that a decision-maker
exerts to perform an informed prospect selection. Figure 2.6 provides us with
a visual analysis of both principals and agents’ average effort in reducing the
degree of uncertainty across MPLs.
AS expected, if no monetary incentive is involved, agents invest signifi-
cantly less in exploring lotteries than principals do (WRT on list B.5: p −
value = 0.035; WRT on list B.7: p − value < 0.001; WRT on list B.9:
p − value < 0.001; WRT on list A.9: p − value = 0.037). Specifically, the
22Table 2.8 in the Appendix reports the frequency of dominated/non-dominated choices
in each of the 10-prospect sub-portfolios.
23A more detailed analysis can be found in Appendix B (Table 2.8)
24All tests are performed on averages at the individual level to preserve statistical inde-
pendence.
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Figure 2.6: Clicking Process - Effort Task
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higher the degree of heterogeneity in the probability distribution, the more
the difference becomes evident. Indeed, the average level of effort exerted by
agents is quite stable and similar across MPLs. In contrast, principals’ effort
gradually increases when moving from the first to the third MPL of the same
set (see Figure 2.25 in Appendix B), i.e. when inferring the right underlying
probability distribution becomes more complex because of the presence of rare
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events (p = .9). Furthermore, the difference in effort is stronger in Set B than
in Set A, with the former displaying larger differences in the standard deviation
of the Rightward and Leftward prospects than the latter. When pooling data
irrespective of the set and the probability associated to the lowest outcome,
Agents click on average 6.6 times for each choice, while Principals click 9 times,
on average. A test on individual-level data shows that the overall difference
in clicking between the two types is highly significant (WRT, p-value< 0.001)
Result 2 - Principals exert higher effort than agents do. The difference in effort
is significantly larger for the set with higher variance and for prospects
characterized by rare events.
2.3.3 Investment in Delegation Avoidance
Now we consider principals’ willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid delegation,
which, as shown by Table 2.5, is generally very high.
In general, principals prefer to make decisions on their own. One possible
explanation is that they correctly predict the degree of risk and inefficiency
characterizing agents’ portfolios. Accordingly, they are willing to pay a sub-
stantial fee, which decreases their potential earnings, in the end. This is true
both when the information process is asymmetric (Treatment DE and ED)
and when it is symmetric (Treatment EE and DD), even if Table 2.5 shows
the willingness to avoid delegation is lower in this case.
Table 2.5: WTP to avoid delegation
Treatment Mean St. Dev.
EE 444.10 260.39
DD 503.33 231.49
DE 615.89 225.34
ED 517.17 231.25
Principals’ WTP reveals a strong distaste for the Experience condition rel-
ative to the Description condition. This is true not only in case of principals’
description, but also in case of agents’ description. In fact, at an aggregate
level, principals’ willingness to pay in DE is higher than in EE (WRT: p-value
= 0.0014) and in DD (WRT: p-value = 0.0096). Similarly, their willingness to
pay is higher in ED than in EE, yet with no statistical significance. This allows
us to rule out the notion that principals prefer to keep their portfolios only
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because they have exerted a positive and substantial effort in gathering infor-
mation to reduce uncertainty. Principals do not feel too confident in making
decisions under Experience, and thus they are less willing to pay in order to
retain their portfolios. Since they cannot rely on objective distributions but on
evaluations, they are more ready to incur the risk embedded in agents’ port-
folios. For the same reason, their desire to take over control increases when
agents face the Experience condition. As a result of the combination of these
two effects, principals’ willingness to pay is systematically higher in treatment
DE than in ED (WRT: p-value = 0.0089), and no significant difference emerges
when comparing DD and ED.
Result 3 - Principals reveal the strongest desire to take over control when they
decide under Description and agents decide under Experience. The de-
sire to take over control is at its minimum level when both decide under
Experience.
With respect to Result 3, it is interesting to note that the lowest proportion
of inefficient portfolios is actually identified among principals’ portfolios built
under Description, while the highest proportion of inefficient portfolios among
those built by agents is identified under Experience (see Table 2.4). This means
that the highest principals’ willingness to pay is found in the treatment where
the efficiency difference between principals and agents’ portfolios is maximized.
As a matter of fact, since they are not explicitly incentivized, agents do not feel
like collecting information, when no full description is provided: the quality of
their decisions is quite low, even if they know that, by default, their portfolios
will determine principals’ payoffs. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that
principals seem to overinvest in delegation avoidance, overall. A comparative
analysis of portfolios’ expected returns shows that in every treatment but
ED principals might get higher expected earnings from their own portfolios.25
However, irrespective of the treatment and the lottery group, principals would
systematically earn more by delegating rather than paying the premium they
choose (WRT: p-value < 0.01).
25For the sake of completeness, we introduce a distinction among lottery sets, and we
always observe a significant difference in Set B (WRT on DD: p-value< 0.05; WRT on
EE: p-value< 0.1; WRT on DE: p-value< 0.05). As for Set A, principals’ portfolios ensure
higher expected returns only when the principal decides under Description (WRT on DD:
p-value< 0.1; WRT on DE: p-value< 0.001)
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2.3.4 Regression Analysis
Table 2.6 reports a regression analysis concerning the determinants of par-
ticipants’ behavior. Four different dependent variables are considered and,
accordingly, four different estimates are reported: Model (1) takes as its depen-
dent variable the expected returns of the 10-prospect subportfolios (MPLs);
Model (2) focuses on determinants of non-dominated sub-portfolios; Model
(3) focuses on clicking effort; Model (4) analyzes determinants of principals’
BDM bids. In Model (1), Model (3), and Model (4) estimates are obtained
via a Linear Mixed Model (LMM). In Model (2) a Generalized Linear Mixed
Model (GLMM) Logit is adopted, given the dichotomous nature of the depen-
dent variable.
Among explanatory variables, Portfolio St. Dev. controls for the risk of
each sub-portfolio. The first treatment dummy variable is Self : it is equal
to 1 when the portfolio is built by a principal, otherwise it is 0. The other
treatment dummy is Experience: it is equal to 1 if the portfolio is built
under Experience, and equal to 0 if built under Description. The effect of the
interaction between these two variables is estimated by introducing the term
Self&Experience.
The dummy Set B takes value 1 when the list from which lotteries are
selected belongs to Set B, instead of Set A. Dummy variables Prob 0.7 and
Prob 0.9 take into account the probability distribution of the ten prospects
included in a portfolio (either 0.70/0.30 or 0.90/0.10). In Model (3) the vari-
able Rightward Prospect is equal to 1 for clicks on the riskier button, and
to 0 for clicks on the safer button; the dummy EV+ takes value 1 when the
expected return of the clicked prospect is higher than that of the alternative.
In Model (4), Agent Des and Principal Des capture choices in which the
Agent and the Principal are in the Description condition, respectively. The
dummy variable Non Dominated takes value 1 in case of an efficient portfolio
and 0 in case of a dominated one.
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Table 2.6: Regression analysis
Portfolio Return ND Portfolio Searching Effort Control Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Portfolio Return 0.503 (3.899)
Portfolio St. Dev. 0.535 (0.013)∗∗∗ −3.299 (4.342)
Non Dominated −8.568 (18.576)
Set B 15.999 (0.206)∗∗∗ −0.830 (0.153)∗∗∗ −0.630 (0.675) −16.827 (76.575)
Self 2.357 (0.487)∗∗∗ 1.257 (0.279)∗∗∗ 2.445 (0.674)∗∗∗
Experience −0.447 (0.289) −1.077 (0.222)∗∗∗
Prob 0.7 −1.864 (0.258)∗∗∗ 0.290 (0.184) −0.302 (0.170)◦
Prob 0.9 −10.332 (0.359)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.184) 2.127 (0.170)∗∗∗
Self&Experience −1.098 (0.409)∗∗ −0.054 (0.305)
Rightward Prospect 2.221 (0.139)∗∗∗
EV+ −1.749 (0.156)∗∗∗
Principal Des 78.870 (35.065)∗
Agent Des −26.040 (30.993)
Constant 69.367 (0.432)∗∗∗ 0.062 (0.234) 6.391 (0.604)∗∗∗ 508.551 (306.106)◦
Observations 936 936 9360 156
Num. groups: ID 156 156 156 78
Fitting model LMM GLMM(Logit) LMM LMM
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.1
Model (1) confirms that principals extract significantly higher returns, yet
at a higher risk, from their portfolios than agents do: in fact, both the dummy
variable Self, and the variable Portfolio St. Dev. are highly significant. The
interaction term Self&Experience confirms that the negative impact of expe-
rience on returns is stronger for principals than for agents. Model (2) shows
that principals are more likely to choose non-dominated prospects, and that, in
general, the Experience condition and the Set B variable both lead towards a
greater degree of inefficiency. Model (3) confirms that principals explore more
than agents. Riskier prospects seem to induce more search, which, however,
decreases for prospects with larger EV relative to the alternative. Finally,
Model (4) shows that principals are ready to pay a higher payoff premium
when they are in the Description condition than when they are in the Experi-
ence condition, but they do not discriminate between the conditions faced by
their agents.
In the Appendix (see Table 2.9), we report the outcomes of a regression
analysis which replicates the analysis of Table 2.6, but adds several further
control variables for idiosyncratic features of the participants. Specifically, we
control for gender, enrollment in the economics program (a dummy variable
Economics that takes value 1 when the participant is a student of economics),
locus of control (Levenson variable), and risk attitude (Dospert variable).
In terms of main explanatory variables, the analysis corroborates the results
reported above. In terms of the impact of the control variables, it is interesting
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to observe that those with higher scores in the Levenson test are more likely to
choose a dominated portfolio and that females pay higher fees to retain control
over their portfolio composition. This gender effect might be due to the fact
that females seem to value the act of choosing more than males, especially in
service purchases (Mattila, 2010). An alternative or additional explanation
can be related to the emphasis females usually put on voice in interpersonal
decision process (McColl-Kennedy, Daus, and Sparks, 2003).
2.4 Conclusions
We show that the mode of information acquisition produces a systematic ef-
fect not only on choice performance but also on the emergence of delegation
itself. Overall, participants exhibit a worse performance under Experience
than under Description: they face a more complex decision situation in which
their direct willingness to gather and collate information affects the underlying
degree of uncertainty.
A novel result of our research concerns agents’ and principals’ decision
quality. The great majority of subjects deciding on behalf of someone else
make dominated decisions: especially when information sampling is required,
agents select prospects ensuring an inefficient combination of risk and expected
returns. Since their final payoff is not linked to their decisions, agents seem
unwilling to exert effort in acquiring information on prospects’ probability dis-
tributions. This might be one of the causes of agents’ poor performance as
compared to that of principals, under Experience.26 Nevertheless, a perfor-
mance discrepancy also emerges under Description, where sampling errors can
play no role at all: the quality of agents’ decision-making improves when they
are provided with full information, though it still falls short of that exhibited
by principals faced with full information. In fact, irrespective of the process
of information acquisition, principals make more ambitious and efficient deci-
sions, even if, to a certain extent, the experience framework affects negatively
also their performance. Our study mimics ubiquitous real-world situations in
which the decisions of the agent have consequences for another individual but
not for the agent themselves: this is not only the case of financial decisions,
26Only principals sample more than what observed in other studies involving decision from
experience for binary lotteries (see Hau, Pleskac, and Hertwig, 2010).
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but also of medical decisions, for instance. Understanding how to optimally
design incentives in delegated risky choices goes beyond the scope of our study,
but may represent an interesting venue for future research.
A further result concerns the effect of experience on principals’ confidence
in delegation: principals tend to show a preference for the decision setting that
involves prospects’ full description. The control premium is highly positive: it
is larger when agents learn from experience, and it is orthogonal to the main
characteristics of principals’ portfolios (expected returns, standard deviations,
and dominance). This result is in line with a questionnaire study by Botti and
Iyengar (2004): they report that, when facing a decision problem, people prefer
making their own decisions, instead of having their decisions either dictated
by someone else or determined by a random device.
This confirms the relevance of agents’ process of information acquisition:
agents learning in a more uncertain environment are less likely to be trusted
with delegation. Therefore, besides the inefficiency issue, which might be
addressed by means of monetary incentives, agents need to understand how to
attract customers. They may decrease principals’ unwillingness to delegate,
leveraging on their own reliability: they can make decisions based on solid
knowledge, not on vague evaluations. In this framework, experience as a
learning mode can help improve agents’ reliability, when combined with a
valid training: in fact, customers or patients’ delegation decision may also
depend on information such as the place where the agent has graduated or
previously worked. Future research might focus on the effect of combining the
two sources of knowledge.
Missed delegation relationships are detrimental both to agents and to prin-
cipals, who overestimate the difference between their own performance and
that of agents. In our study, principals’ portfolios tend to ensure higher ex-
pected returns, but, at the same time, principals are willing to pay an excessive
control premium to enact their decisions and avoid delegation: despite agents’
inefficiency, they could earn more by delegating than by paying to retain con-
trol over their outcomes.
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2.5 Appendix A - Experimental Instructions
This is a translated version (originally in Italian) of the instructions used
for the experimental sessions. Instructions change according to the treatment.
This will be indicated in the text. As for the within-subject manipulation:
Treatment T1 (either first or second part) has been paired with Treatment T2
(either first or second part); Treatment T3 (either first or second part) has
been paired with Treatment T4 (either first or second part).
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome,
Thank you for coming. You are going to take part in an experiment on
economic decisions. For arriving on time, you will receive 3 Euros at the end
of the experiment.
Following you will be given instructions for the experiment. Please, read them
carefully. May you have any doubt, raise your hand and a member of the
experimental staff will come to answer your question.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants. If
you disturb your colleagues or use the computer for activities not strictly re-
lated to the experiment, you will be excluded from the experiment and any
reward. You can trust that what happens during the experiment is in line
with the following instructions.
The experiment consists of two independent parts.
You will be randomly assigned a role (either Participant 1 or Participant 2 ),
that will remain unchanged during the entire experimental session (including
both the first and the second part). If you are a Participant 1, you will be
asked to make decisions for you, i.e. decisions that will affect only your own
payoff. On the contrary, if you a Participant 2, you will be asked to make
decisions for another participant, i.e. decisions that will affect only the payoff
of this participant and not your own payoff.
Every Participant 1 will be randomly assigned to one of the Participants 2, so
that to each Participant 2 corresponds one (and only one) Participant 1.
Both the first and the second part of the experiment consists of two se-
quential decision phases for those playing the role of Participant 1, while they
consist of only one phase for those with the role of Participant 2.
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In the end, you all will be asked to answer a brief questionnaire, and you will
be informed of your final payoff, which is determined as the sum of the payoffs
you get during the first and the second part of the experiment.
Following, you will find the experimental instructions. You will be given
five minutes to read them. Instructions will be then read aloud by a staff
member; you will be asked to answer few simple questions on instructions
comprehension.
During the experiment, ECU (Experimental Currency Units) will be used
to express your earnings. At the end of the experimental session, the ECU
you will have earned are converted in Euros (and rounded to the nearest ten
euro-cent) in order to determine your real payoff (1000 ECU = 2 Euros).
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INSTRUCTIONS: FIRST PART
At the beginning of this part of the experiment, you will be informed of
your role.
Treatment DD
Participant 1
- First Decision Phase: You will be asked to make 30 decisions that will
affect your payoff. These decisions are divided into three subsets: there-
fore, each of them consists of 10 decisions. You will (sequentially) go
through 30 couples of prospects, and you will have to choose the prospect
you prefer (between Left Prospect and Right Prospect) for each of the
30 couples. In general, a prospect offers an outcome T with probability
p and an outcome B with probability 1-p. The value of T and B can
vary for every prospect. Outcomes are in ECU.
Following, you can find an example of a couple of prospects. For each
couple, click on the SELECT button corresponding to the prospect you
prefer.
Figure 2.7: Participant 1 Decision Task - First Part - Exam-
ple
In the meanwhile, your Participant 2 will decide on the same prospects.
Therefore, you both will be asked to make 30 decisions on the same
list of prospects. However, Participant 1’s decisions will affect only his
own payoff, while Participant 2’s decisions will affect the payoff of the
corresponding Participant 1.
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Treatment EE
Participant 1
- First Decision Phase: You will be asked to make 30 decisions that will
affect your payoff. These decisions are divided into three subsets: there-
fore, each of them consists of 10 decisions. You will (sequentially) go
through 30 couples of prospects, and you will have to choose the prospect
you prefer (between Left Prospect and Right Prospect) for each of the
30 couples. In general, a prospect offers an outcome T with probability
p and an outcome B with probability 1-p. The value of T and B can
vary for every prospect. All outcomes are in ECU.
Consider that, in the beginning, you will not receive any information
about the prospects. However, you will have the opportunity to collect
the information you might need to make your decisions. For this reason,
every prospect will be represented by a button: therefore, for each of
the 30 decisions, two buttons (one for the Left Prospect and one for
the Right Prospect) will appear on your screen. Every time you click
on one of them, you will be immediately informed about the payoff you
would have received by choosing the corresponding prospect (according
to the outcome and probability distributions associated to that specific
prospect). You can continue to click until you feel confident enough to
choose. At this point, click on the SELECT button corresponding to the
prospect you prefer. Following, you can find an example of a couple of
prospects.
Figure 2.8: Participant 1 Decision Task - First Part - Exam-
ple
In the meanwhile, your Participant 2 will decide on the same prospects
(presented as buttons). Therefore, you both will be asked to make 30
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decisions on the same list of prospects. However, Participant 1’s deci-
sions will affect only his own payoff, while Participant 2’s decisions will
affect the payoff of the corresponding Participant 1.
Treatment ED
Participant 1
- First Decision Phase: You will be asked to make 30 decisions that will
affect your payoff. These decisions are divided into three subsets: there-
fore, each of them consists of 10 decisions. You will (sequentially) go
through 30 couples of prospects, and you will have to choose the prospect
you prefer (between Left Prospect and Right Prospect) for each of the
30 couples. In general, a prospect offers an outcome T with probability
p and an outcome B with probability 1-p. The value of T and B can
vary for every prospect. All outcomes are in ECU.
Consider that, you will receive no prior information. You will have the
opportunity to collect the information you might need to make your
decisions. Every prospect is represented by a button: for each of the
30 decisions, two buttons (one for the Left Prospect and one for the
Right Prospect) will appear on your screen. Every time you click on
one of them, you will be immediately informed about the payoff you
would have received by choosing the corresponding prospect (according
to the outcome and probability distributions associated to that specific
prospect). You can continue to click until you feel confident enough. At
this point, click on the SELECT button corresponding to the prospect
you prefer. Following, you can find an example of a couple of prospects.
In the meanwhile, your Participant 2 will decide on the same prospects
(yet presented with a full description of outcomes and probability dis-
tributions). Therefore, you both will be asked to make 30 decisions on
the same list of prospects. However, Participant 1’s decisions will affect
only his own payoff, while Participant 2’s decisions will affect the payoff
of the corresponding Participant 1.
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Figure 2.9: Participant 1 Decision Task - First Part - Exam-
ple
Treatment DE
Participant 1
- First Decision Phase: You will be asked to make 30 decisions that will
affect your payoff. These decisions are divided into three subsets: there-
fore, each of them consists of 10 decisions. You will (sequentially) go
through 30 couples of prospects, and you will have to choose the prospect
you prefer (between Left Prospect and Right Prospect) for each of the
30 couples. In general, a prospect offers an outcome T with probability
p and an outcome B with probability 1-p. The value of T and B can
vary for every prospect. All outcomes are in ECU.
Following, you can find an example of a couple of prospects. For each
couple, click on the button SELECT corresponding to the prospect you
prefer.
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Figure 2.10: Participant 1 Decision Task - First Part - Ex-
ample
In the meanwhile, your Participant 2 will decide on the same prospects
(yet presented as buttons). Therefore, you both will be asked to make
30 decisions on the same list of prospects. However, Participant 1’s
decisions will affect only his own payoff, while Participant 2’s decisions
will affect the payoff of the corresponding Participant 1.
Common to all Treatments
Participant 1
- Second Decision Phase: You will be asked to send a bid, so that your
payoff (relative to the first part of the experiment) is determined by your
choices, and not by those of the Participant 2 (you have been assigned
to). The minimum bid you can send is equal to 0 ECU, while the maxi-
mum bid is equal to 1000 ECU. In order to state your bid, you can use
a slider: drag the pointer in correspondence of the sum of ECU you are
willing to pay.
Figure 2.11: Bid Mechanism - Example
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In order to determine whether your bid is such that your payoff depends
only on your decisions, the following procedure will be adopted. A num-
ber between 0 and 1000 is randomly generated by the computer so that
every number can be drawn with the same probability.
– If the randomly generated number is lower than or equal to your
bid, your bid is accepted. Your payoff (for this first part of the
experiment) will be determined by playing the prospects you have
previously chosen, minus the randomly generated number.
– If the randomly generated number is higher than your bid, your bid
is rejected. Your payoff (for this first part of the experiment) will
be determined by playing the prospects the Participant 2 you have
been assigned to has previously chosen.
Consider that the higher is your bid, the higher is the probability that
your bid is accepted, and, thus, that it’s you determining your payoff.
However, a too high bid might make you pay more than your willingness
(if the randomly generated number is larger than your willingness to
pay, but, at the same time, lower than your ‘too high’ bid). On the
contrary, the lower is your bid, the higher is the probability that your
bid is rejected, and, thus, that the Participant 2 determines your payoff.
For all these reasons, the bid you are asked to send is the one representing
your actual willingness to pay.
In any case, for a better comprehension of such a mechanism, the exper-
iment will start with a simulation phase: you will have the opportunity
of sending three independent (trial) bids that will not affect your final
payoff.
At this point, the first part of the experiment ends. You will be informed
of your payoff at the end of the experiment: if your bis is accepted, then your
earnings will be determined as the sum of the payoffs of the prospects you
have chosen; on the contrary, if your bid is rejected, your earnings will be
determined as the sum of the payoffs of the prospects your Participant 2 has
chosen.
Participant 2
The first part of the experiment consists of a single decision phase, which is
contemporary to Participant 1’s first decision phase. You will be asked to eval-
uate 30 couples of prospects (the same of Participant 1), and, for each couple
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(Left Prospect and Right Prospect), to choose a prospect for the Participant
1 you have been assigned to in the beginning.
Treatment DD
Following, you can find an example of a couple of prospects. For each
couple, click on the SELECT button corresponding to the prospect you prefer
for the Participant 1.
Figure 2.12: Participant 2 Decision Task - First Part - Ex-
ample
Treatment EE
You will not receive any prior information. Every prospect will be represented
by a button: for each decisions, two buttons (one for the Left Prospect and one
for the Right Prospect) will appear on your screen. Every time you click on one
of them, you will be immediately informed about the payoff your Participant
1 would receive with that prospect. You can click until you feel confident
enough to choose. At this point, click on the SELECT button corresponding
to the prospect you prefer for the Participant 1. Following, you can find an
example of a couple of prospects.
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Figure 2.13: Participant 2 Decision Task - First Part - Ex-
ample
Treatment ED
Decisions will be presented in a different way with respect to Participant
1’s first decision phase: prospects are fully described in terms of probability
and outcomes. You will not have to ‘explore’ the prospects in order to choose.
Following, you can find an example of a couple of prospects.
Figure 2.14: Participant 2 Decision Task - First Part - Ex-
ample
Treatment DE
Consider that decisions will be presented in a different way with respect
to Participant 1’s first decision phase. Specifically, you will not receive any
information about the prospects (probability p and outcomes T and B). Ev-
ery prospect will be represented by a button: for each of the 30 decisions, two
buttons (one for the Left Prospect and one for the Right Prospect) will appear
on your screen. Every time you click on one of them, you will be immediately
informed about the payoff your Participant 1 would have received if you had
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chosen the corresponding prospect (according to the outcome and probabil-
ity distributions associated to that specific prospect). You can continue to
click until you feel confident enough to choose. At this point, click on the
SELECT button corresponding to the prospect you prefer for the Participant
1. Following, you can find an example of a couple of prospects.
Figure 2.15: Participant 2 Decision Task - First Part - Ex-
ample
Common to all Treatments
Once you have made all the 30 decisions, the first part of the experiment
is concluded.
You will be informed of your payoff (relative to this first part) at the end
of the experiment. However, your payoff is fixed, and it is not affected by the
decisions you make for the Participant 1. Your choices can influence only his
payoff.
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INSTRUCTIONS: SECOND PART
In this second part of the experiment you will have the same role as in the
first part. Furthermore, also the decision phases will remain unchanged: there
will be two phases (the 30 decisions for himself and the bid) for the Participant
1, and one phase (the 30 decisions for the corresponding Participant 1) for the
Participant 2.
Treatment DD
The only difference concerns Participant 1’s first decision phase and Par-
ticipant 2’s decision phase: in both cases, it will be asked to make 30 decisions,
again in terms of sequential choices through 30 couples of prospects (different
from those of the first part). However, such decision problems will be pre-
sented in a different way. More precisely, during the first part of experiment,
it was asked to collect the information necessary to decide; on the contrary,
during this second part, prospects are fully described (both in terms of proba-
bility p and outcomes T and B). Therefore, all the relevant information about
the Left Prospect and the Right Prospect is available from the beginning.
- If you have the role of Participant 1, you can find an example of a
couple of prospects in the following figure. For each couple, click on the
SELECT button corresponding to the prospect you prefer.
Figure 2.16: Participant 1 Decision Task - Second Part -
Example
After your 30 decisions, your first decision phase is concluded. Then, you
will move to the second phase, i.e. the one giving you the opportunity
to send a bid to decide whose decisions will determine your payoff. Like
in the first part, if your bid is accepted, your earnings will be defined as
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the sum of the payoffs of the prospects you have previously selected; on
the contrary, if you bid is rejected, your earnings will be determined by
the Participant 2 you have been associated to.
- If you have the role of Participant 2, you can find an example of a
couple of prospects in the following figure. For each couple, click on
the SELECT button corresponding to the prospect you prefer or the
Participant 1.
Figure 2.17: Participant 2 Decision Task - Second Part -
Example
After your 30 decisions, your decision phase is concluded. Like in the
first part, your payoff is fixed, and it does not depend on your decisions.
Treatment EE
The only difference concerns Participant 1’s first decision phase and Par-
ticipant 2’s decision phase: in both cases, it will be asked to make 30 decisions,
again in terms of sequential choices through 30 couples of prospects (differ-
ent from those of the first part). However, such decision problems will be
presented in a different way. More precisely, during the first part of the exper-
iment, prospects were fully described (in terms of probability p an outcomes
T and B): the relevant information is available from the beginning. On the
contrary, in this second part of the experiment, you will have no prior informa-
tion on the prospects; however, you will have the opportunity to collected the
information necessary to decide. For this reason, each prospect will be repre-
sented by a button: for every decision, two buttons (one for the Left Prospect
and one for the Right Prospect) will appear on your screen. Every time you
click on one of them, you will be immediately informed about the payoff you
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would receive by choosing the corresponding prospect (according to the out-
come and probability distributions associated to that specific prospect). You
can continue to click until you feel confident enough to choose.
- If you have the role of Participant 1, you can find an example of a
couple of prospects in the following figure. For each couple, click on the
SELECT button corresponding to the prospect you prefer.
Figure 2.18: Participant 1 Decision Task - Second Part -
Example
After your 30 decisions, your first decision phase is concluded. Then, you
will move to the second phase, i.e. the one giving you the opportunity
to send a bid to decide whose decisions will determine your payoff. Like
in the first part, if your bid is accepted, your earnings will be defined as
the sum of the payoffs of the prospects you have previously selected; on
the contrary, if you bid is rejected, your earnings will be determined by
the Participant 2 you have been associated to.
- If you have the role of Participant 2, you can find an example of a
couple of prospects in the following figure. Like in the case of the Par-
ticipant 1, prospects are represented by buttons. Every time you click
on one of them, you will be immediately informed about the payoff your
Participant 1 would have received if you had chosen the corresponding
prospect (according to the outcome and probability distributions asso-
ciated to that specific prospect). You can continue to click until you
feel confident enough to choose. For each couple, click on the SELECT
button corresponding to the prospect you prefer or the Participant 1.
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Figure 2.19: Participant 2 Decision Task - Second Part -
Example
After your 30 decisions, your decision phase is concluded. Like in the
first part, your payoff is fixed, and it does not depend on your decisions.
Treatment ED
The only difference concerns Participant 1’s first decision phase and Par-
ticipant 2’s decision phase: in both cases, it will be asked to make 30 decisions,
again in terms of sequential choices through 30 couples of prospects (differ-
ent from those of the first part). However, such decision problems will be
presented in a different way.
- If you have the role of Participant 1, during the first part of the ex-
periment, your prospects were fully described (in terms of probability p
an outcomes T and B): the relevant information was available from the
beginning. On the contrary, in this second part of the experiment, you
will have no prior information on the prospects; however, you will have
the opportunity to collect the information necessary to decide. For this
reason, each prospect will be represented by a button: for every decision,
two buttons (one for the Left Prospect and one for the Right Prospect)
will appear on your screen. Every time you click on one of them, you will
be immediately informed about the payoff you would receive by choosing
the corresponding prospect (according to the outcome and probability
distributions associated to that specific prospect). You can continue to
click until you feel confident enough to choose.
You can find an example of a couple of prospects in the following fig-
ure. For each couple, click on the SELECT button corresponding to the
prospect you prefer.
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Figure 2.20: Participant 1 Decision Task - Second Part -
Example
After your 30 decisions, your first decision phase is concluded. Then, you
will move to the second phase, i.e. the one giving you the opportunity
to send a bid to decide whose decisions will determine your payoff. Like
in the first part, if your bid is accepted, your earnings will be defined as
the sum of the payoffs of the prospects you have previously selected; on
the contrary, if you bid is rejected, your earnings will be determined by
the Participant 2 you have been associated to.
- If you have the role of Participant 2, during the first part of the ex-
periment, no prior information on the prospects was available; in this
second part, on the contrary, prospects will be fully described (in terms
of probability p and outcomes T and B). Therefore, all the relevant in-
formation about the Left Prospect and the Right Prospect is available
from the beginning.
You can find an example of a couple of prospects in the following fig-
ure. For each couple, click on the SELECT button corresponding to the
prospect you prefer or the Participant 1.
After your 30 decisions, your decision phase is concluded. Like in the
first part, your payoff is fixed, and it does not depend on your decisions.
Treatment DE
The only difference concerns Participant 1’s first decision phase and Par-
ticipant 2’s decision phase: in both cases, it will be asked to make 30 decisions,
again in terms of sequential choices through 30 couples of prospects (differ-
ent from those of the first part). However, such decision problems will be
presented in a different way.
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Figure 2.21: Participant 2 Decision Task - Second Part -
Example
- If you have the role of Participant 1, during the first part of the ex-
periment, no prior information on the prospects was available; in this
second part, on the contrary, prospects will be fully described (in terms
of probability p and outcomes T and B). Therefore, all the relevant in-
formation about the Left Prospect and the Right Prospect is available
from the beginning.
You can find an example of a couple of prospects in the following fig-
ure. For each couple, click on the SELECT button corresponding to the
prospect you prefer.
Figure 2.22: Participant 1 Decision Task - Second Part -
Example
After your 30 decisions, your first decision phase is concluded. Then, you
will move to the second phase, i.e. the one giving you the opportunity
to send a bid to decide whose decisions will determine your payoff. Like
in the first part, if your bid is accepted, your earnings will be defined as
the sum of the payoffs of the prospects you have previously selected; on
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the contrary, if you bid is rejected, your earnings will be determined by
the Participant 2 you have been associated to.
- If you have the role of Participant 2, during the first part of the ex-
periment, the prospects were fully described (in terms of probability p
an outcomes T and B): the relevant information was available from the
beginning. On the contrary, in this second part of the experiment, you
will have no prior information on the prospects; however, you will have
the opportunity to collect the information necessary to decide. For this
reason, each prospect will be represented by a button: for every decision,
two buttons (one for the Left Prospect and one for the Right Prospect)
will appear on your screen. Every time you click on one of them, you
will be immediately informed about the payoff your Participant 1 would
receive if you choose the corresponding prospect (according to the out-
come and probability distributions associated to that specific prospect).
You can continue to click until you feel confident enough to choose for
the Participant 1.
You can find an example of a couple of prospects in the following fig-
ure. For each couple, click on the SELECT button corresponding to the
prospect you prefer or the Participant 1.
Figure 2.23: Participant 2 Decision Task - Second Part -
Example
After your 30 decisions, your decision phase is concluded. Like in the
first part, your payoff is fixed, and it does not depend on your decisions.
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(This is an English translation of the questionnaires participants answered to
at the end of the experiment.)
Levenson’s Scale
We kindly ask you to answer the following questionnaire truthfully. We ask
you to indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements by
using a scale of 6 values that goes from ”I strongly disagree” to ”I strongly
agree”.
1. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings.
2. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.
3. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad
luck happenings.
4. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky.
5. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
6. It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things
turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune.
7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it.
8. My life is determined by my own actions.
Dospert
We kindly ask you to answer the following questionnaire truthfully. For each
of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would en-
gage in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that
situation. Provide a rating from Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, us-
ing the following scale: 1 = ”Extremely unlikely”, 2 = ”Moderately unlikely”,
3 =”Somewhat unlikely”, 4 = ”Not sure”, 5 =”Somewhat likely”, 6 = ”Mod-
erately likely”, 7 =”Extremely likely”.
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend.
2. Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
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3. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.
4. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event.
5. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.
6. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one.
7. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work.
Demographics and Other Information
Please, fill in the following fields.
- Date of Birth:
- Gender:
- Field of Studies:
- Number of experiment in which you have taken part:
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2.6 Appendix B - Additional Analysis
Table 2.7: MPLs’ Expected Returns and Standard Devia-
tions
mean (sd) Agent-Des Agent-Exp Principal-Des Principal-Exp
A.5
µ 78.605 (9.441) 76.965 (7.841) 82.737 (5.786) 77.983 (7.019)
σ 16.909 (6.639) 16.722 (5.205) 19.146 (4.17) 16.393 (5.17)
A.7
µ 79.542 (9.377) 76.239 (9.241) 84.038 (5.290) 78.639 (6.612)
σ 21.085 (9.402) 19.2 (8.67) 25.14 (5.037) 21.321 (6.211)
A.9
µ 78.773 (9.767) 75.282 (8.391) 83.379 (6.320) 79.335 (7.540)
σ 34.050 (18.037) 30.223 (16.470) 42.324 (10.354) 35.986 (14.805)
B.5
µ 93.323 (9.128) 94.763 (7.533) 98.303 (6.207) 97.533 (5.798)
σ 16.551 (6.239) 17.855 (6.086) 18.777 (4.953) 19.347 (5.063)
B.7
µ 93.291 (8.961) 995.184 (8.203) 99.875 (5.254) 98.835 (6.069)
σ 20.269 (8.304) 22.337 (9.033) 25.424 (5.849) 24.924 (7.484)
B.9
µ 94.858 (9.033) 93.502 (8.414) 100.365 (3.800) 97.351 (6.174)
σ 37.855 (14.312) 33.414 (20.369) 46.361 (5.767) 40.969 (13.180)
Notes: For every MPL, the average of both portfolios’ expected returns (µ) and stan-
dard deviations (σ) is computed according to role (principal vs. agent) and information
gathering condition (description vs. experience). Corresponding standard deviations
are in parentheses.
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Figure 2.24: Portfolios in mean/variance space
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Table 2.8: Proportion of Dominance - MPL
% Dominated Portfolios Non-Dominated Portfolios
A.5
Agent-Des 57.89 42.11
Agent-Exp 77.50 22.50
Principal-Des 23.08 76.92
Principal-Exp 43.59 56.41
A.7
Agent-Des 34.21 65.79
Agent-Exp 72.50 27.50
Principal-Des 17.95 82.05
Principal-Exp 46.15 53.85
A.9
Agent-Des 44.74 55.26
Agent-Exp 70.00 30.00
Principal-Des 20.51 79.49
Principal-Exp 38.46 61.54
B.5
Agent-Des 60.0 40.0
Agent-Exp 73.7 26.3
Principal-Des 41.0 59.0
Principal-Exp 61.5 38.5
B.7
Agent-Des 57.5 42.5
Agent-Exp 73.7 26.3
Principal-Des 35.9 64.1
Principal-Exp 59.0 41.0
B.9
Agent-Des 75.0 25.0
Agent-Exp 73.7 26.3
Principal-Des 48.7 51.3
Principal-Exp 66.7 33.3
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Figure 2.25: Average Clicking - Principal vs. Agent
l
l
l
l
l
Principal Agent
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
A, p = .5
To
t. 
# 
Cl
ick
s
Principal Agent
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
B, p = .5
To
t. 
# 
Cl
ick
s
l
l
l
l
l
Principal Agent
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
A, p = .7
To
t. 
# 
Cl
ick
s
l
l
Principal Agent
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
B, p = .7
To
t. 
# 
Cl
ick
s
l
l
Principal Agent
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
A, p = .9
To
t. 
# 
Cl
ick
s
l
Principal Agent
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
B, p = .9
To
t. 
# 
Cl
ick
s
74 Chapter 2. Taking Over Control
Table 2.9: Regression analysis with controls
Portfolio Return ND Portfolio Searching Effort Control Premium
Portfolio Return 0.202 (4.221)
Portfolio St. Dev. 0.526 (0.014)∗∗∗ 1.256 (4.941)
NonDominated −4.726 (19.260)
Set B 16.065 (0.224)∗∗∗ −0.752 (0.163)∗∗∗ −1.336 (0.729)◦ −6.451 (19.294)
Self 1.989 (0.524)∗∗∗ 1.044 (0.299)∗∗∗ 2.409 (0.737)∗∗
Experience −0.688 (0.313)∗ −1.128 (0.236)∗∗∗
Prob 0.7 −1.847 (0.277)∗∗∗ 0.318 (0.196) −0.267 (0.184)
Prob 0.9 −10.207 (0.378)∗∗∗ 0.066 (0.196) 2.146 (0.184)∗∗∗
Self & Experience −0.753 (0.442)◦ −0.078 (0.327)
Rightward Prospect 2.263 (0.150)∗∗∗
EV+ −1.739 (0.166)∗∗∗
Principal Des 80.404 (36.198)∗
Agent Des −20.027 (31.369)
Levenson −0.721 (0.524) −0.701 (0.286)∗ −0.033 (0.821) 92.859 (55.634)·
Dospert −0.007 (0.262) −0.046 (0.141) −0.040 (0.412) 8.547 (27.350)
Female −0.711 (0.489) −0.126 (0.262) −1.463 (0.773)◦ 147.941 (55.612)∗∗
Econ −0.052 (0.496) 0.089 (0.265) 1.167 (0.777) −42.437 (58.492)
Constant 72.876 (2.159)∗∗∗ 2.897 (1.169)∗ 7.092 (3.366)∗ 100.285 (395.725)
Observations 816 816 8160 136
Num. groups: ID 136 136 136 68
Fitting model LMM GLMM(Logit) LMM LMM
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
Notes: Because of a technical issue at the end of one experimental session, some participants’ answers to the final
questionnaire have not been properly recorded. Therefore, one of the sessions with treatments DD and EE has
not been included in the following regression analysis.
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Table 2.10: Prospect Set A
Leftward Rightward
List H L EV SD H L EV SD
1 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 75 46.5 28.5
2 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 95 56.5 38.5
3 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 115 66.5 48.5
4 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 125 71.5 53.5
5 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 135 76.5 58.5
6 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 145 81.5 63.5
7 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 155 86.5 68.5
8 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 180 99 81
9 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 225 121.5 103.5
10 A.5 55 75 65 10 18 265 141.5 123.5
11 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 79 46.8 21.1
12 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 111 56.4 35.7
13 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 145 66.6 51.3
14 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 161 71.4 58.7
15 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 178 76.5 66.4
16 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 195 81.6 74.2
17 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 211 86.4 81.6
18 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 253 99 100.8
19 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 328 121.5 135.2
20 A.7 59 79 65 9.2 33 395 141.6 165.9
21 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 83 46.1 12.3
22 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 187 56.5 43.5
23 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 287 66.5 73.5
24 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 337 71.5 88.5
25 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 387 76.5 103.5
26 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 437 81.5 118.5
27 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 487 86.5 133.5
28 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 612 99 171
29 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 837 121.5 238.5
30 A.9 63 83 65 6 42 1037 141.5 298.5
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Table 2.11: Prospect Set B
Leftward Rightward
List H L EV SD H L EV SD
1 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 86 56 30
2 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 106 66 40
3 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 126 76 50
4 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 136 81 55
5 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 156 91 65
6 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 166 96 70
7 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 186 106 80
8 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 206 116 90
9 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 236 131 105
10 B.5 78 92 85 7 26 296 161 135
11 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 89 56.1 21.5
12 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 122 66 36.7
13 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 155 75.9 51.8
14 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 172 81 59.6
15 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 205 90.9 74.7
16 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 222 96 82.5
17 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 255 105.9 97.6
18 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 289 116.1 113.2
19 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 339 131.1 136.1
20 B.7 81 95 85.2 6.4 42 439 161.1 181.9
21 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 92 56 12
22 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 192 66 42
23 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 292 76 72
24 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 342 81 87
25 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 442 91 117
26 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 492 96 132
27 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 592 106 162
28 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 692 116 192
29 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 842 131 237
30 B.9 84 96 85.2 3.6 52 1142 161 327
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Chapter 3
Taxpayer’s Behavior:
From the Laboratory to
Agent-Based Simulations
joint with Luigi Mittone
3.1 Tax Compliance: Theory and Evidence
As pointed out by Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), the decision prob-
lem of tax evasion has been introduced in the economic literature just as
an additional ‘risky asset’ to the household’s portfolio. The first theoretical
representations of individual taxpayers’ compliance date back to the 1970s:
the most influential, and probably the most criticized, rational choice mod-
els have been developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan
(1973b). These models portrait the taxpayer’s decision problem as an invest-
ment choice involving a sure and a risky lottery, and adopt the formalization
of Expected Utility Theory (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Taxpayers
are supposed to choose the extent of income declaration that maximizes their
expected utility, defined according to income level, individual risk propensity,
audit probability, and monetary punishment, in case of evasion detection. In
this framework, they optimize the following function:
E[U ] = (1− p)U(I − θD) + pU(I − θD − pi(I −D)) (3.1)
where p is the audit probability, θ is the tax rate, I is the actual income,
D is the reported income, and pi is the fine rate. These studies focus the
effect of such parameters on evasion, and assume that the optimal proportion
of evasion varies inversely with the likelihood of fiscal audits: a higher audit
probability and/or a punishment proportional to the evaded tax reduce the
expected value of evasion, and thus its attractiveness (Yitzhaki, 1974).
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However, some issues on the aforementioned models have been raised, and
their validity has been questioned, as the portfolio approach fails to address
real-world complexity. Taxpayers are assumed to be able to determine the
optimal proportion of tax to evade by making burdensome calculations, and
having accurate information on the audit strategies adopted by the tax au-
thority. Under these rather unrealistic conditions, such models predict that all
taxpayers should evade if the audit probability and the fines most commonly
used in reality were adopted. Furthermore, the label of ‘tax compliance’ is gen-
erally adopted to refer to a wide variety of behaviors - such as evasion of value
added tax,1 income underreporting, or tax burden reduction - which, though
exhibiting remarkably different idiosyncratic characteristics, are treated with
no distinction. For a recent review see Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2016).
Michael and Louls (1985) suggest that taxpayers’ decisions cannot be en-
tirely explained by the level of enforcement, as tax compliance is not only a
matter of rates and penalties. Furthermore, as it is not easy to obtain pre-
cise information on the actual audit procedure that the tax authority adopt
to discover tax evasion: taxpayers may not know the actual risk of being au-
dited, and need to rely on their own estimate of such a risk, in order to make
a compliance decision. Such an uncertainty about the probability of getting
caught is likely to influence taxpayers’ behavior.
This is supported by empirical evidence documented in many countries,
coming from different sources such as random audits, surveys, laboratory and
field experiments. Hence, many researchers, behavioral economists included,
have tried to find models with a better fit for real taxpayers’ behavior, and
with a focus on potentially relevant psycho-sociological factors. This develop-
ment process has often been built upon an experimental approach: just to list
a few examples, the high degree of control and the greater parallelism with
the natural world are among the main motivations leading researchers to turn
to laboratory experiments, instead of relying only on theoretical analyses. In
this sense, one can say that experiments on tax evasion are mainly motivated
by economists’ dissatisfaction with theoretical models: ‘Rather than question
the experimental method, [...] it is perhaps the theory which needs revision’
(Baldry, 1987). In fact, experiments can provide a valuable support in study-
ing people’s behavior, especially when clandestine activities are involved: the
1In contrast, Mittone (2001), considered as a pioneer in the experimental investigation of
VAT, recognizes the social nature of this kind of tax and explores it in an artificial market
setting. Although VAT and income tax are strictly connected, since self-employed taxpayers
evade VAT in order to reduce their tax liability on income, sellers do not decide by themselves,
but need to collude with their customers. The psychological role, played by the need to find
a collusive (illicit) agreement between buyer and seller, is the core issue of VAT evasion.
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extent of tax evasion as a result of a specific interaction between micro and
macro factors cannot be directly measured in an entirely natural and uncon-
trolled setting. It is not easy to collect evidence on tax compliance, and, even
if this was possible, the specific conditions determining tax decisions would not
be easily kept under control. In contrast, a detailed investigation of individu-
als’ behavior is allowed by the laboratory approach, which can be considered
as the proper system to understand specific real-world phenomena.
To this purpose, many extensions based on experimental findings have been
proposed in order to integrate theoretical models, and make them closer to
the intended domain of application: audits are costly for any audited person;
the tax authority is distinct from the remainder of the government (Melumad
and Mookherjee, 1989); tax collection is delegated (Sanchez and Sobel, 1993);
moral and social dynamics, in terms of shame, moral rules, fairness to the
tax code and its application (e.g., Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Spicer and
Becker, 1980; Benjamini and Maital, 1985; Baldry, 1986; Gordon, 1989; Myles
and Naylor, 1996; Torgler, 2002; Eisenhauer, 2006; Eisenhauer, 2008; Casal
and Mittone, 2016), and evaluation of government expenditure and service
provision (Cowell and Gordon, 1988) are included; the impact of the decision
framework is tested. In this respect, Mittone (2002) finds that the introduction
of an environmental structure closer to the one outside the laboratory fosters
tax compliance thanks to the creation of social ties among participants. Fi-
nally, the investigation of taxpayers’ views of the audit probability has shown
the inadequacy of Expected Utility Theory for tax evasion (e.g., Friedland,
1982; Spicer and Thomas, 1982; Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992a; Alm, Mc-
Clelland, and Schulze, 1992; Hessing et al., 1992; Sheffrin and Triest, 1992;
Scholz and Pinney, 1995): people usually exhibit cognitive difficulties in esti-
mating probability relationships and computing expected values (Einhorn and
Hogarth, 1985; Casey and Scholz, 1991a; Casey and Scholz, 1991b), and the
common uncertainty about the probability of being audited makes taxpayers’
decisions more difficult than those made under the full information charac-
terizing the laboratory environment. As traditional economic models rely on
the unrealistic assumption that taxpayers have accurate information on au-
diting startegies, actual taxpayers’ behavior cannot be predicted. Therefore,
experiments with imprecise information appear to be more realistic.
A further step toward a greater realism in tax research is due to the in-
troduction of Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1955; Simon, 1956). As suggested
by Alm (1999), standard theoretical models, grounded on the simplifying as-
sumptions of taxpayers’ full rationality and homogeneity, should be revised.
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These models rely on the adoption of a unique representative agent, and dis-
regard the interaction among different types, while human behavior exhibits
not only evident anomalies, but also a remarkable heterogeneity (Alm, Mc-
Clelland, and Schulze, 1992): for instance, some individuals may overweight
the occurrence of fiscal audits, or comply because they value what they are
financing. Furthermore, laboratory experiments help prove that human be-
ings are not always able to perform complex computations and to choose the
utility-maximizing action. They are not making an investment decision in iso-
lation, but are affected by many different ‘emotional’ factors and non-economic
considerations that make their decision process rather complex to model.
However, all these aspects, which have been defined and first investigated
at the micro level, as allowed by laboratory experiments and tax theoretical
models, may have unexpected consequences and give striking results at an
aggregate level. For example, the vast majority of macro-empirical research
reports a strong deterrent effect of tax audits on evasion. In contrast, Gemmell
and Ratto (2012) empirically explore compliance response to fiscal audit at an
individual level, and observe contrasting results, due to many factors, such as
the opportunity to underreport, and past audit experience. This implies that,
in order to obtain relevant policy suggestions, neither of the two dimensions
has to be disregarded. In this respect, as reviewed by Alm (2010), a growing
number of researchers have adopted behavioral techniques, which rely on both
human-based experimental economics and agent-based modeling, in order to
address this micro-macro issue, and to gain new insights on taxpayers’ behav-
ior, which could not be observed otherwise. Micro-level experimental findings
have widely shown that human agents are not rational, as assumed in theoret-
ical models; on the contrary, they are guided by emotions, psychological and
moral constraints, which might be mimicked in a computational simulation,
as agents are calibrated according to human-based experimental evidence. In
such a way, interesting and useful considerations can derive from agent-based
modeling: on the one hand, it allows the implementation of a rather realis-
tic system of individuals, with the intent of uncovering and testing specific
cognitive aspects of taxpayers’ decision process; on the other hand, the soci-
etal evolution, as due to an interaction among heterogeneous agents, can be
studied from a macro perspective.
Hence, we point out that a synergic adoption of a human- and a computer-
based approach gives the opportunity of gaining a deeper understanding of
empirical phenomena or behavioral patterns, by scientifically studying a valid
representation of these in the laboratory. Thanks to the combination of these
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two approaches, compliance decisions are studied both at an individual and a
collective level: the exploration of the overall behavior of the society requires
taking into account social interactions among heterogeneous and boundedly
rational human beings. Agent-based simulations might provide a valuable
support, since they can rely on realistic assumptions - i.e. behavioral regular-
ities previously observed in the laboratory - and allow the implementation of
complex settings in which both micro and macro factors interact and affect
agents’ behavior, as it usually happens outside the walls of the experimental
laboratory.
3.2 Research on Tax Compliance: A Methodologi-
cal Analysis
According to the previously presented evolution of research on tax compliance,
an apparent challenge between economic theoretical models and the experi-
mental approach seems to emerge. On the one hand, experimenters claim that
anomalies observed in the laboratory are an important proof of the failure of
theory in describing and predicting taxpayers’ behavior in an accurate way.
On the other hand, however, theorists reply that their models are intended
to address phenomena taking place in the real-world, and not in the artificial
environment of the laboratory. Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992a) point out
that ‘[...] experimental results can contribute significantly to policy debates,
as long as some conditions are met: the payoffs, and the experimental set-
ting must capture the essential properties of the naturally occurring setting
that is the object of investigation. Laboratory methods may offer the only
opportunity to investigate the behavioral responses to policy changes’.
In such a framework, the necessity of grounding experiments’ external va-
lidity is evident: researchers claim that results are not always generalizable, i.e.
applicable to the real world, because the environment reproduced in the labo-
ratory is too simplistic and does not take into account many relevant variables.
For instance, Webley (1991) argues that ‘[experimental] results may reflect a
person’s understanding of economics rather than the behavior that would be
displayed in the real situation”. The experimental setting might be perceived
as too artificial and far from the environment outside the laboratory, if it is not
a perfect replica of the real-world. The experimental system needs an external
validity hypothesis, which maps laboratory elements onto elements of the phe-
nomenon observed in the field. Only if this hypothesis holds, researchers can
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draw valuable inferences on individuals’ decision process from the laboratory
and move to the world outside (Guala, 2002).
The present chapter enters such a debate and explicitly focuses on the
problem of tax experiments’ external validity, adding to the small literature
available on the topic. On the contrary, it disregards the internal validity
issue, which has already received much attention in the experimental liter-
ature. Specifically, the novelty of this methodological review resides in the
proposal of a synergic approach, involving both human-based observations
and agent-based simulations as a valuable tool aimed to solve the problem of
tax experiments’ external validity.
In a very recent contribution, Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2016) address
this methodological issue, providing an interesting review of both experimental
and empirical research on tax compliance. The authors point out that little is
known about the external validity of tax experiments, and identify a number of
criticisms: in addition to a rather general critique on artificiality, participants’
self-selection, experimenter effect, social desirability, and social blaming, a
more detailed methodological review on tax research is offered. For instance,
as already well documented in previous studies, income-reporting decisions in
a tax setting systematically differ from those in an abstract setting (Baldry,
1986; Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; Mittone, 2006; Choo, Fonseca, and
Myles, 2016); the introduction of a redistribution mechanism strongly affects
taxpayers’ decisions (Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992b; Alm, McClelland, and
Schulze, 1992; Mittone, 2006); students might not be representative because
they have no experience in paying taxes (Webley, 1991). Furthermore, com-
pliance depends on the way in which subjects’ income is provided (Boylan and
Sprinkle, 2001; Boylan, 2010; Durham, Manly, and Ritsema, 2014). Finally,
in reality, there is a temporal distance between compliance decisions and au-
dits, which might have a significant effect on actual compliance decisions, and
make experiments disregarding this issue less reliable (Kogler, Mittone, and
Kirchler, 2016). Based on this, Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2016) suggest that
experimental investigations in the laboratory should induce the same psycho-
logical mechanisms taxpayers adopt outside, and take into account possible
interactions between treatment factors and setting characteristics. If such
requirements are met, experimental findings can be applied also outside the
laboratory, and thus provide useful insights for policy interventions.
According to Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan (1995), ‘a government compliance
strategy based only on detection and punishment may well be a reasonable
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starting point but not a good ending point. Instead, what is needed is a multi-
faceted approach (...) Put differently, explaining tax compliance requires rec-
ognizing the myriad factors that motivate individual behavior, factors that go
much beyond the standard economics-of-crime approach to include theories of
behavior suggested by psychologists, sociologists, and other social scientists.
Until this effort is made, it seems unlikely that we will come much closer
to unraveling the puzzle of tax compliance.’ Following the same approach,
Guala and Mittone (2005) get into this debate on experiments’ role and ex-
ternal validity, suggesting that experiments might help theoretical models to
get closer to real-world phenomena, and thus answer specific questions about
causal relationships.
From this viewpoint, Guala and Mittone (2005) claim that experiments
serve as epistemic mediators between theoretical models and empirical eco-
nomic phenomena. In fact, theory and experiments are not considered as two
distinct entities: they both require initial hypotheses and inference; they are
two useful and complementary structures to study and subsequently under-
stand economic behavior. Figure 3.1 shows this relationship as presented by
Guala and Mittone (2005): They identify a gap between theoretical models
and the intended domain of application, and experimental systems occupy the
middle ground between the two. Nevertheless, both experiments and targeted
economic phenomena belong to the same ‘real world’: in fact, according to
the authors, compared to theoretical models, experimental systems are closer
to the target, since they actually allow the collection of observations of real
people’s behavior under specific conditions, though in an environment that
has been artificially manipulated by the experimenter.
Figure 3.1 also refers to the way in which the gap - or better the gap be-
tween theory and experiments, and the one between these and the target -
can be closed. On the one hand, internal validity - in terms of testing dif-
ferent hypotheses in isolation by controlling for confounding variables, and
ruling out undesired effects - bridges the gap between theoretical models and
experiments. On the other hand, external validity - in terms of laboratory
identification of mechanisms that characterize also the targeted phenomena
- is intended to bridge the gap between experimental systems and the spe-
cific domain of application. While the former has received much attention in
the economic literature, little can be found on the analysis of external valid-
ity (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2016). The problem of internal validity can
be ‘easily’ solved by adopting a number of techniques allowing the identifica-
tion of causal relationships. However, even a high degree of internal validity
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does not ensure that the external validity requirement is met. Experiments
provide a higher degree of concreteness with respect to theoretical models,
by including features that could be reasonable for externally valid inferences.
However, they are still artificially isolated from the world outside the walls of
the laboratory, in which a wide variety of micro and macro factors - tax audit
plans, risk preference, reasoning biases, moral constraints, social norms, social
comparison, interaction and imitation, fairness, trust, just to name a few -
interact in determining actual taxpayers’ behavior. Experiments try to imple-
ment these factors, yet under the constraint of balancing between internal and
external validity: an excessively complicated experimental setting impairs the
identification of clear causal effects, and makes experimental results harder
to interpret (Cowell, 1991). Therefore, most laboratory experiments are not
able to perfectly replicate the specific targeted phenomena, and feed back into
the theoretical literature. Experiments can help at an intermediate stage, as
they cannot bridge the gap between the target and the theoretical model: the
highly controlled experimental setting is aimed to determine which theory bet-
ter explains a certain pattern of data, but this explanation might be not valid
outside the laboratory (Guala, 1998; Guala, 1999; Guala, 2003).
Figure 3.1: Experimental systems as mediators between the-
oretical models and economic phenomena
Nevertheless, as suggested by Guala and Mittone (2005), experiments
might also be intended to discover new real and robust empirical phenomena,
not necessarily explained by existing theories to be tested in the laboratory.
These phenomena might include generic psychological effects, biases, heuristics
to be applied to specific empirical situations. In such a case, experiments do
not need to perfectly reproduce the target, but may contribute to the creation
of a library of phenomena (Guala and Mittone, 2005): they simply discover
new facts useful from a policy perspective.
In addition, Guala and Mittone (2005) propose interesting examples of ro-
bust biases involved in probabilistic reasoning and the effects of uncertainty
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that have been identified and extensively studied in the laboratory and in the
field, also as strictly related to research on tax compliance. Both Sheffrin and
Triest (1992) and Scholz and Pinney (1995) perform an econometric analysis
of the influence of taxpayers’ perceived probability of detection on compliance
decisions. The former analysis finds that individuals who perceive a higher
audit probability expect significantly less evasion in the population, and those
not trusting others or the government engage in more evasion. Nevertheless,
such an analysis solely relies on survey data, and therefore, as suggested by
Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), the results could be biased by the co-
herent image individuals tend to convey in surveys. In contrast, Scholz and
Pinney (1995) also collect tax-return data, and their analysis is intended to in-
vestigate the extent of people’s guilt and moral obligation, by testing the duty
heuristic hypothesis: if taxpayers have no accurate information on the prob-
ability of detection, they can rely on heuristics to derive subjective estimates
of the risk and to make their compliance choice. The authors observe a sig-
nificant positive relationship between subjective probability and duty, which
in fact leads to an overestimation of the risk of getting caught, and therefore
to a higher degree of compliance. Such an effect is even strengthened by peo-
ple’s tax knowledge and previous contacts with the authority. This evidence
is supported also by Hessing et al. (1992): although, according to Andreoni,
Erard, and Feinstein (1998), their results seem to partially contradict those
reported by Scholz and Pinney (1995), it emerges that the duty is fostered by
mere contacts between taxpayers and the tax authority, while it is impaired by
previous audits and fines. In fact, traditional enforcement activities built on
coercive power seem to negatively affects taxpayers’ sense of duty (Kirchler,
Hoelzl, and Wahl, 2008); tax agencies prefer to adopt an horizontal monitor-
ing approach, by treating taxpayers as customers to whom they can provide
useful services.
Friedland (1982), Spicer and Thomas (1982) and Alm, Jackson, and McKee
(1992a) manipulate the quality and the accuracy of information on fines and
probabilities in the laboratory: they observe that a higher degree of informa-
tional ambiguity enhances compliance. Nevertheless, as theoretically proved
by Snow and Warren (2005), such an effect strictly depends on individual
ambiguity aversion.
From a similar viewpoint, Bernasconi (1998) suggests that the portfolio ap-
proach needs to be integrated with subjects’ probability weighting. The non-
linear weight function proposed according to Rank Dependent Utility models
(Quiggin, 1982), and Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), may
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describe the higher degree of compliance actually observed, compared to the
theoretically predicted low level. In this respect, Prospect Theory provides
new approaches to modeling tax evasion decisions (Schepanski and Shearer,
1995; Dhami and Al-Nowaihi, 2007; Ping and Tao, 2007; Trotin, 2010; Pio-
latto and Rablen, 2014; Piolatto and Trotin, 2016), by taking into account
probability weighting, and reference-dependence (Copeland and Cuccia, 2002;
Bernasconi and Zanardi, 2004; Watrin and Ullmann, 2008).
Also Erard and Feinstein (1994) underline the significant impact of proba-
bility weighting on taxpayers’ decisions: in order to provide useful and reliable
behavioral insights, fiscal models have to take into account the difference be-
tween actual audit probabilities, and estimates. In support of the occurrence
of this probability weighting process, Spicer and Hero (1985) build a repeated
measurement setting, and find that the extent of under-reporting diminishes
as the number of previous undergone audits increases. This evidence has been
explained by the availability heuristic: people tend to rely on immediate exam-
ples they recall when evaluating a decision problem (Tversky and Kahneman,
1973). An alternative explanation is the target effect, according to which peo-
ple assume that a fiscal investigation is likely to be followed by another one
(Hashimzade, Myles, and Tran-Nam, 2013).
In contrast, Mittone (1997) reports on an experiment investigating the dif-
ference between probability subjective estimation and weighting: tax-payers
exhibit overestimation, when simply asked to judge the probability of being
audited, and underweighting, when asked to actually make a decision. Specif-
ically, according to their estimated probability, compliance is expected to en-
sure a higher expected value than evasion does; however, in the compliance
decision, evasion is the predominant choice.
More detailed analyses of the dynamics underlying taxpayers’ decisions in a
repeated-measurement framework, mimicking a ‘taxpaying life span’, are pro-
vided by Mittone (2006) and Kastlunger et al. (2009). In contrast to Bayesian
updating, such that audited taxpayers have higher estimates of audit proba-
bility than non-audited taxpayers, and are more deterred from evasion, these
authors observe that the occurrence of an audit seems to make taxpayers more
prone to evade. This result is commonly referred to as the bomb crater effect :
the probability of observing compliance decreases if a taxpayer has just under-
gone a fiscal audit. According to Guala and Mittone (2005), this phenomenon
observed in the laboratory has to be tested under a variety of conditions in
order to verify whether it exhibits robustness and external validity. As for
the former property, Kastlunger et al. (2009) find similar results and report
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that the decrease in compliance after an audit is very rarely due to loss-repair
tendencies: the decrease in compliance seems not to depend on whether the
taxpayer is fined in the previous round or found to be compliant. As for the
latter, it might not be easy to observe the bomb crater effect outside the labo-
ratory: in many countries, variability in declarations increases the probability
of being investigated. Nevertheless, such an effect might emerge under specific
conditions. Studies about the impact of audits on subsequent compliance have
shown that the decline in compliance after an audit can also be observed in
real taxpaying situations (DeBacker et al., 2015), and not only with respect
to income tax. Bergman and Nevarez (2006) analyze VAT data from indi-
vidual tax return information in Argentina and Chile, and identify the effect;
however, authors also argue that taxpayers who evade more tend to be less
deterred by audits. The bomb crater effect in VAT evasion is also confirmed by
the experimental research project ‘Tax morale among self-employed and their
customers: A psychological comparison of value added tax versus income tax’
I have been conducting in joint collaboration with J. Olsen, C. Kogler, L.
Mittone and E. Kirchler. We actually observe that subjects who have just
undergone a fiscal audit are more prone to evade - i.e. to offer their customers
a VAT-esclusive price - irrespective of whether they are found to comply.
The so-called echo effect is another laboratory phenomenon Guala and Mit-
tone (2005) deal with. Mittone (2006) studies the effect of different patterns
of audits over time, and finds that frequent audits experienced early in ‘tax
life’ may lead to higher compliance at later stages. Guala and Mittone (2005)
report that this phenomenon is robust to changes in the experimental setting,
and suggest that this laboratory evidence is supported by a number of real life
examples: for instance, fare evasion on Italian public transport is increased
by the experience of infrequent controls. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
assume that taxpayers evaluate or weight the audit probability according to
their experience: repeated audits may lead to a decrease in evasion even in
the long run because of chance misperception. Taxpayers learn that the like-
lihood of audits is higher than the objective probability when these are rather
frequent in the beginning; therefore, they rely on this sample to form their
probability evaluations, and stick to a high compliance level even when the
frequency of investigations diminishes.
In summary, our analysis starts recalling the approach by Guala and Mit-
tone (2005) who identify the mediator role of economic experiments in the
study of empirical phenomena. Experiments rely on hypotheses and allow the
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investigation of specific, framed and concrete settings: individuals’ decisions
are real, though in an artificial environment. We recognize the undeniable
relevance of experimental systems in supporting theoretical models and pro-
viding better insights on empirical regularities, which otherwise could not be
studied and understood so clearly outside the laboratory.2 For this reason,
experiments call for internal validity, while an a priori external validity is not
necessary: as previously pointed out, experimental investigations might con-
tribute to the identification of robust economic and psychological phenomena
that can be borrowed and applied to specific cases inside or outside the lab-
oratory. At the same time, however, it is also true that, in order to increase
their reliability, experimental findings might need to be further tested before
valid inferences are drawn.
In this respect, we provide a novel contribution to the literature on exper-
imental methodology in tax research, by extending the framework presented
by Guala and Mittone (2005) and claiming that agent-based simulations offer
a valuable support. In fact, both theoretical economic models and related
experiments are mainly defined in a microeconomic setting and they address
empirical issues with a high degree of specificity. In addition to this, experi-
ments cannot control for all cognitive drivers involved in the decision process of
tax compliance, but only for those specifically targeted and isolated by the ex-
perimental design. In this framework, a computational approach to the study
of tax evasion tests not only the robustness of experimental findings, but also
their external validity. On the one hand, agent-based simulations may pro-
vide valuable insights of cognitive nature, which an experimenter would not be
able to get simply observing the behavior of a limited sample of human sub-
jects in the laboratory. Human-based experiments contribute to the library of
phenomena; computer-based simulations aim to validate laboratory findings,
and help understand complex cognitive processes involving psychological bi-
ases and heuristics. On the other hand, simulations allow the combination of
micro- and macro-level factors actually interacting outside the laboratory and
determining people’s compliance.
2This is exemplified by the research presented in Chapter 4: the laboratory experiment
aims to mimic a highly specific empirical setting, and relies on previous and robust experi-
mental results taken from the more generic literature of decision-making under uncertainty.
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3.3 From Human-Subject to Computational-Agent
Experiments
From the previous analysis, it is evident that a pure theoretical approach may
offer an ‘unrealistic [or better, incomplete] picture of human decision-making’,
which is neither based on nor confirmed by empirical evidence (Selten, 2001).
Therefore, it requires to be mediated by an experimental approach, in order to
effectively target the empirical domain of interest. This implies the adoption
of heterogeneous and less strict assumptions on individual behavior. Never-
theless, in spite of helping theoretical models target specific phenomena, some
experiments might still lack external validity. On the one hand, decisions ob-
served in the laboratory are real and the choice setting is specifically intended
to address the issue of interest; on the other hand, human samples usually
are rather small, and the setting might turn out to be too simple and pre-
vent valid inferences to be transferred outside the laboratory. According to
the materiality thesis by Guala (2002), experiments may not display a formal
similarity to the complex framework of the target system, though being able
to replicate almost the same causal processes taking place in the real world
outside the laboratory. Therefore, relying on the assumption that human be-
ings are basically the same inside and outside the laboratory, it is possible to
identify a correspondence at a ’material’ level between the experimental and
the target system, but not necessarily at a ‘formal’ and ’abstract’ level, which
might hinder experiments’ external validity.
In this framework, Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) may
significantly contribute to the development of more realistic decision-making
models; it helps bridge the gap between economic models and the intended
domain of application. Similar to theoretical and experimental approaches,
simulations require a formal definition of behavioral types. As a matter of
fact, ACE is not intended to disregard theoretical considerations, as relation-
ships describing human behavior need to be known in advance for the calibra-
tion of agents. Nevertheless, simulations can rely on behavioral assumptions
(and experimental observations) so that different agent types are defined, the
standard neoclassical economics idea of a homogeneous representative agent
is overcome, and a realistic replication of the world is provided. In this sense,
both the theoretical and the experimental analysis are enriched by the intro-
duction and the robustness check of heterogeneous behavioral patterns, which
might be designed according to previously collected empirical and experimen-
tal evidence.
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Nevertheless, in contrast to laboratory experiments, according to the onto-
logical analysis by Guala (2002), simulations rely on a process of abstraction:
the external validity requirement might be hardly met at a material level, as
the correspondence between the simulating and the target system is of a more
’formal’ kind. ACE agents are virtual entities endowed with specific attributes,
purposes, and behaviors; they interact with a rather complex landscape - it
consists of institutions, enforcement rules, social networks, etc. - which, in
general, resembles the real-world but cannot be replicated in human exper-
iments; they receive an input, and, based on this, select an action allowing
them to reach their pre-defined motive goals, such as wealth, happiness, or
honesty.
Nowadays, in the field of economic behavior, the spectrum of possible
experimental methodologies is quite broad and ranges from 100% human-
subject to 100% computational agent experiments. These two extremes were
first thought to be either in opposition or completely unrelated: until a few
years ago, the majority of ACE researchers did not consider human-subject
experiments as a valuable and real source of information and results in order to
build and calibrate simulation models, as reviewed by Duffy (2006). Similarly,
the great majority of experimentalists tend to exclusively rely on human-based
tests or explorative investigations, without trying to increase the potential and
the extent of their experimental results by means of computational simulations.
However, these two methodologies tend to converge: half way, different
techniques, such as a mixture of human and computer agents interacting with
each other, human-calibrated computer agents, and computer agents with real
world data streaming, are gaining relevance. Researchers admit that the lab-
oratory with human subjects is a rather artificial context: time is compressed,
subjects are asked to make unnatural repeated decisions, so that lifetime span
can be mimicked, and the landscape is fully controlled and manipulated by
the experimenter. Experimental design factors, such as round numerosity, are
strictly related to the specific aim of the investigation: even a few rounds are
enough to study some simple learning processes, while a higher number of
repetitions is necessary if more complex behavioral dynamics are investigated.
Nevertheless, an excessive increase in the number of rounds can often harm the
results’ reliability, as participants get bored. Therefore, from this viewpoint,
well-designed experiments allow researchers to carefully study and deeply un-
derstand simple dynamics and individual behaviors. In a complementary way,
simulations permit to disregard the boredom issue and analyze more com-
plex and dynamic behavioral processes over an extended period of time and
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among heterogeneous agents: in order to see the emergence and the evolution
of behaviors over time, and investigate cognitive processes, ACE researchers
implement artificial agents that make decisions and react to consequences and
signals. As this approach is based on heterogeneous and predominantly bound-
edly rational agents acting within a dynamic environment, it extends the idea
of the representative agent that does not evolve, is fully rational and endowed
with an unlimited computational power.
In doing this, simulation models may rely on data from human-subject
experiments. The agent-based methodology can be used to understand re-
sults from human-based studies, since it allows the exploration of the decision
process in a more complex economic environment, by replacing humans with
agents. The potential of experimental results can be increased by means of
these computational tests: it is possible to explore the psychological mecha-
nisms giving rise to phenomena whose robustness and external validity can
be checked. Simulations relate the micro-level (i.e., agent-level) behavior to
macro-level (i.e., system-level) dynamics, represent multiple scales of analysis
in a natural way, and investigate adaptation and learning. Agents are built
on experimental evidence, and behave according to actually observed heuris-
tics; in addition, the implementation of an interaction among different agents
over time provides insights on macro evolution, which could not be investi-
gated in a simpler human-based experiment. The ’formal’ similarity ensured
by simulations is combined with the ’material’ one provided by laboratory
experiments in a complementary way. The potential of both methodologies
is exploited in order to meet the external validity requirement (Guala, 2002).
Therefore, from this viewpoint, not only simulations contribute to the external
validity hypothesis of experimental systems, but, in turn, experiments increase
ACE studies’ validity, which is considered as one of the key aspects to judge
the performance of a computational model (Taber and Timpone, 1996). In
fact, simulation results can be tested in the laboratory in order to better grasp
human behavior in computational settings, and observe whether and why com-
puter and human behaviors differ. Collected data can feed the software model,
and contribute to ameliorate agent-based predictions of real world economic
behaviors, and ground them on a material basis, rather than a merely formal
one.
Based on this synergic approach, agents’ behavioral traits are no longer
defined only according to simplifying theoretical assumptions, but to observa-
tions actually taken from the real world: behavioral regularities discovered in
economics and psychology experiments (e.g., Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein,
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1998; Mittone, 2002; Mittone, 2006; Kirchler, 2007) can be used to calibrate
and/or test simulation models, which, in turn, can help check and explain
experimental results. Therefore, both approaches gain in external validity:
the high number of degrees of freedom in agent-based models can be managed
with human calibration, and human-based experiments, which are not always
able to perfectly manipulate subjects’ behavior and control their cognitive
processes, can find a further confirmation in simulations.
In light of the above, the complementarity of simulations and laboratory
experiment also emerges as a support to external validity: the ’formal’ similar-
ity between simulations and real-world phenomena can be combined with the
‘material’ similarity characterizing the relationship between the experimental
and the target system. On the one hand, the simulations’ need for a relevant
background knowledge can be met by means of an experiment-based calibra-
tion: evidence on human decision processes are collected in the laboratory and
used to feed simulated agents, so that they can resemble real decision-makers
also at a more material level.3 On the other hand, the mere materiality of
laboratory experiments is enriched by simulations’ formal correspondence to
reality: people’s behavior is first observed in a rather simple and artificial
laboratory setting; then, it is further investigated and tested in a more real-
istic environment, in which human-calibrated agents interact. Therefore, it
seems possible to conclude that none of the two methodologies has epistemic
privilege over the other (Parke, 2014): ’material’ and ’formal’ correspondence
should be used in a complementary manner, so that each methodology can
take advantage from the other while addressing the common external validity
issue.
A graphical analysis of this relationship between experiments and ACE
models is provided in Figure 3.2: the framework adopted by Guala and Mit-
tone (2005) is extended in order to include agent-based simulations as a sup-
port for experiments in studying empirical economic phenomena and bridging
the external validity gap. The figure shows that ACE simulations rely on both
macro and micro theoretical models: in fact, they allow the investigation of
the evolution over time of network systems involving heterogeneous individu-
als, and these heterogeneity is built upon micro experimental evidence. In this
sense, also simulations belong to the real world, as experimental observations
are used for agents’ calibration, and complex and more complete settings can
3According to Winsberg (2009), the main difference between simulations and experiments
depends on the prior ’knowledge that is invoked to argue for the external validity of the
research’.
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Figure 3.2: ACE simulations supporting experiments
be implemented, to the purpose of making experimental results more likely
to be externally valid. Agent-based models rely on preference assumptions
but they exhibit a high degree of complexity with respect to human-based
experiments, as they mimic societies made of heterogeneous individuals. Not
only human-calibrated agents can be endowed with diverse attributes, such as
income level, risk propensity, compliance preferences, norm adherence, heuris-
tics, biases, etc., but also various policy parameters, and the effect of these on
the interaction among agents can be taken into account.4 This allows both the
investigation of taxpayers’ cognitive process, and the combination of micro-
level evidence and macro dynamics among heterogeneous agents in a unique
decision setting resembling the economic environment of interest. The analy-
sis of tax compliance dynamics in a pretty realistic, though complex, system
may lead to discover new and efficient policy options (Garrido and Mittone,
2013; Pickhardt and Seibold, 2014), which could take into account the variety
of reactions emerging in a population of heterogeneous taxpayers.
4Despite the quite recent development of agent-based modeling in the literature of tax eva-
sion, two distinct strands can be already identified. Models belong to the economic domain if
the interaction process is due to a change in parameter values in the taxpayer’s utility func-
tion (e.g., Mittone and Patelli, 2000; Davis, Hecht, and Perkins, 2003; Bloomquist, 2004a;
Bloomquist, 2004b; Antunes et al., 2007; Bloomquist, 2007; Korobow, Johnson, and Axtell,
2007; Bloomquist, 2006; Bloomquist, 2011b; Bloomquist, 2011a; Hokamp and Pickhardt,
2010; Me´der, Simonovits, and Vincze, 2012). In contrast, models with an interaction pro-
cess driven by statistical mechanics fall in the domain of econophysics/sociophysics (e.g.,
Lima and Zaklan, 2008; Zaklan, Lima, and Westerhoff, 2008; Zaklan, Westerhoff, and Stauf-
fer, 2009; Hokamp and Pickhardt, 2010; Lima, 2010; Lima, 2012b; Lima, 2012a; Seibold
and Pickhardt, 2013; Hokamp and Seibold, 2014a; Hokamp and Seibold, 2014b; Pickhardt
and Seibold, 2014; Bazart et al., 2016). Agents are not endowed with a utility function;
their behavior is described as a stochastic process affected by the changing balance between
individual’s autonomy and influence from neighbors’ behavior. This chapter focuses on the
economic domain.
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3.4 An Agent-based Approach to Taxpayers’ Be-
havior
With a closer focus on tax experiments, this section proposes two separate
ACE approaches intended to pursue the aforementioned goal of filling the
external validity gap: both of them are aimed to tackle the limitations of full
rationality and behavioral homogeneity, which impair the external validity of
theoretical and experimental claims.
Firstly, agent-based models may analyze the interaction among types and
study the subsequent emerging macro dynamics; this is mainly based on the
implementation of recurring behavioral styles in the population of taxpay-
ers previously identified in laboratory experiments (Mittone and Patelli, 2000;
Davis, Hecht, and Perkins, 2003; Antunes et al., 2007; Hokamp and Pickhardt,
2010; Hokamp, 2014). Due to their scope, these models are usually charac-
terized by a modest degree of granularity: they try to tackle the unrealistic
theoretical assumption of a lack of heterogeneity in taxpayers’ behavior, yet
without always addressing the bounded rationality issue. They are not in-
tended to explore individuals’ cognitive dynamics; therefore, behavioral types
are specified as rather simple agents. This interest in the identification of
groups of taxpayers dates back at least to the 1990s. Building on Cowell
(1991), Hessing et al. (1992) identify three behavioral types according to will-
ingness to comply, and underline the importance of behavioral heterogeneity
to evaluate the extent of efficiency and effectiveness of different policy instru-
ments: some auditing strategies might have the negative impact of crowding
out honesty, and thus reducing individual willingness to comply; in contrast,
an efficient strategy might fight tax evasion by sustaining honesty and com-
pliance. In this respect, different from human-based experiments, agent-based
simulations allow the implementation and manipulation of population hetero-
geneity in a highly controlled manner, so that this, and its interaction with
other variables, can be treated and analyzed as a determinant of policies’ ef-
ficacy. In a synergic view, such simulation results can be subsequently tested
on human subjects.
Secondly, simulations may also look into micro behavioral patterns that go
beyond the macro type specification. Therefore, they are characterized by a
higher granularity, since agents are more complex in their attributes. In fact,
in this case, human behavior is first investigated at an individual level in the
laboratory, and then reproduced by means of artificial agents (Bloomquist,
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2006; Garrido and Mittone, 2008; Me´der, Simonovits, and Vincze, 2012): sim-
ulations help uncover and understand human cognitive processes and psycho-
logical drivers, which cannot be fully investigated in a purely human setting.
Therefore, this kind of analysis is well suited to the implementation of bound-
edly rational decision-makers, who are intended to mimic human subjects, and
choose according to a restricted set of information.
The following sections provide an exemplification of the methodological
validity of combining human- and agent-based techniques in the study of tax
phenomena. To this purpose, the aforementioned distinction between mainly
macro or micro computational analysis is adopted; in addition, some attempts
of reconciling such a distinction are analyzed (e.g., Korobow, Johnson, and
Axtell, 2007; Garrido and Mittone, 2013; Mittone and Jesi, 2016). The anal-
ysis of these simulation examples is aimed to offer a guidance in the imple-
mentation of the synergic approach, involving both human- and agent-based
models, with the intent of filling the external validity gap of economic ex-
periments. Providing an extensive review of research with human calibrated
models is, instead, beyond the scope of the present chapter.
3.4.1 The Macroeconomic Approach
Mittone and Patelli (2000) carry out a dynamic simulation in order to model
a fiscal environment in which different types of taxpayers interact and, accord-
ing to their degree of compliance, a public good is provided5. The two authors
investigate taxpayers’ psychological and moral motives by using human cali-
brated simulation models. The idea of studying specific taxpayers’ behavioral
traits is developed in the seminal work by Mittone (2002): he categorizes be-
havioral regularities, and identifies classes of subjects reacting in a similar way
to certain economic and moral factors.6
Mittone (2002) verifies whether subjects’ behaviors can be captured and
classified in homogeneous categories, by performing a cluster analysis.7 He
5The two authors specify that, given their focus, what they refer to as ‘agent’ or ‘taxpayer’
(taken as synonyms in this context) is a ‘taxpaying behavior’, defined as a form of reaction
to the introduction of a tax.
6The former are exemplified by income level, tax rate, audit probability, and fees, which
enter taxpayers’ utility function. Moral factors are investigated by manipulating the decision
context in a between-subject fashion: the effects produced by either the introduction of a tax
yield redistribution, which depends on all taxpayers’ compliance decisions, or the lack of any
reference to the fiscal environment are tested. This not only allows the researcher to study
the role of moral constraints, but also to check the robustness of the emerging categories
over different settings.
7For this kind of analysis, the author adopts the average linkage between groups method
(also called UPGMA - Unweighted Pair-Group Method using arithmetic Averages), and uses
standardized variables. According to this method, the distance between two groups is the
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finds four main clusters:8 the great majority of subjects do not exhibit a
stable behavior, in line with the intuition that previous experience affects
taxpayers’ decisions. Behavioral clusters are almost identical across experi-
mental conditions. Results confirm the difficulty of modeling and explaining
the actual dynamics of taxpayers’ behavior by simply relying on the traditional
expected utility approach: refinements based on empirical and experimental
observations are necessary, in order to understand the interaction between be-
havioral heterogeneity and enforcement policies. As pointed out by Mittone
(2002), contrarily to rational predictions, participants seem not to be comfort-
able with repeated choices under risk, and alternate opposite choices, probably
because the ongoing interaction with the environment leads them to weight
probabilities, and not to stick with a predetermined pure strategy. However,
he also reports that tax yield redistribution triggers honesty. This change
in the composition of the population due to the institutional setting might
have serious policy implications: these experimental results seem to suggest
that the policy maker should implement fiscal plans designed according to the
institutional setting, and subsequently exploit the composition of taxpayers’
population to foster honesty imitation, as proposed by Hessing et al. (1992).
To this purpose, a valid support is offered by ACE simulations, which test
the efficiency and the efficacy of different enforcement strategies on a large
population consisting of a realistic variety of human-calibrated types. This
computational approach adds to the experimental one, since it manipulates
the composition of the population, and thus controls for the macro effects
deriving from the interaction among different behavioral types under given
institutional and fiscal settings.
Building on this, Mittone and Patelli (2000) study the true nature of tax
compliance, by focusing not only on the effect of tax authority enforcement,
but also on social interaction and moral concerns. They focus on the coexis-
tence of three different behavioral styles which require agents’ interaction in
order to evolve, and adopt a computational approach that might contribute to
the validity of experimental findings. The work by Mittone and Patelli (2000)
average of the distances between all pairs of individuals (i.e. by taking one individual for
each of the two clusters).
8The four styles are: (i) the (pure) ’absolute stability’ of subjects always paying the tax
due; (ii) the ’relative stability’ of subjects always evading, yet at different extents; (iii) the
’oscillatory behavior’ between full compliance and partial evasion; (iv) the ’mixed behavior’
of subjects adopting the oscillatory behavior in the first half of the session, and fully evading
in the second half. The large majority of subjects exhibited a stable behavior: it was rare
to observe a drastic change in their ’style’.
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can be considered as a good example of the synergic approach of ACE sim-
ulations and human-based experiments aimed to provide greater realism and
concreteness for the subsequent application of results to specific policy targets.
In fact, Mittone (2002) identifies in the laboratory some behavioral regular-
ities; Mittone and Patelli (2000) not only test the robustness of laboratory
findings, but also study the macro evolution of a dynamic and heterogeneous
population facing different enforcement systems. Behavioral types identified
with the experimental micro approach are used to calibrate agents, whose
behavior is analyzed from a macroeconomic viewpoint: type imitation and
population evolution are the main scopes of this ACE investigation. These
types include the honest taxpayer, the imitative taxpayer, and the perfect free-
rider.9 Agents share a decision algorithm, leaded by utility maximization,
while each type has a unique utility function that specifies its behavior.10
This allows the implementation of heterogeneous agents, and aims to extend
microeconomic models towards the investigation of behavioral evolution and
evasion activity in a population of interacting taxpayers, who have different
preference structures.
In such a system, at regular intervals, a genetic algorithm can be activated
in order to update the composition of the population, without modifying the
overall number of agents. The two authors set an initial scenario, and observe
how a given population composition evolves over time: taxpayers initially
belong to one of the three categories, but then they can decide to switch to
another type, according to the degree of success of their style in pursuing the
goal of utility maximization.
This optimization strictly depends on tax-payment decision and the risk
of being investigated. In fact, in each round, a fixed number of agents are
audited according to either a uniform auditing (all agents have the same prob-
ability of being investigated) or a low-tail auditing strategy (agents who report
the lowest amount of tax have a higher probability of being audited). This
9This classification resembles the one identified and investigated by Fischbacher, Ga¨chter,
and Fehr (2001) and Burlando and Guala (2005): unconditional cooperators, conditional
cooperators, and free-riders.
10The utility function is built on the work by Myles and Naylor (1996), in which tax
compliance is assumed to be affected by social customs and group conformity. The honest
agent derives additional utility, proportional to the percentage of honest taxpayers in the
population, form behaving in accordance to the social norm of compliance. The imitative
agent ’s utility function depends on the amount of tax he should pay, and on the average
amount of tax paid by the population. Finally, the freerider agent derives a positive utility
from adopting an opportunistic behavior. Moreover, they all get a non-negative utility from
the public sector: the model hypothesizes the existence of a single public good, which is
produced every round thanks to the tax yield previously collected.
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diversification is intended to investigate the effect that different auditing poli-
cies produce on taxpayers’ behavior, also depending on the specific degree of
population heterogeneity. Figure 3.3 shows the functioning of the simulated
economy: it is evident that agents’ decisions are determined by both social
interaction, and the enforcement activity of the tax authority.
Figure 3.3: System structure diagram designed after Mittone
and Patelli (2000)
In summary, Mittone and Patelli (2000) study the macro experimental
interaction among behavioral types identified by means of a microeconomic
approach; they test the efficacy of different audit strategies in fighting tax
compliance when population heterogeneity is not the result of abstract as-
sumptions, but of real-world observations. Such a controlled exploration of the
interaction of different population compositions with the environment would
not be easily implementable in a purely human-based setting. This justifies the
adoption of an agent-based approach, which allows the observation of macro
behavioral dynamics, but needs human calibration for the implementation of
realistic taxpayers.
Results show that a uniform auditing strategy is more effective than a
low-tail one in fostering compliance; imitating the honest behavior is a win-
ning strategy when low-tail auditing is implemented. Finally, genetic selection
favors honesty, as frequently observed also inside and outside the laboratory
when moral concerns on contribution are involved in the decision process.
When taxpayers are aware that they will actually benefit from their fiscal
contribution, they appear to be more prone to comply.
Hence, if combined together with theoretical models and laboratory exper-
iments, agent-based simulations can help understand and explain behavioral
processes underlying tax payment decisions. The novelty of this study resides
in the implementation of a simulation model investigating the relationship
between enforcement activity and social interaction among different behav-
ioral styles, that have emerged as regularities in previous human-based exper-
iments. Taxpayers are heterogeneous and their behavior is described by utility
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functions; furthermore, they can switch to a different type according to the
‘satisfaction’ they are able to derive from the behavior of their own category.
Nevertheless, agents’ decision-making process still relies on optimization, and
depends only on the information they receive from the system. In this sense,
they are myopic, since they are not designed to take into account either inter-
temporal or strategic expectation on the evolution of the environment. For
this reason, a further development in this direction might include a distinction
between naive and sophisticated agents, where the latter should be modeled
in order to mimic agents capable of making efficient predictions about their
future behavior and that of their mates.
3.4.2 The Microeconomic Approach
Besides this macro approach, mainly focused on the analysis of the effect of
behavioral heterogeneity, a parallel line of research is based on the assumption
of boundedly rational agents has gained relevance, too: the micro dimension of
individual history serves as a base for ACE simulations aimed to understand
and explain decision-makers’ cognitive process. Under this view, decisions are
expected to vary according to individuals’ state, which is determined by ex-
ternal environment and past experience, and is translated in a ‘local’ set of
information the agent may use to decide. For instance, in the fiscal context,
evasion might be more likely when an individual has been audited either dur-
ing the previous round (bomb crater effect) or at the beginning of his fiscal
life (echo effect). Human-based experiments show whether different experi-
ences lead to states characterized by diverse levels of willingness to evade,
and thus, more in general, whether subjects modify their behavior according
to their current condition. Thanks to agent-based simulations, it is possible
to systematically analyze and explain human behavior, in order to check the
robustness and the external validity experimental phenomena on a larger pop-
ulation. For instance, the standard theoretical approach could be replaced by
a setting closer to the Aspiration Adaptation Theory by Selten (1998): agents
have a limited set of decision dimensions, and they can select even opposite
actions, depending on their specific current state, which affects probability
evaluation and weighting.
This micro approach is well exemplified by Garrido and Mittone (2008),
who use the theory of finite automata (Rubinstein, 1986; Romera, 2000) to
interpret Italian and Chilean experimental data on tax compliance. They
report that the behavior of the great majority of subjects can be explained by
either unconditional honesty or the bomb crater effect, which is part of the
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library of phenomena (Guala and Mittone, 2005; Mittone, 2006; Kastlunger
et al., 2009).
Recalling the original notion of boundedly rational approach, Garrido and
Mittone (2008) consider individuals as limited in their computational power:
each taxpayer can rely on a restricted set of information, in order to decide
whether to comply or fully evade. The two authors assume that the prob-
ability of evading depends on the current state of the taxpayer (referred to
as ‘locally determined decision maker’): this state may change according to
external events, such as the occurrence of a fiscal audit. Every artificial agent
consists in a finite state automaton (Moore, 1956; Sipser, 2006), whose bi-
nary stochastic output (compliance vs. evasion) does not depend only on the
current state (for instance audited in the previous period), but also on the
probability of evasion associated to that specific state. Garrido and Mittone
(2008) collect human-subject data: experimental results show the bomb crater
effect, which however turns out to be less evident at an aggregate level. For
this reason, the experiment is followed by an agent-based simulation aimed to
identify the specific micro determinants of taxpayers’ behavior, i.e. to identify
the automaton with the highest success ratio in predicting human subjects’
decisions.
According to our view, this application of an agent-based model helps un-
derstand how simulations can support the experimental approach in the field
of tax research. Human-based experiments provide more or less clear insights
on taxpayers’ behavior, and an agent-based system enriches our understanding
of human behavioral regularities, by testing many cognitive drivers and inner
motives which are supposed to be involved in the decision process. This syn-
ergic approach might resemble theory testing in the laboratory: as a matter
of fact, like experiments help identify which theory best explains human be-
haviors observed in the laboratory, simulations allow the identification of the
main cognitive drivers explaining human behavior and thus check its validity
outside the laboratory.
Specifically, in their work, Garrido and Mittone (2008) propose a set of
seven hypotheses,11 which might explain experimental findings by testing the
robustness of the bomb crater against the loss-repair effect.12 Each hypothesis
11The decision of evading depends on whether the subject is (H0) audited in the previous
period; (H1) audited in the previous period, and caught; (H2) audited during the previous
two periods; (H3) audited in the previous two periods, and caught; (H4) audited in the pre-
vious three periods; (H5) audited in the previous four periods; (H6) audited in the previous
three periods, and caught.
12Both effects imply an immediate decrease in compliance after an audit. However, the
former is due to chance misperception, and depends only on the occurrence of an audit,
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is translated into an automaton, whose states map the characteristics of the
hypothesis itself. This tests different behavioral motives, and helps identify the
best one in explaining patterns observed in the laboratory. From this perspec-
tive, it is again evident how ACE simulations can provide a valuable support
also at a micro level: they help increase the potential of experimental evidence
and fully understand the psychological and cognitive drivers characterizing the
individual decision process.
The hypothesis that gives the most detailed description and prediction
of subjects’ behavior is the one involving the bomb crater effect; the only
other relevant automaton is the one describing unconditionally honest agents,
i.e. those who fully comply, irrespective of their current state. These results
confirm, on the one hand, the robustness of the bomb crater effect as a common
behavioral trait, and, on the other hand, the existence of an honest type
(Mittone and Patelli, 2000).
In addition, Garrido and Mittone (2008) test three further hypotheses, in
order to control for the effect of different audit sequences.13 In line with the
expectations of robustness and external validity of the echo effect (Guala and
Mittone, 2005), computational results confirm that human subjects’ behavior
can be explained by means of a rather simple hypothesis: repeatedly auditing
subjects at the beginning of their fiscal life has a positive impact on compliance
over a certain time period, because of a wrong probability evaluation people
form when relying on sampled experience (Guala and Mittone, 2005; Mittone,
2006; Kastlunger et al., 2009).
Hence, two main behavioral patterns are identified: about 70.3% of the
entire experimental pool consists of subjects who never evade and subjects
who evade strategically according to the bomb crater effect. Honest subjects
exhibit an evading probability close to 0, irrespective of their state; in con-
trast, in case of strategic evaders, the likelihood of evasion is low only in the
‘not audited’ and in the initial state. The remaining 29.7% does not exhibit
a clear behavioral pattern, since, in every state, they evade with a probability
close to 0.5. Therefore, the adoption of ACE modeling leads to conclude that
even a simple behavioral hypothesis, which might be modeled as a heuristic,
and not on actual evasion detection. In contrast, the loss-repair effect emerges only when a
taxpayer is found to be an evader.
13They assume that taxpayers’ evasion might depend (H7) positively on being audited
in the previous period, and negatively on experiencing an audit in the first five periods of
the experiment. This hypothesis is extended in H8, which also considers the effect of being
caught during the latest audit. Finally, they test whether (H9) subject’s decision depends on
being audited during the previous two periods, and on experiencing an investigation during
the first five periods of the experimental session.
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can explain a large proportion of subjects’ decisions. Nevertheless, such a
comprehension of human behavior can be achieved thanks to agent-based in-
vestigations, as the mere observation of human subjects might not be sufficient
to draw valid conclusions.
3.4.3 Micro-level Dynamics for Macro-level Interactions among
Behavioral Types
This section deals with ACE models that combine micro behavioral aspects
and macro dynamics, with the intent of providing a better understanding of
both experimental evidence and economic phenomena taking place outside
the laboratory. Therefore, this kind of comprehensive analysis can be of great
relevance for policy implications, by relying on the implementation of human-
calibrated agents.
The first example is the work by Garrido and Mittone (2013), which ana-
lyzes how the efficiency and the efficacy of an enforcement strategy - defined
in terms of audit frequency and targeting - can be considered as a function
of the population composition. However, different from the macro analysis by
Mittone and Patelli (2000), behavioral types are defined according to income
distribution and specific traits that characterize individual cognitive process
(Garrido and Mittone, 2008). Taxpayers are endowed with a decision function,
and, in each round, they choose whether to evade. Honest taxpayers tend to
comply in any case, irrespective of their current state; strategic evaders be-
have according to the bomb crater effect. Right after all taxpayers make their
decisions, the policy-maker applies an optimizing selection rule that targets a
subset of agents to audit: on the one hand, collected tax increases revenues;
on the other hand, audits are costly and not always successful.14
Garrido and Mittone (2013) conclude that the optimal audit scheme must
take into account income distribution, the possibility of identifying behavioral
patterns with micro foundations, and the specific fiscal history of individuals.
Micro-level behavioral regularities emerging in laboratory experiments turn
out to be fundamental in designing an auditing strategy: being aware of some
cognitive biases can help predict people’s behavior; agent-based simulations
built on these biases are useful to plan a coherent and efficient fiscal policy. As
income inequality increases, the optimal plan targets the richest taxpayers, and
frequently repeats two consecutive audits as a strategy against the bomb crater
effect. In contrast, as income distribution becomes more uniform, the optimal
14The degree of efficiency takes its maximum value 1 only when each audit catches an
evader.
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plan suggests to spread audits throughout the entire population. Every time an
agent is investigated, his last four declarations are verified: if the tax authority
audits each agents every four periods, also strategic evaders are caught.
Nevertheless, despite the relevant contribution of this study in understand-
ing how the policy-maker can address the issue of tax evasion when realistically
dealing with a heterogeneous population, results are partially due both to the
rationality assumption on the tax authority and to the main characteristics
of taxpayers’ choice function (no intensive decision is allowed, and no actual
learning is implemented). This simplifying decision process might lead to par-
tially misleading behaviors: in fact, in their laboratory experiment, authors
allow for intensive decisions, and observe that rich individuals often prefer to
evade a small amount of tax with the aim of reducing the probability of being
targeted. In contrast, the simulation by Garrido and Mittone (2013) disre-
gards this important aspect, and the optimal plan might target the richest
taxpayers so that expected revenues of the tax authority are maximized.
The second example of a computational analysis combining the macro and
the micro approach is the one by Mittone and Jesi (2016). By extending the
agent-based analysis by Garrido and Mittone (2013) and Mittone and Patelli
(2000), they build a complex adaptive system in which a variety of behavioral
types coexist. However, different from Mittone and Patelli (2000), these types
are based on the definition of simple heuristics, and not of utility functions
to optimize. In addition, with the intent of overcoming the limitations of the
model by Garrido and Mittone (2013), they also allow for intensive decisions,
learning, different risk perceptions, and for probability weighting as a common
feature of individuals’ decision process. Specifically, Mittone and Jesi (2016)
investigate the functioning and the evolution of a system where boundedly
rational agents cope with a public good which might be consumed and created
by the agents themselves. The authors build a self-reproducing economy as a
setting for the study of the emergence of a responsible behavior in managing
a renewable resource. They study the necessity of an exogenous mechanism
of auditing in order to achieve a sustainable set-up.
In every period, agents extract their private endowment from the good;
then, they contribute by paying their tax due. These actions are carried
out according to a limited set of heuristics (basically either imitative behav-
iors or habits) and to the employment type of the agent (employee vs. self-
employed):15 heuristics suggest the amount to take in order to perform a
15Agents can be categorized into two different cross-sectional sets according to institutional
constraint introduced: agents subject to the high constraint (employees) cannot evade more
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satisfying extraction, but the agent can try to extract more resources. In the
beginning, each agent is randomly assigned a type and one of the five available
heuristics, then, in order to keep the system dynamic, new agents are injected
into the economy, and individuals can switch from one heuristic to another ac-
cording to the achieved satisfaction level: the higher the level of sadness (i.e.
the lower the degree of satisfaction), the higher the probability that an agent
opts for switching to another heuristic. This sadness is mainly determined by
the level of the extracted endowment, and the proportion of agents actually
contributing to the public good. In addition, irrespective of the individual
heuristic adopted, agents share the bomb crater effect as a common micro-
founded psychological trait: as widely observed in human-based experiments,
after an investigation occurs, the audited agent evades, underestimating the
probability of a repeated audit. Such a characterization makes agents closer
to human beings: they are not supposed to be rational, but rather emotional
and biased in their decision process. For this reason, results can be of great
interest and relevance for externally valid policy suggestions.
At the end of every period, the tax authority performs random audits and
the good reproduces itself so that it cannot extinguish. Before the reproduc-
tion takes place, the good triggers a signal if the critical status in terms of
quantity is reached. Agents react to this alarm according to their sensitivity
level, i.e. to their propensity to take risk, and their adopted heuristic. See
Figure 3.4 for a comprehensive representation of the overall system structure.
Figure 3.4: System structure diagram designed after Mittone
and Jesi (2016)
Thanks to the implementation of this complex framework with a micro-
founded behavioral heterogeneity, Mittone and Jesi (2016) identify the extent
of behavioral heterogeneity that is able to trigger a responsible behavior, and
than 10% of the tax due, while those subject to the low constraint (self-employed) are free
to evade up to 50% of the tax due.
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thus find interesting results from a normative point of view. In fact, as al-
ready suggested by Hessing et al. (1992), they claim that selfishness, and thus
evasion, can be effectively counterbalanced if other behavioral types are more
attractive for taxpayers. In their model, an efficient fiscal policy can tremen-
dously decrease tax evasion not only by means of audit deterrence, but also
by sustaining the advantage that a taxpayer can get adopting an honest be-
havior. From this perspective, an efficient policy should exploit behavioral
heterogeneity and induce taxpayers to the imitation of honest agents by mak-
ing compliance more attractive for both employees and self-employed workers.
Hence, also in this case, the validity of the synergic approach of human-
based and agent-based experiments is undeniable: human evidence serves as
a basis to build behavioral types, and simulations allow the manipulation of
population heterogeneity as a treatment variable, with the intent of leveraging
the full potential and overcoming the limits of human-based experiments. This
results in a more complete and deeper analysis of tax payment decisions: useful
policy suggestions can be derived, as it is possible to implement a rather
realistic system, in which different fiscal strategies are tested on a dynamic
and heterogeneous population of interacting agents.
3.5 Conclusions
Since the appearance of the first theoretical models in the early 1970s, the
study of tax compliance has moved a long way towards the development of
new models, taking into account psychological regularities and anomalies of
decision-making. The increasing success of the application of behavioral eco-
nomics has shown the importance of relying on empirical and experimental
data in order to integrate theoretical analyses, and overcome the traditional
limit of representative agent. In fact, recent evidence from laboratory ex-
periments and surveys underlines the impact of non-economic considerations
in determining individuals’ behavioral heterogeneity in real-world compliance,
and the relevance of understanding taxpayers’ behavior and the underlying
cognitive process, in order to provide useful normative policies, able to sustain
compliance and deter evasion.
From our perspective, much interest and effort need to be devoted to the
combination of experimental techniques and agent-based models, in order to
investigate the interaction between taxpayers’ cognitive process and the sur-
rounding environment. This would not only contribute to the external validity
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of experimental findings by testing the robustness of human subjects’ behav-
ior in systems with an increased degree of complexity, but it would also allow
the integration of a micro-level perspective with macro-level considerations:
dynamics at an aggregate level can be studied starting from micro-level ob-
servations.
This chapter explains how simulations can increase tax experiments’ ex-
ternal validity in two different ways. On the one hand, agent-based mod-
els consist in the implementation of a set of human-based behavioral types
and extend experimental analyses by manipulating the composition of agents’
population. This provides a greater adherence to the environment outside
the laboratory, and tests the effects of a variety of policies on a heterogeneous
population. In fact, agent-based models may define different macro behavioral
types interacting with diverse policy solutions adopted by the tax authority,
and this heterogeneity can be based on the identification of micro-level behav-
ioral dynamics emerging from psychology, economics laboratory experiments,
and empirical studies. On the other hand, experiments’ external validity can
be increased by identifying the main cognitive drivers that explain phenom-
ena observed in the laboratory. Human-based experiments contribute to the
library of phenomena, by simply searching for facts and regularities, while
agent-based simulations analyze and test these phenomena, so that they can
be applied to specific cases to a normative purpose.
Overall, this kind of innovative approach adds to the ongoing discussion
about the inclusion of behavioral realism into theoretical studies in the lit-
erature on tax evasion. Therefore, it supports a greater parallelism with the
natural world, yet without denying the importance of model development: the
synergic combination of theoretical analyses and human-calibrated simulations
may help shed new light on the issue of tax evasion, since it focuses on the
specific problem of new policy implementations in a rigorous way and in a
realistic environment, before an actual application in the field.
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Chapter 4
Commitment to Tax
Compliance:
Timing Effect on Willingness
to Evade
joint with Luigi Mittone
4.1 Introduction
Many experimental studies on decision-making demonstrate the existence of
a significant difference between planning and ongoing decisions. When asked
to plan their actions, people often overweight events with small probabilities
while in ongoing (i.e. real time and, in general, repeated) decisions, they tend
to underweight these events and thus behave as if they ignored them (Yechiam,
Barron, and Erev, 2005; Schurr, Rodensky, and Erev, 2014b; Camilleri and
Newell, 2013). The so-called planning-ongoing gap, which can be considered
a translation of the renowned description-experience gap (Barron and Erev,
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Rakow and Newell, 2010), emerges in many diverse
situations e.g. drivers passing on a two-lane road (Harris, 1988) or very rare
computer backups. Following this stream of research, Schurr, Rodensky, and
Erev (2014a) and Erev et al. (2010) study problems related to not obeying
safety rules in the workplace. They observe that workers are aware of the
likelihood of rare events (i.e. accidents), and thus of the importance of rules
but they actually tend not to obey them as if they underestimated the proba-
bility of accidents. Erev et al. (2010) test a gentle enforcement program aimed
to help people behave according to safety rules. The program requires that
workers remind each other to obey rules, especially when a violation occurs.
Authors report a significant increase in compliance with safety rules thanks to
this program.
108
Chapter 4. Commitment to Tax Compliance:
Timing Effect on Willingness to Evade
We argue that violation of safety rules has a structural similarity to the
problem of tax evasion: when taxpayers are asked to make a number of sequen-
tial decisions regarding their tax declaration, their behavior may change ac-
cording to the Planning-Ongoing Gap. Not only their behavior, but also their
attitudes towards risk of evasion may depend on the timing of decisions: as in
the case of workers evaluating relevant risks in their workplace, the Planning-
Ongoing Gap can be translated into a discrepancy between taxpayers’ plans
about income declaration and their actual behavior.1 Many taxpayers, such
as retailers or taxi drivers, deal with frequent tax payment decisions. Every
time they sell a good or a service, they can decide whether to give proof of
payment (either an invoice or a bill) to their customers and thus they auto-
matically decide whether to declare the transaction or not. When they evade,
they have to consider the risk of a fiscal investigation. Hence, according to
the Planning-Ongoing Gap in the context of tax evasion, it is reasonable to
expect that when asked to evaluate in advance the risk of evasion (i.e. at the
beginning of the business year, for instance), taxpayers show a preference for
compliance. Based on this assumption, our work investigates the existence
of the Planning-Ongoing Gap in taxpayers’ behavior in order to understand
whether compliance systems can be introduced. A possible empirical example
of this is the widespread adoption of POS devices for taxi fare payments in
the US where taxicabs have a customer-friendly system that requires neither a
signed receipt nor a minimum payment, and allows passengers to swipe their
card and tip with reasonably high preset amounts. Thanks to compliance with
credit card payments, the collection of revenue is higher: without POS, some
customers would use taxicabs less frequently and tips would not be so gener-
ous. On the contrary, cash payments leave much more room for evasion but
nevertheless do not ‘ensure’ frequent rides and tips. According to the data
collected by the Taxi and Limousine Commission of New York, even if cab
drivers may refuse to accept credit cards in favor of cash, a widespread use
of POS is actually observed. Over time drivers seem to prefer to adopt this
device since it allows them to earn more when complied with. Clearer con-
clusions about the functioning of such a system in tax-payment decisions and
its relationship with the Planning-Ongoing Gap could be drawn by means of
experimental implementation. In addition, such a research may provide nor-
mative recommendations for tax administration and regulation of ridesharing,
as related to taxes and profitability for Uber’s business model (Oei and Ring,
2016).
1Mittone (1997) provides evidence of taxpayers’ underweighting in ongoing decisions.
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We conduct our research in an experimental setting with repeated mea-
surements by mimicking the taxicab scenario: subjects make a number of
sequential decisions regarding their tax declaration. The application of simi-
lar settings (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973a; Guala and
Mittone, 2005; Mittone, 2006; Kastlunger et al., 2009) aims to replicate the
decision dynamics during a taxpayer’s life span. Differently, the sequential
repetition of trials in the present study is intended to mimic the condition of
those taxpayers (e.g. retailers or taxi drivers) that face these decisions every
time they sell a good or a service during a fiscal year.
In order to examine the Planning-Ongoing Gap and to investigate the
existence of a possible resolution, we experimentally test the availability of a
compliance mechanism similar to that of the POS device used by taxi drivers.
The inconsistency between planning and ongoing decisions is investigated by
allowing taxpayers to commit to automatically pay half of the due tax (plastic
payments) and then decide whether to pay the remaining part.2 Thus, we not
only compare Planning and Ongoing decision-making but also explore whether
an enforcement system can be built on this gap in order to foster compliance
in the long-term.
4.2 Methodology
We investigate people’s behavior in a computerized tax-evasion experiment
within a repeated choice framework. Such a dynamic setting was originally
adopted to investigate the effect of audits on taxpayers’ expectation: tax com-
pliance depends not only on audit probability and punishment magnitude but
also on time lag among audits (e.g., Spicer and Hero, 1985; Webley, 1987;
Antonides and Robben, 1995; Mittone, 2006).
In the present research, we adopt the same setting but without dealing
directly with the frequency and the pattern of audits during repeated trials.
Nevertheless, this is useful for the investigation of the Planning-Ongoing Gap,
given the focus on probability weighting in planning and purely experience-
driven behavior in ongoing decisions.
4.2.1 Experimental Design and Task
At the beginning of every session we elicit subjects’ risk preferences through
the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013)3 where results
2A detailed explanation of the commitment mechanism can be found in Section 4.2.1.
3This method was selected because it allows us to measure risk preferences without ex-
plicitly asking participants to choose among lotteries, which is the task participants are given
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are given to participants only at the end of the experiment.4 In this task,
every subject is shown100 boxes: he knows that 99 boxes contain 50 ECU
each, while the remaining one contains a bomb. He is asked to collect as many
boxes as he likes. Boxes are then opened: if the box with the bomb has not
been selected, a subject’s earnings depend on the number of collected boxes
(50 ECU per box) but, if the bomb is among his boxes, this explodes causing
null earnings (see Appendix B for details).
Sessions last for 60 rounds.5 In each round the participant is informed of
his exogenous income Y , and of the amount of tax he is asked to pay tY , where
t = 0.3 is the tax rate. The sequence of incomes participants are assigned varies
every ten rounds: the ten levels of income are {991, 1006, 989, 1005, 990, 1013}.
These are determined as the algebraic sum of 1000 and a random error uni-
formly distributed between -15 and 15. This allows for a slight variation
among the levels of income and tax which, however, does not determine an ac-
tual change of income stakes. The same sequence is kept stable across subjects
since errors are not expected to have an impact on participants compliance de-
cisions. This was simply intended to prevent subjects from getting escessively
bored and distracted.
As shown in Table 4.1, we identify three between-subject treatments. In
this setting, we investigate the effect of the availability of a compliance system
based on the Planning-Ongoing Gap applied to the context of tax evasion. We
examine whether a change in the timing of decisions and in the characteristics
of the compliance enforcement system affects evasion.
Table 4.1: Treatments Table
Treatment Commitment Timing Commitment Characteristics
(self)ControlTreatment 10-round planning Reduced evasion attractiveness
PlanningTreatment 10-round planning Reduced tax liability
Reduced evasion attractiveness
OngoingTreatment round-by-round Reduced tax liability
Reduced evasion attractiveness
during the main part of the experiment. We adopted the structure of the static version and
added a computerized visual support. Nevertheless, differently from Crosetto and Filippin
(2013), subjects are not asked to state the number of boxes they desire to collect as they
can actually choose and select the boxes they want.
4Subjects do not receive immediate feedback, so that their decisions about tax are not
influenced by BRET outcome. For a similar reason, we did not administer this task at
the end of the experiment as subjects decisions could have been affected by the feedbacks
received during the 60 rounds.
5Even if no actual learning process is involved, we decided to set quite a high number
of rounds to capture possible variations over time, such as the duration of commitment
attractiveness.
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In the Control treatment, the participant is asked every 10 rounds (i.e. in
round 1, 11, 21, 31, 41, and 51) to select the condition under which he prefers to
play: he can choose either the No Commitment (NC) or the Commitment (C)
condition. The chosen condition is implemented for the following 10 rounds
until the next selection. This means that if he opts for the NC condition
for ten rounds, he can decide whether to declare his income. In the case of
declaration, he simply pays tY and his round payoff is Y (1 − t). Where no
declaration exists, he can be audited6 and fined with probability p = 0.20. If
he is not audited, his round payoff is equal to his entire income Y while, if he
undergoes a fiscal investigation, his payoff is Y −f where f = 4tY is the fine.7
If, instead, the participant selects the Commitment condition, he accepts to
automatically pay half of his due tax at the beginning of each of the following
10 rounds. Based on this, he can then decide, round by round, whether to
declare the rest of his income and pay the corresponding tax 0.50(tY ). Thus
as in the No Commitment condition, in the case of declaration, a participant’s
round payoff is Y (1− t). If he does not pay the remaining half of his tax, he
can be audited and his round payoff is equal to Y (1− 0.50t) with probability
1− p and to Y − f with probability p. At the end of every round, subjects are
informed of their payoff.
Figure 4.1: Decision structure (self) Control treatment
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Similarly, in the Planning treatment, the participant chooses the condition
(either No Commitment or Commitment) every ten rounds. However, while
the No Commitment condition remains unchanged, the Commitment condition
now includes a reduction of 10% on tax liability in return for advance tax
6According to the classification adopted by Hertwig et al. (2004) regarding probability
distributions, evasion is defined as the option including the rare event (audit).
7The entity of the fine has been determined such that Y − f < 0. By introducing this
mixed prospect, we do not focus only on either the (pure) gain or the (pure) loss domain.
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payment.8 If the participant opts for the automatic payment of half of his
due tax (0.50tY ) for the following ten periods, then in every round he decides
whether to pay the discounted residual amount of 0.40tY . As in the (self)
Control treatment, the tax authority can audit the participant. Therefore, if
he does not comply, his payoff is equal either to Y (1− 0.50t) with probability
1− p or to Y − f with probability p.
Figure 4.2: Decision structure Planning treatment
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Finally, in the Ongoing treatment, the subject makes every round decisions
regarding both tax payment and condition selection. At the beginning of
each period, he first chooses a condition (again, between No Commitment and
Commitment), which lasts only for that round; then, according to his selection,
he decides whether to pay his due tax. The condition and the payoff structure
are those adopted for the Planning treatment: the Commitment allows for a
discount of 10% on tax liability in return for certain and automatic payment of
half due tax (i.e. 0.50tY ). The only actual difference regards the timing and
the duration of the condition choice: in the Ongoing treatment participants
choose the condition every period while in the Planning treatment they choose
the condition every ten rounds.
8Parameters are determined in order to avoid a near ceiling effect (evasion is too attractive
to most people). We tested this in preliminary sessions by implementing different values for
tax rate (40% vs. 30%) and discount rate (5% vs. 10%).
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Figure 4.3: Decision structure Ongoing treatment
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In order to reduce possible differences across treatments, subjects’ deci-
sions are divided in two sequential screens.9 The first (i.e. the condition-
selection screen) contains a brief description of the two conditions (these are
also presented in detail in the instructions). In addition, subjects receive all
the information they need to make their decisions: they are informed about
the income level, the rate and amount of due tax under each condition, the
fee, and the payoff they get in case of evasion and lack of audit (also with
a distinction between the two conditions). The second screen (i.e. the one
including the actual tax-payment decision) recalls the same information as
the previous screen but with a focus on the chosen condition.10 If the subject
selects the NC condition, then he is shown a description (in terms of payoffs
and probability distributions) of the two ‘lotteries’, i.e. the certain one of full
tax compliance, and the risky one of full tax evasion. If the subject chooses
the C condition, he is also informed of how his due tax has been split: the
amount, and not only the proportion, that has been automatically paid, and
the amount that is still to be paid. Regardless of the treatment, the subject is
informed of his current payoff at the end of every round: he knows whether he
has been audited and how much he has earned. The final payoff is determined
as the sum of all the round payoffs.
9Screenshots can be found in Appendix B.
10Perhaps because of this information repetition, the experimental sessions took almost
the same time independently of the treatment. It seems that in the Ongoing treatment
subjects spend more time in front of the first screen than in front of the second; in the
Planning treatment condition selection takes time, and then subjects spend some time to
make their tax-payment decision (more time with respect to the Ongoing treatment).
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4.3 Participants and Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Cognitive and Experimental Economics
Laboratory (CEEL) in the University of Trento. We conducted six sessions
(two for each treatment). Participants were recruited among undergraduate
students who enrolled for CEEL. The total number of recruited subjects was
100, and the average age was 21.77 (s.d. = 2.457): 98 students (47 females,
and 51 males) took part in the experiment, while the other 2 were eventual
replacements. Most of them (49%) were students of Economics, 24% of Law,
9% of Engineering, 7% of Humanities, 6% of Social Sciences, and 5% of Math-
ematics and Hard Sciences. None of the participants was informed in advance
about the purpose of the experiment and subjects were allowed to participate
only once.
In the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to a computer; they
received the general instructions11 and those for the first part of the experi-
ment, i.e. the risk preference elicitation task. Subjects had five minutes to
read them individually. Then, instructions were read aloud by one member
of the experimental staff and participants were asked to answer some com-
prehension questions. Once the first part of the experiment was completed,
subjects received instructions for the second part. Again, they had five min-
utes to read them individually and then instructions were read aloud. After a
brief comprehension test,12 the second part of the experiment started. Before
leaving, subjects were asked to fill out a brief demographic questionnaire.
The experiment was designed and administered using the Borland Delphi
programming language. Each session lasted about 50 minutes. Subjects re-
ceived 3 Euros as show-up fee, plus a sum of experimental currency units that
varied according to their performance during the experiment and that was
converted in Euros (1000 ECU = 0.25 Euros) at the end of the session. The
average payment was equal to 14 Euros, with a maximum of 16 Euros and a
minimum of 11 Euros, show-up fee included.
11A translated and complete version of the instructions is available in Appendix A.
12Comprehension of the instructions was controlled before the beginning of each of the
two parts of the experimental sessions. The questions are reported at the end of the in-
structions in Appendix A where we tested the correct comprehension of the payoffs in the
different strategies. Appendix B includes the original experimental screens: subjects are not
asked to make computations when making their decisions since they receive all the relevant
information they may need to compare the different options. As a result, we conclude that
subjects behavior cannot be due to a wrong understanding of how the experiment works and
payoffs are computed. Even if subjects in the Ongoing treatment can experience the option
space more easily and rapidly, since no actual learning is required, it is possible to exclude
that behavioral differences across treatments are only due to diverse learning possibilities.
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4.4 Behavioral Predictions
According to the majority of experimental studies on tax evasion, the as-
sumption of risk neutrality can be adopted for a comparison with behavioral
predictions based on the Planning-Ongoing Gap. This experimental study is
based on a dynamic setting where subjects make very similar decisions for a
high number of rounds. Therefore, since the repeated decision problem does
not change noticeably13 during the experimental session, predictions can be
based on a single round.
For the sake of simplicity, we start from the Control treatment where no
actual difference exists between the two conditions in terms of compliance
payoff. Regardless of the selected condition, the expected value is EV (NC −
Compliance) = EV (C − Compliance) = 700. As for evasion, payoffs vary
according to the condition: EV (NCEvasion) = 760 and EV (CEvasion) =
640.
In the Ongoing treatment the participant first selects the condition (No
Commitment vs. Commitment). Under the No Commitment condition the
subject may fully comply and get EV (NC − Compliance) = 700 or fully
evade and get EV (NC − Evasion) = 760. Similarly, under the Commitment
condition, he may comply and get EV (C − Compliance) = 730 or evade and
get EV (C − Evasion) = 640. The highest expected value is associated with
evasion under the No Commitment condition. Therefore, in each round, a
risk-neutral utility maximizer would adopt this strategy.
Both in the Control and in the Planning treatment, risk-neutrality predicts
evasion under the No Commitment condition in each round.
Even if the assumption of (Constant Absolute) Risk Aversion were taken
into account, we would expect subjects to choose a mixture of evasion and
compliance lotteries which does not depend on the treatment applied.
On the other hand, the Planning-Ongoing Gap predicts that many tax-
payers, when asked to decide between immediate full compliance and imme-
diate full evasion, underweight the probability of being audited, while they
overweight this event when planning their future behavior. In the ongoing de-
cision setting, we expect subjects to choose the condition under which evasion
is more attractive (i.e. they do not adopt the POS device). When planning is
involved, however, we expect them to focus on the benefits of paying tax and
to choose the condition under which compliance is more profitable (i.e. they
13For the sake of simplicity, in the present numerical analysis an income of 1000 ECU is
used. Predictions do not vary when considering the other income levels.
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adopt the POS device that ensures them higher compliance revenues).14 In
addition to this, we also expect that fewer taxpayers select the commitment if
this has the only purpose of making evasion less attractive (i.e. they do not opt
for a POS device that does not give higher revenues). The Planning-Ongoing
Gap predicts that subjects, when asked to evaluate their tax-payment prob-
lem in advance, focus on evasion drawbacks, overestimating audit occurrence.
Our compliance mechanism is built on the fact that subjects are expected to
choose the condition that allows them to earn more by paying tax; in con-
trast, they are expected to select less frequently the condition that simply
helps them manage self-control problems by reducing evasion temptation.15
Here the (self) Control treatment plays a fundamental role as it disentan-
gles the effects of a commitment involving only advance tax-payment and the
effects of a commitment which also offers tax reduction in return. Making
evasion less attractive is sufficient to induce only sophisticated participants to
adopt the commitment mechanism. Contrarily, the commitment system with
a tax discount may involve managing self-control problems, but it does not
actually require participants to be sophisticated and thus aware of possible
decision inconsistencies. In our setting, the system relies on the fact that the
majority of participants adopts it because they think that evasion is too risky
and not necessarily because they know they will change their mind in ongoing
decisions.
A discrepancy between the Planning and the Ongoing treatment would
imply a difference in the evaluation based on decision timing. When subjects
plan, they recognize the importance of compliance while this does not happen
in ongoing decisions.
Consequently, we formulate the following research hypotheses:
14Erev and colleagues have recently conducted a similar investigation on the role of gentle
rule of enforcement on driving speed. Here the Planning-Ongoing Gap shows that the ma-
jority of drivers that usually exhibit reckless behavior agree to install an IVDR (‘In Vehicle
Data Recorder’ or ‘Green Box’) that punishes them when speed is excessive.
15This prediction is mainly based on results presented by Schurr, Rodensky, and Erev
(2014b). In their experiments participants sequentially face 100 lotteries (this means the
repetition of 100 trials): in the planning condition, they are asked to plan in advance how
many of the 100 lotteries they would play for money; in the ongoing condition, at each
trial participants are asked whether they want to play the current lottery for money or
without money. Therefore, in this setting, planning affects all the trials and subjects have
no possibility of (even just partially) changing their plans. To build a decision setting closer to
reality, in our experiment planning simply reduces subjects’ decision room for some periods:
decisions taken in advance are expected to affect participants’ behavior, but they do not
prevent either tax-compliance or tax-evasion. After choosing the condition, subjects are still
free to decide about their income declaration: indeed, it is difficult to find real situations in
which taxpayers can commit in advance to tax-compliance for a certain number of periods
Despite the difference between our experiment and that proposed by Schurr, Rodensky,
and Erev (2014b), it is plausible to assume that the Planning-Ongoing Gap plays a role in
affecting taxpayers’ behavior (even in the case of a ‘partial’ commitment).
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H1a - Ceteris paribus, a higher proportion of taxpayers adopt the compliance
mechanism in planning than under ongoing decisions.
H1b - Under planning, the reduction of evasion temptation is not sufficient to
induce the majority of taxpayers to adopt the commitment.
H2 - Under planning, the adoption of the commitment mechanism helps tax-
payers to stick with their compliance plans.
H3 - Overall, compliance is higher when people are asked to plan their future
decisions and to adopt a long-lasting compliance system.
Finally, we also expect that the widespread tax compliance due to the
long-lasting mechanism leads to higher tax revenues (in spite of the discount
on tax liability).
H4 - Despite the higher commitment rate (hence the higher exploitation of the
tax discount), a larger amount of tax is collected in the Planning than
in the Ongoing treatment.
4.5 Results
Section 4.5.1 introduces a statistical descriptive analysis of participants’ deci-
sions where our main hypotheses on the relevance of the Planning-Ongoing
Gap in taxpayers’ behavior are supported by our findings. Section 4.5.2
presents the application of a binomial regression model (with mixed effects
taking into account the presence of repeated measurements).
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Main Results
Subjects do not show relevant differences in terms of risk preferences across
treatments. These are elicited by means of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
(Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). We checked for the presence of outliers in our
samples and observed that subjects collected on average 42 boxes (s.d. =
14.481) in the Planning treatment and 48 boxes in both the Ongoing treat-
ment (s.d. = 11.459) and in the Control treatment (s.d. = 11.115). A slight
difference in average risk preferences exists (as in standard deviations), but it
does not seem plausible to assume that all our results are explained only by
subjects’ risk attitudes because we also observed a low correlation (0.30) be-
tween treatments and risk preferences. Following the classification by Crosetto
and Filippin (2013), the cumulative distribution of choices shows 50% of risk
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averse subjects (less than 50 boxes collected), 15% of risk neutral subjects (50
boxes collected), and 35% of risk seekers (more than 50 boxes collected).16
From a first comparison between the Planning and the Ongoing treatment,
a difference in subjects’ commitment rate emerges: participants opt for the
Commitment condition more frequently in the former. The average commit-
ment rate17 is equal to 0.56 (s.d. = 0.317) in the Planning treatment and to
0.40 (s.d. = 0.335) in the Ongoing treatment. This difference is statistically
significant across subjects (WRT: p− value = 0.029).18
Figure 4.4 shows the average commitment rate and displays a clear, im-
mediate comparison between the two treatments. In the first 50 periods the
difference is highly significant, while in the last 10 periods we observe a de-
crease in the distance. However, this fact may be explained mainly by a decline
in the commitment rate in the Planning treatment rather than an increase in
the Ongoing treatment, which tends to be quite steady over the entire exper-
imental sessions.
Since this is not the specific purpose of the present study, future research
can address this interesting issue and investigate how to make the attractive-
ness of the commitment more stable over time and avoid subjects’ boredome.
Similar evidence did emerge in some pilot experimental sessions we ran over
100 (instead of 60) rounds where we observed a similar decrease but at a
later stage. For this reason, and thanks to subjects’ instruction comprehen-
sion checks (see Footnote 12), we are able to exclude slow exploration and
learning as determinants of the initial high commitment rate in the Planning
treatment.
Result 1a - Taxpayers who are offered the option of a system (with tax discount)
having effect just on their immediate compliance decision are less willing
to adopt this system compared to those who are offered the same option
but with a longer effect.
Figure 4.4 also allows for comparison between the Planning and the Con-
trol treatment where the average commitment rate is 0.16 (s.d. = 0.151). As
expected, participants adopt the system more frequently in the Planning treat-
ment (WRT: p−value < 0.001): a commitment that involves only an advance
tax payment is not as attractive as one also offering a discount on tax liability
16Results are in line with Crosetto and Filippin (2013): their cumulative distribution of
choices reports 52.1% of risk averse subjects, 14.7% risk neutral subjects and 33.2% risk
seekers.
17The average commitment rate is computed as the mean of the individual average rates.
18All tests are two-sided, if not specified. WRT stands for Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.
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even if the decrease in evasion attractiveness is the same. Given the specific
structure of the commitment of the Planning treatment, it seems possible to
conclude that taxpayers who are asked to evaluate compliance decisions in ad-
vance are less willing to evade. It follows that they recognize the importance
of compliance and tend to choose the condition under which the safe option is
more profitable. On the contrary, the commitment is not widely adopted if it
does not produce any difference other than a reduction in evasion temptation.
Result 1b - The number of taxpayers opting for the commitment mechanism is sys-
tematically higher when a discount on tax liability is involved. Only a few
of them are explicitly driven by the need to manage self-control problems.
Figure 4.4: Average Commitment Rate over Time
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Apart from commitment adoption, what is relevant for the investigation
of taxpayers’ behavior is how actual compliance is affected by planning. Fig-
ure 4.5 shows how compliance rate varies according to the selected condition:
by analyzing individual average behavior over the 60 rounds in the Planning
treatment, taxpayers choosing the Commitment (C) condition systematically
comply more (WRT: p− value < 0.001) than those choosing the No Commit-
ment (NC) condition.
For the sake of completeness, Table 4.2 and Figure 4.5 report all treat-
ments. However, while the analysis of the Planning and the Control treatment
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Table 4.2: Compliance Relative Frequency
Mean Median St. Dev.
(self) Control Treatment No commitment 0.402 0.4 0.075
Commitment 0.665 0.667 0.245
Planning Treatment No commitment 0.383 0.360 0.142
Commitment 0.757 0.740 0.102
Ongoing Treatment No commitment 0.215 0.216 0.081
Commitment 0.949 1 0.062
is useful to understand whether the adoption of the commitment is actually
correlated with a higher compliance rate, the same investigation for the On-
going treatment is relevant only to verify subjects’ comprehension of the tax-
payment mechanism. In the Ongoing treatment, it is reasonable to assume
that the taxpayers’ commitment adoption strictly depends on their immediate
intention to pay taxes in that specific period. Indeed, no long-term evalua-
tion is required. Thus, the proportion of people complying under Condition
C is higher in the Ongoing than in the Planning treatment. But this fact
needs to be interpreted together with evidence on the commitment rate where
the relative frequency of commitment selection in the Ongoing treatment is
systematically lower than in the Planning treatment.
Table 4.2 also shows a significant difference in individual compliance rates
across conditions in the Control treatment (WRT: p − value < 0.001). This
may indicate that some sophisticated taxpayers use the commitment to reduce
evasion temptation but the compliance rate under the commitment is higher
in the Planning treatment. Nevertheless, as depicted in Figure 4.4, the relative
frequency of commitment adoption is very low (or even negligible in the end).
Result 2 - Taxpayers who adopt the long-lasting commitment actually comply more
than those who do not adopt it.
This can be interpreted as a confirmation of Result 1a: subjects who seem
to be willing to pay tax when evaluating and planning their decisions in ad-
vance actually comply. Although the commitment requires the automatic
payment of half tax and leaves room for ongoing evasion, the great majority
of taxpayers stuck with their compliance plan even if they could be tempted
to evade.
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Figure 4.5: Compliance Rate across Conditions
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Considering what has been observed so far, it is reasonable to assume
that taxpayers comply more on average in the Planning than in the Ongoing
treatment. A direct comparison of compliance rates across treatments, with
no distinction regarding the condition, can help verify this. Figure 4.6 shows
that, on average, compliance is equal to 0.588 (s.d. = 0.247) in the Planning
treatment and to 0.50 (s.d. = 0.248) in the Ongoing treatment. As expected,
individual average compliance rates are higher in the Planning treatment (one-
tailed WRT: p− value < 0.1).
Result 3 - Regardless of the commitment adoption, the compliance rate is higher
when taxpayers are asked to plan their future behavior and offered a
long-lasting commitment mechanism.
Despite the decrease in commitment adoption observed at the end of the
Planning treatment, the difference between these two treatments is significant
with respect to both condition selection and actual compliance. Such a dis-
tinction is necessary since in the present experiment subjects can pay tax in
both conditions: on the one hand, the commitment adoption simply repre-
sents a choice room reduction (people can evade less but they are still free to
evade); on the other hand, not opting for the commitment does not prevent
from compliance.
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Similarly, when considering the Control treatment (mean = 0.441; s.d. =
0.223), compliance in the Planning treatment is significantly higher (WRT:
p − value < 0.01). This is in line with the low commitment rate observed in
the Control treatment.
Figure 4.6: Average Compliance across treatments
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Result 3 does not necessarily imply that the amount of collected tax is
higher in the Planning than in the other two treatments. The analysis of the
compliance rate is not sufficient to determine which treatment is characterized
by the highest amount of paid tax. The majority of subjects who comply
in the Planning treatment adopt the Commitment, which has the positive
effect of fostering compliance, but also the negative effect (from the point of
view of the government) of offering a discount to taxpayers. Figure 4.7 shows
that in Planning much more tax has been systematically collected (WRT:
p− value < 0.001):19 the average of (per-capita) collected tax is 163.36 in the
Planning treatment but 139.635 in the Ongoing treatment. This proves how
important the automatic payment of the commitment mechanism is: although
the difference in individual average compliance across treatments seems to be
quite small (Figure 4.5), the amount of collected tax is higher in the Planning
treatment. However, a decline in tax compliance in the Planning treatment is
also seen here.
19We performed the test on the average levels of tax paid over the session. We found a
significant difference both between Planning and Ongoing and between Planning and Control.
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Finally, the average is equal to 140.305 in the Control treatment where the
introduction of the discount on tax liability increases tax revenues.
Figure 4.7: Average (per capita) collected tax over time
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Result 4 - Not only do taxpayers comply more in the Planning than in the Ongoing
treatment, and they also pay a higher amount of tax.
In spite of the widespread exploitation of the discount in the Planning
treatment, we observe an overall increase in collected tax: the discount is
more than compensated by the high compliance in the Planning treatment.
4.5.2 Regression Analysis
Table 4.3 describes determinants of taxpayers’ behavior by drawing a compar-
ison between the Planning and the Ongoing treatment while Table 4.4 focuses
on the Control and the Planning treatment. A Logit Model is adopted because
the dependent variable is compliance (1 = full compliance; 0 = full evasion)
and we introduce Mixed Effects to check for repeated decisions.
Model (1a) analyzes the main treatment effects on taxpayers’ behavior.
That subjects comply more in the Planning than in the Ongoing treatment
and that commitment and compliance are positively correlated is confirmed.
Then, in line with previous results, the Commitment-Planning interaction
term has a negative impact on compliance: the very few subjects committing
in the Ongoing treatment almost always comply.
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Table 4.3: Regression analysis - Planning vs. Ongoing.
Compliance
(1a) (1b) (1c)
Commitment 4.869 (0.244)∗∗∗ 4.907 (0.254)∗∗∗ 4.917 (0.254)∗∗∗
PlanningTreatment 1.479 (0.367)∗∗∗ 1.478 (0.377)∗∗∗ 1.360 (0.376)∗∗∗
BRET − − −0.016 (0.010)
Male − − 0.283 (0.385)
Economics − − −0.704 (0.414)∗
Audit−1 − −0.699 (0.128)∗∗∗ −0.698 (0.128)∗∗∗
Audit−2 − −0.689 (0.127)∗∗∗ −0.687 (0.127)∗∗∗
Commitment&Planning −3.725 (0.277)∗∗∗ −3.701 (0.284)∗∗∗ −3.726 (0.288)∗∗∗
Audit−1&Audit−2 − 1.302 (0.284)∗∗∗ 1.302 (0.284)∗∗∗
Constant −1.591 (0.262)∗∗∗ −1.375 (0.272)∗∗∗ −0.454 (0.525)
Log Likelihood −1677.6 −1584.0 −1579.7
Observations 3840 3712 3712
Num. groups: ID 64 64 64
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.1
As for the comparison between the (self) Control and the Planning treat-
ment (see Table 4.4), Model (2a) analyzes the role of the discount: when the
adoption of the commitment makes compliance more attractive (and not only
evasion less profitable), the probability of paying tax is significantly higher.
Table 4.4: Regression analysis - Planning vs. (self) Control.
Compliance
(2a) (2b) (2c)
Discount 0.775 (0.323)∗∗ 0.825 (0.342)∗∗ 0.592 (0.081)∗
BRET − − −0.019 (0.009)∗∗
Male − − 0.193 (0.339)
Economics − − −0.408 (0.344)
Audit−1 − −1.154 (0.110)∗∗∗ −1.154 (0.110)∗∗∗
Audit−2 − −0.726 (0.106)∗∗∗ −0.726 (0.106)∗∗∗
Audit−1&Audit−2 − 1.066 (0.235)∗∗∗ 1.069 (0.235)∗∗∗
Constant −0.251 (0.224) 0.038 (0.239) 1.156 (0.557)
Log Likelihood −2333.4 −2175.5 −2172.1
Observations 3960 3828 3828
Num. groups: ID 66 66 66
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.1
Model (1b) and Model (2b) introduce fiscal investigations as possible de-
terminants of compliance. According to the literature of tax experiments with
a repeated measure design, an increase in tax evasion is expected immedi-
ately after an audit.20 This is the so-called bomb crater effect (Mittone, 2006;
Kastlunger et al., 2009; DeBacker et al., 2015; Mittone, Panebianco, and San-
toro, 2016) and it is confirmed by our results: the probability of observing
compliance decreases if a subject has been audited in the previous period (i.e.
if the dummy variable Auditt−1 is equal to 1). In addition, these models also
20In the Ongoing treatment, audits are expected to produce a similar effect also on the
commitment rate: as shown in Table 4.2, almost any subject willing to evade decides not to
adopt the commitment.
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report how compliance in period t is affected not only by an audit in period
t-1, but also in t-2. Results confirm an increase in tax evasion if one audit
is recent: the coefficient of both Auditt−1 and Auditt−2 are significantly neg-
ative.21 However, the interaction term has a positive impact on compliance:
this implies that if subjects are audited both in period t-1 and in period t-2,
then the probability compliance is not necessarily reduced as in the case of a
single investigation, either in period t-1 or in period t-2. Therefore, subjects
who are audited only once during the previous two rounds tend to underesti-
mate the probability of observing an immediate new audit whereas those who
have experienced two sequential investigations recognize the likelihood of re-
peated audits.22 This result (as well as the bomb crater effect) is in line with
the ‘Black Swan Effect’ suggested by Taleb (2007). Subjects do not perceive
each round as completely independent from the others and for this reason they
try to infer the likelihood of audit sequences by relying on limited and recent
information. When a sequence of small feedback-based decisions is involved,
and subjects perceive audits as non-frequent (or even rare), then the average
tax-evasion rate is quite high especially immediately after a fiscal investiga-
tion. Subjects underweight the probability of experiencing many sequential
audits. However, when the audit is not perceived as rare (e.g. because it
has been experienced in the previous two rounds), then average tax evasion
is reduced with respect to the other case. During the experimental session,
subjects make decisions by experiencing (and thus by learning) patterns of
outcomes. This fact supports our hypothesis that participants decisions may
be affected by probability weighting.
Finally, Model (1c) and Model (2c) add control variables: gender is never
significant; the dummy variable representing the enrollment in Economics
courses shows that these students tend to comply less but only in Model (1c).
For risk preferences,23 risk seeking is negatively correlated with compliance in
Model (2c).
4.6 Conclusions
We experimentally explore how taxpayers’ decisions are affected by evaluating
decision problems in advance and by planning actions. Results confirm the
21Although the regression without the interaction term Auditt−1&Auditt−2 is not reported
for the sake of exposition, it confirms the bomb-crater effect.
22With this respect, it might be useful to recall the echo effect, identified by Guala and
Mittone (2005), and studied (in terms of the effect produced by different audit schemes) by
Kastlunger et al. (2009).
23The variable BRET is determined as the number of boxes a subject collected: the higher
the value of such variable, the higher the degree of risk-seeking.
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existence of a Planning-Ongoing Gap in taxpayers’ behavior and the need of
a compliance mechanism: ex-ante evaluation induces the majority of people
to adopt a long-lasting commitment (when compliance is more profitable)
which, in turn, fosters tax compliance. In the case of ongoing decision-making,
however, we find a less frequent adoption of the (short-term) commitment
and a significantly lower rate of compliance which suggests that taxpayers
perceived evasion as less risky.
Taxpayers (in their ex-ante evaluation) show preferences for compliance
perceiving evasion as too risky but not exclusively as they expect possible
inconsistencies between their planned and ongoing decisions (sophistication).
Unsurprisingly the majority of subjects choose the commitment because it
ensures a more profitable compliance. Only a few of them seem to predict
that they will be tempted to evade in their ongoing decisions. When planning,
they are frightened by evasion and thus opt for the condition that ensures the
most beneficial compliance. Only a small proportion of our pool chose the
commitment to reduce temptation. In addition, the compliance rate under
commitment is lower in the Control treatment (where sophisticated subjects
are supposed to commit) than in the Planning treatment.
On the basis of this experimental and empirical analysis, it would be in-
teresting to investigate both the effect of a different timing on decisions and
the effect of diverse incentives for the adoption of the commitment mecha-
nism. In our experiment, the implemented incentive is the introduction of a
discount on due tax; nevertheless, also the implementation of a reduction in
the audit probability in return for certain declaration could be investigated.
Our results could provide the basis for field explorations as investigations on
the Planning-Ongoing Gap could shed new light on and help reshape current
fiscal policies.
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4.7 Appendix A - Experimental instructions
[This is a translated version (originally in Italian) of the instructions used
for the experimental sessions. Instructions change according to the treatment.
This will be indicated in the text.
As indicated in the general instructions, both the first and the second part
of the experiment start only once every subject has correctly answered a brief
comprehension test. We report the questions for each part at the end of the
instructions.]
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome.
Thank you for coming. You are going to take part in an experiment on
economic decisions. For arriving on time, you will receive 3 Euros at the end
of the experiment.
Now you will be given instructions for the experiment. Please read them
carefully. If you have any doubts, raise your hand and a member of the
experimental staff will come and answer your question.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to the other partici-
pants. If you disturb your colleagues or use the computer for activities not
strictly related to the experiment, you will be excluded from the experiment
and any reward. You can trust that what happens during the experiment is
in line with the following instructions.
All participants will have the same role and they will not interact with
each other.
The experiment consists of two parts.
You will be given two minutes to read the instructions about the first part.
They will be then read aloud by a staff member; you will be asked to answer
a few simple questions to check the instructions have been understood.
The first part of the experiment starts now.
At the end of this part, you will have five minutes to read the instructions
on the second part of the experiment. Once again, the instructions will be read
aloud and you will be asked to answer few simple questions on comprehension.
Then, the second part starts.
At the end, a brief questionnaire is administered and you will be informed
of your reward. During the experiment, ECU (Experimental Currency Units)
will be used as your earnings. At the end of the experimental session, the
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ECUs you have earned are converted into Euros to determine your real payoff
(1000 ECU = 0.25 Euros).
INSTRUCTIONS: FIRST PART
100 boxes appear on your screen. In one of them, there is a bomb; each of
the other 99 boxes contains 50 ECU. You do not know where the bomb is but
you know that it might be in any of the 100 boxes with the same probability.
For this part of the experiment, you are asked to select all the boxes you
like. You will earn 50 ECU for each box (without the bomb) you collect. To
select a box, you can simply click on it. Selection does not imply immediate
opening: you will discover the actual content (ECU or bomb) of your boxes
only at the end of the experiment (that is, after the second part). If you select
the box containing the bomb, then everything you have collected is destroyed
and you will earn 0 ECU for this first part of the experiment.
After collecting all the boxes you like, select the STOP button. This
completes the first part of the experiment.
[Here we include the comprehension test administered before the first ex-
perimental part starts. The order is randomized.]
1. How many ECU are there inside a box (without bomb)?
• 20 ECU
• 10 ECU
• 50 ECU
2. How many boxes have a bomb inside?
• Every box contains a bomb
• No box contains a bomb
• Only one box contains a bomb
3. Imagine you have collected a certain number of boxes. At the end of
the experiment, you discover that one of these boxes contains the bomb.
How much do you earn?
• It depends on the number of collected boxes (50 ECU per box)
• 0 ECU
4. Imagine you have collected a certain number of boxes. At the end of the
experiment, you discover that none of these boxes contains the bomb.
How much do you earn?
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• It depends on the number of collected boxes (50 ECU per box)
• 0 ECU
INSTRUCTIONS: SECOND PART
Common to all treatments
This part of the experiment will last for 60 periods. You are asked to
make sequential decisions and after each period you will be given feedback. In
every period, you can earn a certain amount of ECU. Your per-period earnings
do not depend on the ECU you get in other periods and your final payoff is
determined as the sum of all the ECU you have earned during the first and
the second part of the experiment. You will be informed of such a payoff at
the end of the experimental session.
Imagine you are a self-employed worker. For 60 consecutive periods you
will be asked to declare your income (for taxation purpose). At the beginning
of every period, you will be informed about the amount of your income and
the corresponding amount of tax. The tax rate is equal to 30% and it does not
change during the experimental session but your income will vary slightly every
10 rounds. In every period, you will be asked to make a decision regarding
your declaration. You can decide whether to declare your income (i.e. whether
to pay your tax) or not.
Control and Planning Treatment
Every 10 periods (i.e. in periods 1, 11, 21, 31, 41, and 51) you will have the
opportunity to select the condition under which you will subsequently decide
about your income declaration in the following 10 periods. Therefore, the
condition you select will last for 10 periods: you will first choose the condition
(at the beginning of a series of 10 periods) and then, in each period, you will
have to decide whether to declare all your income or none of it.
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Ongoing Treatment
In each period, you will be asked to make two decisions. At the begin-
ning of every period, you will have the opportunity to select (first decision)
the condition under which you will subsequently decide about your income
declaration (second decision) in that period.
Common to all treatments
Here is a detailed description of the two conditions. This will be help you
to select the one you prefer.
Condition N - If you choose this condition, then you are free to decide
whether to declare your income. However, remember that in every period you
can be audited by the Tax Authority with a probability of 20%. If you are
found guilty of no declaration, you will be fined. If you declare your income,
your final amount of ECU for that period is determined as your after-tax
income. However, if you do not declare your income, the final amount of ECU
for that period will depend not only on your decision but also on the possibility
of being audited and fined. Hence, your round payoff will either be equal to
your income in case of no audit or equal to your income minus the fine.
Condition C - If you choose this condition, then you are free to decide
whether to declare your income. However, if you choose this condition, half
of your tax is automatically paid at the beginning of the period before you
can decide about your income declaration. In every round, you can then only
decide whether to pay the remaining part of your tax.
Control Treatment
In this condition, you can also be audited and fined with a probability of
20%. If you declare your income, your final amount of ECU for that period is
determined as your after-tax income.
Planning and Ongoing Treatment
Thanks to this automatic payment, the Tax Authority offers you a discount
on the remaining half of tax. Such a reduction is computed as 10% of the total
amount of tax due. In this condition, you can also be audited and fined with
a probability of 20%. If you declare your income, your final amount of ECU
for that period is determined as your after (discounted) tax income.
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Common to all treatments
If you do not declare your income and you are not audited, the final amount
of ECU will be equal to your income minus the part of tax that has been
automatically paid at the beginning of the period. Otherwise, if you are
audited, your payoff will be equal to your income minus the fine (paid tax
is deducted from the fine).
Control and Planning Treatments
To summarize: every 10 periods you are asked to select the condition you
prefer for the following 10 rounds. Then in each of the 10 periods, you will
have to decide whether to declare your income under the condition you have
previously selected. From the beginning condition-selection round, you will
be given all the information you might need to make your choice.
At the end of every period, you will receive feedback.
Ongoing Treatment
To summarize: in every period you will be asked first to select the condi-
tion you prefer and then to decide whether to declare your income under the
condition you have previously selected for that period. From the beginning of
each round (i.e. in the condition-selection screen), you will be given all the
information you might need to make your choice.
At the end of every period, you will receive feedback.
[Here we include the comprehension test administered before the first exper-
imental part starts. The order is randomized. Answers vary according to the
treatment. Subjects are given questions 5-7 and either question 8 or question
9, and either question 10 or question 11 (in a randomized way).]
1. How many times do you choose between Condition N and Condition C?
• At the beginning of every period
• Only once, at the beginning of this second part of the experiment
• 6 times
2. What is the frequency of income change?
• Income change occurs every period
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• Income change occurs every ten periods
3. Under both conditions, what is the probability of being investigated by
the fiscal authority in a given period?
• It depends on what has happened in the previous periods
• 20%
4. Imagine your income is 2,000 and you choose Condition C (50% of due
tax is paid). How many ECU do you get if then you also declare the
rest?
• 1,400 ECU
• 1,460 ECU
5. Imagine your income is 2,000 and you choose Condition C (50% of due
tax is paid). How many ECU do you get if you then do not declare the
rest and you are not audited?
• 1,700 ECU
• 2,000 ECU
6. Imagine your income is 2,000 and you choose Condition N (no tax paid in
advance). How many ECU do you get if then you declare your income?
• 1,400 ECU
• 1,460 ECU
7. Imagine your income is 2,000 and you choose Condition N (no tax paid
in advance). How many ECU do you get if you then do not declare the
rest and you are not audited?
• 1,700 ECU
• 2,000 ECU
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4.8 Appendix B - Breakdown of the experiment
FIRST PART - RISK PREFERENCES ELICITATION
For the BRET task, participants are shown 100 boxes and they are told
that each box (apart from the one with the bomb) contains 50 UMS. They can
collect all the boxes they like (without immediately discovering what is inside
each box) and then move on to the second part of the experiment. At the end,
they are told whether the bomb is among the boxes they have collected: if so,
they get no reward for the BRET because the bomb destroys everything. If
the bomb is not present, they are given an amount of UMS, which depends on
the number of boxes they have previously collected.
Figure 4.8: Bomb Risk Elicitation Task - Screenshot
SECOND PART - CONDITION SELECTION
In the following screens, subjects receive any relevant information they
might need to make a choice. For each of the two conditions, they know the
amount of due tax (discount included for Condition C if applicable), the fee,
and final earnings in the case of evasion and no audit. No complex computa-
tions are required as subjects can draw a direct comparison between the two
conditions.
At the beginning of rounds 1,11,21,31,41, and 51 in the Control treatment,
the following condition-selection screen is displayed.
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Figure 4.9: Condition Selection Screen - Control Treatment
At the beginning of rounds 1,11,21,31,41, and 51 in the Planning treatment,
the following condition-selection screen is displayed.
Figure 4.10: Condition Selection Screen - Planning Treat-
ment
At the beginning of each period in the Ongoing treatment, the following
condition-selection screen is displayed.
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Figure 4.11: Condition Selection Screen - Ongoing Treat-
ment
THIRD PART - TAX PAYMENT DECISION
At this stage, subjects know the amount of tax (discount included for
Condition C if applicable), the after tax income, and final earnings in the case
of evasion. No complex computations are required to decide whether to send
the income declaration.
If the No Commitment (N) condition is selected, the following screen is
displayed.
Figure 4.12: No Commitment - Tax Payment Screen
If the Commitment (C) condition is selected in the Control treatment, the
following screen is displayed.
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Figure 4.13: Commitment in the Control Treatment - Tax
Payment Screen
If the Commitment (C) condition is selected either in the Planning or in
the Ongoing treatment, the following screen is displayed.
Figure 4.14: Commitment in the Planning and in the Ongo-
ing Treatment - Tax Payment Screen
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Concluding Remarks
This thesis mainly adds to the literature on Decision from Experience (DfE),
defined in Chapter 1. By means of an experimental approach, it investigates
the effect of experience not considered as history but as a source of information
acquisition on human behavior in the field of decision-making under risk. In
line with previous evidence, this research shows that reliance on experience
affects people’s probability estimation and weighting (description-experience
gap). This leads to decisions that differ from those induced by a full knowledge
of true outcome distributions. As reported in Chapter 2, in a simplified system
of delegated choices (either medical or financial, for instance), the effect of the
learning modality on the extent of risk-taking and efficiency varies according
to the role of the decision-maker (principal vs. agent). In addition, the source
of knowledge has a systematic impact on principals’ expectations on agents’
decisions, and therefore on their willingness to delegate.
Some related phenomena are described in Chapter 3, which provides not
only a methodological analysis of external validity of laboratory experiments,
but also an overview of behavioral anomalies such as the bomb crater effect
and the echo effect identified in the field of tax research, and strictly linked
to the effect of experience on probability estimation and weighting. Chap-
ter 4 focuses on an experimental investigation of the planning-ongoing gap
in the context of tax evasion, and tests the introduction of a gentle enforce-
ment system that relies on people’s probability weighting in order to sustain
compliance.
This last section summarizes the main findings of the thesis, provides an
overview of the possible implications, and suggests potential extensions for
further research.
Overview: Main Findings and Future Research
Chpater 2 is a novel contribution to the literature on decision-making under
risk: it provides an analysis of the impact that different information acquiring
modalities have on risk-taking and decision efficiency in the context of dele-
gation. The literature on decision-making under risk investigates how people
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choose in different information acquiring situations (description vs. experi-
ence), and how the extent of risk-taking varies when a three-party agency
dilemma is involved - i.e., when decision are made by either principals (recip-
ients) or agents. Nevertheless, the two strands have never been combined: in
this sense, the present paper can be considered as a first step towards briding
this gap. In addition, it also investigates the problem from delegating agents’
viewpoint, by eliciting people’s willingness to delegate risky decisions.
Specifically, we replicate in the laboratory two learning modes. Under de-
scription decision-makers receive full information on the main features of the
given problem; therefore, this can be regarded as a situation in which people
have previously undertaken a formal training. According to the other modal-
ity, decision-makers can acquire information from personally experiencing over
time similar problems, without having a solid background of knowledge. In
such a framework, the main goal of the research is the investigation of how
risk-taking and delegation decisions are affected by the way in which principals
and agents gain their expertise on the problem. We find that, irrespective of
the learning modality, principals’ decisions are more ambitious and efficient;
this is more evident under description, as learning from experience impairs
both principals’ and agents’ decision efficiency. As a matter of fact, informa-
tion acquired from experience is more likely to be incomplete and therefore
inaccurate and misleading. Such an incompleteness can be balanced only by
exerting a substantial effort in information gathering: the longer experience is,
the closer the decision problem gets to the one presented under description. In
this respect, we observe that only principals tend to adapt their effort extent
to the complexity of the problem; in contrast, agents’ lack of effort contributes
to determine the poor quality of their portfolios.
Hence, it is evident that Chapter 2 does not focus on the motives for
delegation, such as the potential difference in expertise between agents and
principals. We provide no information on agents’ expertise and competences,
and agents receive no monetary incetives for their decision efficiency. In line
with this, in every treatment, we observe a highly positive willingness to pay
not to delagate: principals seem to predict agents’ lack of effort and poor
performance; apparently, they do not expect agents to have a higher expertise.
In turn, agents might predict principals’ unwillingness to delegate, and make
less efficient decisions. To control for this, a future extension of the present
research may include the manipulation of agents’ competences: this would
allow the investigation of the effect produced by differences in expertise on
delegation decisions. In addition, we can explicitly elicit principals’ beliefs on
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agents’ effort and performance, instead of simply inferring them by relying on
principals’ bids to avoid delegation. Simmetrically, we can elicit agents’ beliefs
on principals’ preference for delegation.
Given the focus of our investigation, we also experimentally rule out the
delegation motif related to the trade-off between the monetary cost of dele-
gation and the time consumption that self decision-making requires. In fact,
irrespective of principals’ delegation preference, all participants are asked to
build the portfolios. In general, even if principals have the chance of mini-
mizing the time they devote to the building process through blind prospect
selection, they bear some psychological costs, and, at the end of each part
of the experiment, are willing to pay to retain their portfolios. In addition,
as in such a structure principals not only build their own portfolios, but also
have the chance to pay not to delegate, agents might feel less responsible for
their choices, as they predict principals’ preference for delegation avoidance.
In this respect, an interesting future treatment might be characterized by the
removal of principals’ opportunity to decide about delegation. This would in-
duce agents to feel more responsible, as their choices actually affect principals’
final monetary well-being.
The role of experience as a learning modality is further investigated in
Chpater 3 and Chapter 4, which however address the problem of probability-
related choice anomalies in the field of tax compliance. In fact, a closer look
at such a field provides an interesting analysis of specific aspects of taxpayers’
decision process involving both objective and subjective probabilities. In this
framework, Chapter 3 has a twin role. On the one hand, Section 3.1 and 3.2
contain a literature review on tax compliance, with a specific focus on the the
effect of probability estimation and weighting on compliance decisions. On
the other hand, a novel methodological analysis on the use of tax laboratory
experiments is provided.
Hence, we introduce the rational choice model developed by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972); then, we include experimental evidence on the effect of un-
certainty and experience on taxpayers’ decisions (e.g., Friedland, 1982; Spicer
and Thomas, 1982; Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992a; Alm, McClelland, and
Schulze, 1992; Hessing et al., 1992; Sheffrin and Triest, 1992; Scholz and Pin-
ney, 1995; Mittone, 2006; Kastlunger et al., 2009). In this respect, we refer
back to Guala and Mittone (2005): in their analysis of tax compliance, they
provide examples of common biases emerging in probabilistic reasoning. Lab-
oratory findings suggest the necessity of taking into account subjects’ prob-
ability estimation and weighting when modeling taxpayers’ decision process
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(Mittone, 1997). To the purpose of gaining a better comprehension of people’s
tax choices, laboratory experiments can play a fundamental role. According
to Guala and Mittone (2005), experiments can be considered as mediators
between theoretical models and the intended domain of application, as they
allow experimenters to fully control and manipulate an artificial environment
in which real people’s behavior is observed. Nevertheless, since experiments
are usually required to tackle and balance the internal and external validity
issues, they might not be able to completely bridge the gap between the target
and the theoretical model. For this reason, as suggested by Guala and Mittone
(2005), experiments might be intended to discover new empirical phenomena,
such as psychological effects, biases, or heuristics. In doing so, experiments
may contribute to the creation of a library of phenomena, and thus discover
new facts useful from a policy viewpoint. Among these pheomena, the bomb
crater effect an the echo effect can be named: laboratory findings ahow that,
in contrast to Bayesian updating, people’s probabilistic reasoning is biased by
previous experience. In spite of knowing the objective probability of fiscal
investigations, taxpayers seem to evaluate or weight such a probability ac-
cording to their experience, and rely on this in order to make their compliance
decisions.
Building on this, Chapter 3 provides a novel extension of the mediation
approach proposed by Guala and Mittone (2005): agent-based simulations are
presented as a useful tool, intended to help experiments bridge the gap between
theoretical models and and the real domain of application. Precisely, human-
calibration of artificial agents is suggested as one of the possible realizations
of the synergic use of laboratory experiments and computer simulations. Ex-
perimental investigations might contribute to the identification of specific and
isolated economic and psychological phenomena, but they cannot control for
all the cognitive drivers involved in the tax decision process. For this reason,
as in the case of probabilistic biases, laboratory evidence might lack external
validity, and need to be further tested for policy potentially relevant implica-
tions. This can be achieved by means of agent-based simulations, which can
provide valuable insights of cognitive nature, by validating laboratory find-
ings, and helping understand complex cognitive processes. In addition to this,
simulations allow the combination of micro- and macro-level factors actually
interacting outside the laboratory and determining people’s compliance: cog-
nitive drivers can be investigated in a population of interacting heterogeneous
taxpayers.
Nevertheless, the synergic approach proposed in Chapter 3 can be further
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developed, so that the realism and the potential of the mediator role of exper-
iments between theoretical models and the intended domain of application is
increased. Agents’ features can be manipulated in order to take into account
the effect of metadata: population heterogeneity can be built on taxpayers’
past experience, age, and culture. To this purpose, not only collected empirical
and experimental evidence can be combined and used for a better calibration of
agents, but also the laboratory simultaneous interaction between human sub-
jects and artificial agents can be implemented. This would allow researchers
to draw interesting and externally valid inferences on people’s behavior, which
is first experimentally investigated and observed outside the walls of the lab-
oratory, and subsequently tested in a rather realistic context by means of a
more complex computer-based simulation.
Such a combined approach might be applied also to the experimental find-
ings of the laboratory investigation described in Chapter 4. As a matter of
fact, this chapter deals with the effect of probability weighting on compli-
ance decisions, and aims to test and suggest the adoption of an enforcement
system built upon emerging human reasoning biases. Agent-based simula-
tions may help understand the potential of our findings, and identify different
decision contexts to which they can be applied. Chapter 4 starts from the
robust experimental evidence on the existence of a substantial gap between
how people make decisions from description versus experience. On the one
hand, Prospect Theory is in general adopted with non-trivial choice problems
on monetary gambles that explicitly describe outcomes and associated proba-
bilities. Experimental investigations reveal that people’s decisions are driven
by a probability weighting function, according to which small probabilities are
generally overweighted. On the other hand, Decision from Experience is char-
acterized by repeated decisions, and lack of prior information on payoff and
probability distributions. Decision makers have to rely on their experience,
that is on the partial information they collect during their iterated choices
or trials. Because of the structural features of DfE, its experimental applica-
tion shows that low probabilities are underweighted with respect to objective
probabilities.
Similarly, experimental studies have identified a difference between plan-
ning and ongoing decisions: when asked to plan their actions, people often
overweight events with small probabilities; while in ongoing - i.e. real time,
and, in general, repeated - decisions, they tend to underweight these events,
and, thus, to behave as if they ignored them. The planning-ongoing gap has
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been documented in a variety of decision contexts, for instance related to com-
pliance with safety rules in the workplace. Although workers are aware of the
likelihood of accidents, and thus of the importance of rules compliance, they
actually tend not to obey safety rules, as if they underestimated the probabil-
ity of accidents. In such a context, the understanding of the planning-ongoing
gap can be used to enhance safety: it is possible to build an enformcement
system on the fact that workers, when asked to plan and think about the
relevant risks in their workplace, state they are willing to behave safely.
Building on this, in Chapter 4 we argue that such a problem of rules viola-
tion has a structural similarity to the problem of tax evasion. Many taxpayers,
such as retailers or taxi drivers, face very frequent tax payment decisions: in
their ongoing decisions, i.e., everytime they sell a good or a service, they can
decide whether to declare the transaction and give a proof of payment to their
customers. Everytime they opt for not printing the receipt, they incurr the
risk of being investigated and found non compliant. Nevertheless, according
to the planning-ongoing gap, it is reasonable to expect that taxpayers are less
willing to evade, for instance when asked to evaluate the value of compliance
at the beginning of the business year. Like in the case of workers evaluating
relevant risks in their workplace, we experimentally test the availability of a
system of partial commitment, and observe a discrepancy between taxpayers’
plans about income declaration and their actual behavior. Taxpayers are re-
quested to make sequential income declaration decisions; to do this, they are
offered the possibility to commit to automatically pay half of the period due
taxes in return for a discount on the taxes computed on the remaining part of
income they can decide whether to declare. In the Planning Treatment, the
commitment lasts for 10 rounds; in the Ongoing Treatment, the commitment
needs to be adopted every round in order to be valid. In line with previous
experimental results, we find that policy tools aimed to sustain compliance
should take into account the planning-ongoing gap. In fact, the long lasting
effect of the commitment in the Planning Treatment invloves an ex-ante eval-
uation of the risky decision problem: this helps foster compliance, by inducing
the majority of participants to overweight the risk associated to evasion and,
interestingly, stick with their compliance plans.
In the light of this, as suggested in Chapter 3, both macroeconomic behav-
ioral styles, and microeconomic behavioral regularities emerging in this labo-
ratory experiment (such as the bomb crater effect) can be used to calibrate
computational agents. This would allow us not only to comprehend psycho-
logical drivers determining the gap in taxpayers’ behavior, but also to check
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the robustness of our policy results. Specifically, thanks to an agent-based
simulation, it would be possible to test and manipulate a variety of factors,
and observe long-run effects on compliance. In fact, as shown in Chapter 4,
the attractiveness of the planned commitment tends to decrease over time
(see Figure 4.4); in this respect, a simulation-based investigation can help un-
derstand how to make the commitment adoption more stable and therefore
sustain compliance also in the long run. Furthermore, the implementation of
computational models also allow the study of the effect of a different timing
on decisions, in terms of a different planning time span, and the effect of a
diverse incentive in return for the adoption of the commitment mechanism. In
our experiment, we only considered the introduction of a discount on due tax;
nevertheless, also a reduction in the audit probability can be implemented.
Finally, we can investigate to what extent our laboratory results can be ap-
plied to a variety of contexts - such as the one of sector studies - in order to
effectively foster compliance.
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